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2 Chapter 1. Introduction and Overview
1.1 Overview
The experimental approach has gained tremendous attention and importance in
economic research over the last decades (Heckman and Smith, 1995; Harrison
and List, 2004; Falk and Heckman, 2009; Levitt and List, 2009; Banerjee and Du-
flo, 2010; Viceisza, 2016). Its rise in popularity is tightly connected with its suit-
ability to establish causality in a credible way (Viceisza, 2016). Experiments are
conducted to test theories or new interventions, to estimate the size of a possible
impact of an intervention or to elicit characteristics. They thus contribute to sci-
entific advance, stimulate new research and inform policy1 (Falk and Heckman,
2009; Levitt and List, 2009; Viceisza, 2016).
This dissertation presents four independent papers that advance experimental
methods and test theories on saving using experimentally elicited characteristics.
The first two papers test two behavioral theories on precautionary saving
based on the characteristics loss aversion and prudence by using a combination
of survey data and experimental measures of these preferences from a sample
of poor households in Bogota. In that context, the second paper presents a new
method to elicit risk preferences with their intensities. The last two papers make
a methodological contribution to binary and multiple treatment group assign-
ment in experiments by presenting a new theoretically derived method with a
simulation study and a software implementation for its convenient application.
1.2 Testing Theories on Precautionary Saving Using
Experimental Measures
Uninsured risk is a cause of poverty, since without insurance, shocks can result
in poverty (Dercon, 2010). One prevalent risk for many people, especially in low-
income urban areas in Latin America, is income risk due to unemployment, as
informality levels are high and formal working contracts are rather an exception
(Loayza, Servén, and Sugawara, 2009). Saving is a risk coping strategy that is
available even in absence of or with only restricted access to insurance or credit
markets (Dercon, 1996, 2010); a setting often found in developing contexts. Yet,
in low-income economies, the propensity to save is only about half as large as in
high-income economies (World Bank, 2014). This is additionally consequential,
since the lack of accumulated capital may lead people to apply risk management
1. Even for educational purposes, experiments have been used (McPeak, Chantarat, and Mude,
2010).
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strategies such as engaging in low-risk low-return projects, which implies per-
manently low incomes: People are stuck in a poverty trap (Dercon, 1996). Thus,
a failure in saving can result in vulnerability to poverty.
The first two papers address this issue by advancing our understanding of
how individual preferences may affect the saving process. These insights may be
used for policy interventions to increase the saving rate among those that would
benefit from it, namely the poor and those exposed to otherwise uninsured risks.
Income Risk, Precautionary Saving, and Loss Aversion - An Empirical Test
This first paper is joint work with Marcela Ibañez and studies the empirical and
theoretical connection between loss aversion, income uncertainty and saving.
More specifically, we investigate predictions derived from the theoretical frame-
work of Kőszegi and Rabin (2009) with a sample of the poor population in Bogota,
Colombia, where loss aversion is elicited experimentally.
Kőszegi and Rabin (2009) derive from their model of reference-dependent
consumption—which bases on prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979)—
that loss-averse individuals increase their savings as a response to income uncer-
tainty. According to their model, for loss-averse individuals, the disutility from
lowering consumption is larger than the utility from increasing consumption by
the same amount relative to the expected level. As a result, uncertainty induces
a precautionary saving motive, since for a higher level of saving, the decrease
in consumption relative to the expected level connected with a negative income
shock is lower and thus its impact is mitigated. We extend the analysis in Kőszegi
and Rabin (2009) with respect to the degree of loss aversion and derive the hy-
pothesis that the just explained increase in savings is larger, the larger the degree
of loss aversion.
We test these hypotheses with a sample of the low-income population in Bo-
gota, Colombia, as this group is exposed to informality and would profit from in-
terventions to increase savings as outlined above. We apply different definitions
of loss aversion to experimentally elicited utility points on the individual level
using the procedure proposed by Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt, and Paraschiv (2007).
Data on saving figures and household characteristics is obtained from a survey
with the same population and income uncertainty is measured as the official un-
employment rate or aggregated self-reported unemployment risk in the area an
individual is living in.
We advance the literature by empirically and theoretically investigating the re-
lation between loss aversion and saving in presence of income uncertainty, using
individual and incentivized measures of loss aversion. In particular, our study
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is the first to test the loss-aversion based precautionary savings motive proposed
by Kőszegi and Rabin (2009).
We find a substantially lower proportion of loss-averse individuals in our
sample compared with student samples. The empirical analysis is consistent with
the predictions of the model by indicating that income uncertainty is related to an
increase in savings for loss-averse individuals. This precautionary motive for sav-
ing increases with the degree of uncertainty. Moreover, the stronger the degree
of loss aversion, the higher the savings. These findings establish that the relation
between loss aversion and saving can be positive and is thus more complex than
previously assumed.
The findings in this chapter base on correlations, however, and with the data
used, causality cannot be established without any doubt. Future research could
fill this gap with the use of panel data or a lab-experiment. Moreover, the role of
loss aversion with respect to saving deserves more attention.
A possible intervention to increase savings using the insights of this chapter
could illustrate potential ‘losses’ connected with income shocks, for example by
picturing a loss in the standard of living. Moreover, the uncertainty of income in
informal settings could be highlighted.
Higher Order Risk: An Application To Savings of the Poor in Bogota
This chapter, which is joint work with Marcela Ibañez and Gerhard Riener, inves-
tigates the relationship between prudence, income uncertainty and saving. Pru-
dence can be defined as the preference to accept risk at higher levels of wealth
instead of lower levels of wealth.
Extending the work by Leland (1968), we show that—in addition to prudent
risk-averse individuals—also prudent risk-loving individuals react to income un-
certainty by increasing their saving rate proportionally to the degrees of income
uncertainty and prudence. Previously, this precautionary motive for saving was
established also for prudent risk-loving individuals (Crainich, Eeckhoudt, and
Trannoy, 2013), but leading to the prediction that they would save their whole in-
come as a reaction to income uncertainty. Moreover, we show that the measure of
intensity of prudence advocated for by Crainich and Eeckhoudt (2008)—which is
independent of risk aversion—can directly be linked to this precautionary motive
for savings, whereas the commonly used measure by Kimball (1990) can only be
used to indicate the degree of prudence for risk-averse individuals.
To test the predictions generated by this model, we present a new experi-
mental method to elicit higher order risk preferences. This method uses a non-
parametric estimation of the utility function using P-splines to connect utility
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points that are elicited with the procedure proposed by Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt,
and Paraschiv (2007). By its non-parametric nature, it is flexible enough to reflect
any combination of risk preferences that is observed empirically. This method
allows the computation of the abovementioned, theoretically derived measures
of the intensities of prudence and risk aversion, which is a novelty.
We apply this method to measure prudence in a low-income sample from
Bogota, Colombia. Income uncertainty is measured by working sector dynamics
as expressed in the ratio of closed to existing businesses in Bogota in 2013. This
rate of firm closures of the working sector an individual usually is working in is
assigned as individual income risk. Savings and other household characteristics
are obtained from a survey with the same sample.
We find comparable results to earlier studies with respect to the classification
of individuals as prudent or imprudent among a sample of poor households in
Bogota. In addition, the results strongly support the theoretical prediction that
uncertainty leads to increases in savings for prudent individuals—even when we
pool risk-averse and risk-seeking individuals, which supports our extension.
It would be fruitful to see a comparison of our proposed method for the
elicitation of prudence with the conventionally applied methods that base on
risk-apportionment tasks with compound lotteries as introduced by Deck and
Schlesinger (2010). Moreover, it would be interesting to investigate the predic-
tions from our model in a laboratory experiment to establish causality and con-
firm the findings in this chapter. Lastly, it could be interesting to empirically
compare the prudence-based precautionary motive for saving with the one that
relies on loss aversion as in the first paper of this dissertation.
The results obtained in this paper suggest that the population group under
study lacks alternative options to smooth consumption. Thus, one policy im-
plication of this research is to provide consumption smoothing devices at an af-
fordable cost without introducing an additional risk of indebtedness. Moreover,
pension or saving campaigns might stress the uncertain nature of income and
make the use of saving salient by illustrating that risk in a state of higher wealth
is less consequential than when wealth is low.
1.3 A New Method for Binary and Multiple Treatment
Assignment
A striking drawback of field experiments are their costs and the difficulty of
implementation (Deaton, 2010; Al-Ubaydli and List, 2015; Viceisza, 2016). One
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of the difficulties in implementation that directly affects costs is connected with
treatment assignment. For example, when assigning cluster to treatment groups
using a matching approach, the drop-out of one single cluster from the exper-
iment may leave the whole study underpowered and an effect that otherwise
could have been found might not be verified anymore. Similarly, when units have
to be assigned to multiple treatment groups, pure randomization might lead to
some groups in which desired characteristics are not present at all. This is disad-
vantageous if the experiment’s purpose lies in studying heterogeneous treatment
effects connected with the missing characteristics.
Moreover, comparable experimental groups, which can be obtained through
appropriate treatment assignment, are credited for allowing an efficient estima-
tion of average treatment effects (Kallus, forthcoming (2017)). A failure in assign-
ing units such that treatment groups are comparable might thus result in addi-
tional costs in terms of an increased sample size that is necessary to detect a given
treatment effect.
Unbalanced treatment groups are also a threat to the validity of the outcome of
any experiment—in the lab or in the field (Fisher, 1935). An experiment might on
average yield the true result when performing random treatment assignment, but
any given single realization might lead to wrong conclusions. This is of particu-
lar interest with the increasing attention on replicability of experiments (Camerer
et al., 2016). The last two papers of this dissertation address these issues by pro-
viding a solution to the mentioned problems.
The min Mean Squared Error Treatment Assignment Method
The third paper of this dissertation is joint work with Martin Schlather. We
present a new approach to treatment assignment in (field) experiments for the
case of one or multiple treatment groups. This procedure—which we call the min-
imizing Mean Squared Error (MSE) Treatment Assignment method—uses sample
characteristics to obtain balanced treatment groups and is particularly suited for
multiple treatment assignment or when attrition might be a concern. The infor-
mation used for treatment assignment can be multivariate, continuous and may
consist of any number of variables.
We implement the idea for conducting treatment assignment of Kasy (2016),
allowing for randomness and using a frequentist approach, thereby increasing its
applicability by eliminating the need of specifying any parameter value. More-
over, as we show, this leads to ‘more equal groups’ as compared to the suggested
implementation in Kasy (2016). We present a way to extend this method to as-
sign multiple treatment groups, making the min MSE approach the first one to
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rely on a theoretically-derived decision statistic allowing for multiple treatment
assignment.
We show theoretical properties of this method and compare it to competing
mechanisms theoretically and by virtue of simulations. In the simulation study,
our proposed procedure performs better than, or at least comparably to, com-
peting approaches, such as matching. Furthermore, the min MSE approach is
attrition tolerant, offers greater flexibility and is very fast. It can conveniently
be implemented and aims at balancing a generalized second moment of the co-
variate distribution of the treatment groups, which is important whenever the
treatment effect differs across individuals (and is a function of covariates).
A possible limitation is that p-values from conventional t-tests might not be
adequate as the distribution of covariates can in general not be assumed to be
normal. This is the case in many settings, such as in experiments with a small
sample size or even when performing randomization several times until the re-
sult is satisfactory. It would therefore be of great interest to see a software im-
plementation for the computation of exact p-values resulting from a permutation
test, sometimes referred to as Fisher’s exact test, as this might make the analysis
more convenient.
A clear recommendation from the simulation study is that purely random
treatment assignment should be avoided if information is available that is likely
to affect the treatment, as group means in baseline variables in treatment and
control groups might differ considerably in any given realization of treatment
assignment.
Software for min MSE Treatment Assignment
The last chapter presents a software implementation of the min MSE Treatment
Assignment mechanism derived in the third paper for the statistical software
Stata and explains its usage.
Although most scholars might agree that controlled treatment assignment
should be preferred to completely random treatment assignment, in practice,
applying a sophisticated method is often timely and complicated. For multiple
treatment assignment—to our knowledge—no software implementation of any
sophisticated or theory-based approach is available.
This gap is filled by the min MSE ado-package for Stata. It implements the min
MSE Treatment Assignment procedure for one and multiple treatment groups as
derived in the third paper using the stochastic simulated annealing algorithm
(Kirkpatrick, Gelatt, and Vecchi, 1983). When implementing an experiment, re-
searchers can use this software to conveniently assign subjects to one or multiple
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treatment groups based on observed pre-treatment characteristics with a single
command before treatment is executed. This method is particularly suited for
treatment assignment in the field, as it is very fast compared to several compet-
ing methods for binary treatment assignment. The created treatment groups are
balanced across multiple dimensions and, within the model laid out in the third
paper, the mean squared error of the estimator for the conditional average treat-
ment effect is minimized.
The min MSE ado-package is also suited for rebalancing to preserve the sam-
ple’s balance, for example in case an intervention is implemented on several days
and attrition has happened on the first day(s). With the same function, sequential
treatment allocation may be realized.
Chapter 2
Income Risk, Precautionary Saving,
and Loss Aversion: An Empirical Test
This chapter is joint work with Marcela Ibañez. We thank Sonia Triviño Muné-
var, Lukas Hermann and Tatiana Orozco Garcia for research assistance.
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2.1 Introduction
Income shocks, such as unemployment, diseases or natural disasters, are perva-
sive in developing countries (World Bank, 2013). Due to limitations in access
to credit markets and weak social protection systems, saving is one of the few
alternatives that households have to mitigate the effect of income shocks (Der-
con, 2010). However, saving rates are quite low in developing countries (World
Bank, 2014). Hence, from a policy perspective it is important to understand which
factors influence savings. This paper contributes to answering this question by
investigating the impact of uncertainty and loss aversion on savings.
Our conceptual framework is based on Kőszegi and Rabin’s (2009) reference-
dependent model of intertemporal consumption. Building on prospect theory
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), this model assumes that deviations in consump-
tion from previous expectations induce a gain-loss sensation. When individuals
are loss averse, bad news about consumption changes are more unpleasant than
good news are pleasant. The prospective loss from lowering expected future con-
sumption generates a precautionary savings motive. Individuals who are loss
averse save to decrease the impact of any given wealth shock on future consump-
tion utility. The larger the frequency and magnitude of the shocks and the larger
the degree of loss aversion, the more individuals save.
To empirically test the above hypotheses, we take as a case study the low-
income population in Bogota, Colombia. Similar to comparable population groups
in other developing countries, this population is exposed to substantial uncer-
tainty and is highly vulnerable to poverty (Loayza, Servén, and Sugawara, 2009).
The unemployment rate is relatively high and a large share of the population de-
pends on informal employment or works as domestic employees; naturally, the
savings are quite low for this population. Among our sample of low-income in-
dividuals, we find that more than 80 percent do not have any savings while 75
percent report having a day-by-day financial plan. The problem of a low saving
rate is even more worrisome given that less than 10 percent of the low-income
population has access to a pension in the old age (Aguila, Attanasio, and Quin-
tanilla, 2010).
To inform policy makers about the obstacles that this population group faces
in saving, we launched an independent study on the financial situation of low-
income households in Bogota, Colombia in 2013. The study comprised the survey
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entitled ‘Savings for old age in Colombia’ and complementary experimental mea-
sures of risk and time preferences for the same group of individuals. This survey
allows us to estimate the total value of households’ assets as well as households’
perceived unemployment risk. The risk experiment is based on the experimen-
tal design by Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt, and Paraschiv (2007) and aims at obtaining
individual estimates of loss aversion and risk attitudes. This method has the ad-
vantage that it provides flexibility in estimating the utility function for both gains
and losses, while also correcting for probability weighting. Nonetheless, it is easy
for participants to understand as it is based on comparisons of binary lotteries.
In line with Kőszegi and Rabin’s (2009) hypothesis, we find that loss-averse
individuals increase savings when they are exposed to greater uncertainty. This
finding is robust to different measures of loss aversion and income uncertainty, to
the inclusion of controls on a large set of socioeconomic characteristics and to dif-
ferent econometric specifications. The novelty of this result is that it demonstrates
that the relationship between loss aversion and savings is more complex than
previously proposed. While previous studies have considered that loss aversion
creates an obstacle for savings (e.g. Thaler and Benartzi, 2004), our study shows
that in the presence of uncertainty, loss aversion leads to an increase in savings.
The larger the degree of loss aversion, the larger is the increase in savings.
Bowman, Minehart, and Rabin’s (1999) theoretical model predicts that because
of loss aversion there is an asymmetric response to learning about certain fu-
ture income shocks on savings—i.e. good news regarding future income leads
to an immediate upward adjustment in consumption, reducing the possibility of
future consumption growth. Bad news results in less than proportional adjust-
ments of consumption, leading to a larger decrease in future consumption when
the shock is realized. Empirical evidence supports this hypothesis. Using macro
data, Shea (1995) and Bowman, Minehart, and Rabin (1999), showed that con-
sumption changed more in response to anticipated positive income shocks than
in response to anticipated negative shocks. Using microdata, Fisher and Mon-
talto (2011) find that there is an asymmetric effect of positive and negative income
shocks on savings. In particular, unusually low income decreased savings more
than unusually high income increased them.
We make various contributions to the literature on this topic. First, this is—
to the best of our knowledge—the first paper to empirically test the precaution-
ary savings motive predicted by the reference-dependent model of intertemporal
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consumption by Kőszegi and Rabin (2009). Second, unlike previous studies, we
use a direct and incentivized measure of loss aversion at the individual level.
Hence, we contribute to this research by explicitly considering the impact of loss
aversion on savings. Third, we consider the impact of income risk that is resolved
in the future, and hence, do not consider the asymmetric response of savings to
certain future income shocks as predicted by the model of Bowman, Minehart,
and Rabin (1999). Last, we propose a new measure to capture uncertainty about
future income by considering the effect of unemployment.
Our paper also addresses the literature considering behavioral approaches to
increase the savings rate among the poor (for a comprehensive overview of the
research on saving among the poor see Karlan, Ratan, and Zinman, 2014). In
particular, a couple of interventions have considered the effect of loss aversion
on savings. One of the most well known interventions is Thaler and Benartzi’s
(2004) ‘SMarT (Save More TomorrowTM) Program’. Considering that due to loss
aversion, individuals would perceive saving a portion of their current income as a
loss of income, this program proposes to make saving decisions on future income
increases. Karlan et al. (2016) compares the effectiveness of reminders that are
framed as a loss (“your dreams won’t come true”) versus as a gain (“your dreams
will come true”) and find no significant effects of the loss versus the gain frame
on a household’s savings rate. However, they do not consider heterogeneous
effects of the degree of loss aversion. We contribute to this literature, exploring
the relationship between uncertainty, loss aversion and savings. This research
could suggest alternative interventions to increase savings.
This paper is structured as follows. The next section presents the model of in-
tertemporal consumption by Kőszegi and Rabin (2009) from which the hypothe-
ses of the study are derived. Section 2.3 explains the empirical strategy used to
test the predictions of this model and Section 2.4 explains how the different mea-
sures were obained. Results are presented in Section 2.5 and the approaches and
findings of the paper are discussed in Section 2.6. Section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 Theoretical Framework
The conceptual framework that we use in the analysis is based on the reference-
dependent utility model of intertemporal consumption by Kőszegi and Rabin
(2009). First, we introduce this model and derive the precautionary motive for
saving as presented in their paper. In a second step, we extend the analysis
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in Kőszegi and Rabin (2009) using this model to derive hypotheses relating the
strength of the precautionary saving motive with the degree of loss aversion.
2.2.1 Kőszegi and Rabin (2009): Model of Consumption and Sav-
ing
The model considers a two-period consumption-savings decision problem where
individuals face uncertainty regarding their future wealth. Here, we only present
the model for the case in which wealth,W , is is a binary random variable and and
uncertainty is resolved in the second period.1 With equal probabilities, wealth
takes two possible values: W0 + s and W0 − s, where W0 is deterministic income
and s > 0 a scalar, reflecting income uncertainty.2
An individual has to divide wealth W between consumption ct in two periods,
t = 1, 2, maximizing the sum of instantaneous utility in the first period and the
expected instantaneous utility in t=2:
U = u1(c1) + E[u2(c2)],
subject to the budget constraint c1 + c2 = W .
In the first period, there is not uncertainty on income and instantaneous utility
is given by
u1(c1) = m(c1),
where m is the utility of consumption that is assumed to be three times differen-
tiable, increasing and strictly concave.3
The expected instantaneous utility in the second period, E[u2(c2)], depends on
the expected utility of consumption in that period and on the so-called ‘gain-
loss utility’. The ‘gain-loss utility’ reflects utility gains or losses due to changes
in ‘beliefs’ about consumption levels after uncertainty is resolved compared to
1. In Appendix A.1.1, we present the two-period model for a more general case.
2. Results generalize to non-binary random income; see the corresponding Proposition 8 in
Kőszegi and Rabin (2009), as well as the Proposition and its Corollary in this study, for more
general results.
3. We abstract from overconsumption and assume that a deviation in period 1 from the ex-ante
optimal plan cannot increase the assessment of the overall utility in period 1, see Proposition 5 in
Kőszegi and Rabin (2009).
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the ‘beliefs’ before uncertainty was resolved.4 If new beliefs imply a higher con-
sumption level than previously planned, this results in a utility gain. On the other
hand, if consumption according to new beliefs is lower than previously planned,
the feeling of a loss lowers utility. Following Kahneman and Tversky (1979), it is
assumed that individuals weight losses relative to the believed level of consump-
tion by a factor λ that captures the degree of loss aversion. For an individual who
is loss averse, we have λ > 1, whereas for a gain-seeking individual, λ < 1.
























where m is the utility of consumption as defined above, c+2 = W0 − c1 + s and
c−2 = W0 − c1 − s. If income is high (i.e. if W = W0 + s), which occurs with
probability 1/2, there is a gain in utility from changes in beliefs, as the individual
had planned a lower consumption level (c−2 ) with probability 1/2; this change is
weighted by η > 0. Contrarily, if income is low, there is a loss in utility since the
agent had planned a higher consumption level (c+2 ), again with probability 1/2;
this change is weighted by η > 0 and λ > 0 to account for loss-averse (λ > 1) or
gain-seeking (λ < 1) behavior.5











η(λ− 1)[m′(c−2 )−m′(c+2 )]. (2.1)
To see whether or not m′(c1) increases when uncertainty s increases (then c1
decreases if m is strictly concave), we apply a Taylor approximation of the right
4. Beliefs result from ‘credible consumption plans’ that specify possibly stochastic consump-
tion levels for each period, which the agent forms before the first period starts. ’Credible’ plans
only feature consumption levels, from which the individual would not deviate later on. Details
on this concept are given in Appendix A.1.2 or in Kőszegi and Rabin (2009).
5. The assumption of putting a higher weight on utility below the reference point, hence as-
suming loss aversion (i.e. λ > 1), is common in reference-dependent models. Kőszegi and Rabin
(2009) call it the “clearly correct assumption”, although empirical studies could not exclusively
validate this assumption (e.g. Schmidt and Traub, 2002). Therefore, we only assume λ > 0 and
allow for ‘gain-seeking’ behavior. See Appendix A.1.1 for further details.
6. See equation (10) in Kőszegi and Rabin (2009).
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hand side of (2.1) around s = 0 to find7








From this derivation, we see that for a loss-averse individual (i.e. when λ > 1),
uncertainty causes an increase in savings as consumption decreases in period 1
when m′′′ > 0 or the last term dominates the second term in (2.2). The first con-
dition corresponds to the classical theory of precautionary saving, as initiated by
Leland (1968), where ‘prudence’, defined as the preference for allocating a zero-
mean risk to a state of higher wealth instead of to a state of lower wealth, causes
the individual to save. The latter condition is, according to Kőszegi and Rabin
(2009), “technically speaking” true only for a small amount of risk. They argue,
however, thatm is a global utility function and therefore a small risk in the model
can still be substantial in “practical terms”. Using this interpretation of small
risks, and generalizing to cases where second-period income has more than just
two realizations and where people might overconsume in the first period, we can
derive the first hypothesis from this model.8
Hypothesis 1. With loss aversion, the effect of uncertainty on savings is unambiguously
positive.
2.2.2 The Effect of the Degree of Loss Aversion in the Two-period
Model by Kőszegi and Rabin (2009)
We now extend the analysis in Kőszegi and Rabin (2009) regarding the degree
of loss aversion. From both, (2.1) and (2.2), we see that savings increases in the
degree of loss aversion.9 This finding can be generalized to non-binary income
risk and individuals overconsuming in the first period; the latter case is linked
to a parameter γ ≥ 0 in this more general framework (Appendix A.1.1), where
an individual increases consumption in the first period relative to the ex-ante
optimal level if γ < 1/λ; see Appendix A.1.1 for further details.
Similarly to Kőszegi and Rabin (2009), we call a ‘personal preferred equilib-
rium’ the preferred plan among those that are credible before the first period
starts.
7. See equation (11) in Kőszegi and Rabin (2009).
8. See Proposition 8 in Kőszegi and Rabin (2009).
9. Although this effect is independent of the amount of risk on the right-hand side of (2.2), we
have to keep in mind that this expression is a Taylor approximation around s = 0. Thus it is a
good approximation only for small amounts of risk. Although the first-order condition (2.1) holds
independent of the amount of risk, technically, for large amounts of risk, it cannot be certain that
this condition yields a utility maximum. For small amounts of risk, however, the second-order
condition for a utility maximum is satisfied.
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Proposition 1. Suppose wealth is equal toW0+sy, where y is a non-deterministic mean-
zero lottery that is resolved in period 2. For any increasing, strictly concave, three times
differentiable consumption utility function m, any η > 0, λ > 0, γ ≥ 0 and s small and
positive, the personal preferred equilibrium consumption rule satisfies dc1/dλ < 0.
The proof of Proposition 1 is in Appendix A.1.3. From this proposition, we
derive the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2. With income uncertainty, the effect of the degree of loss aversion on sav-
ings is unambiguously positive. This also includes coefficients of loss aversion λ ≤ 1.
Irrespective of Hypotheses 1 and 2 being true, i.e. the degree of loss aversion or
uncertainty for loss-averse individuals having a positive effect on savings, from
(2.1) and (2.2), we see that the effect of loss aversion on saving increases in uncer-
tainty and that the effect of uncertainty on saving increases in loss aversion. As
expected, this result generalizes to non-binary income lotteries and individuals
overconsuming in the first period:
Corollary 1. Suppose wealth is as specified in Proposition 1. For any increasing, strictly
concave, three times differentiable consumption utility function m and any η > 0, λ > 0,
γ ≥ 0, the personal preferred equilibrium consumption rule satisfies d2c1/(dsdλ)|s=0 < 0.
From Corollary 1 and following the interpretation of small risks by Kőszegi
and Rabin (2009), we can derive the third hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3. The effect of the degree of loss aversion is an increasing function of un-
certainty. Equivalently, the effect of uncertainty is an increasing function of the degree of
loss aversion. As in Hypothesis 2, this also includes coefficients of loss aversion λ ≤ 1.
2.3 Empirical Strategy
We want to test the hypotheses derived from Kőszegi and Rabin’s (2009) model
and investigate the relationship between income uncertainty, loss aversion and
the joint effect of both on the individual level of savings using individual mea-
sures of savings, uncertainty and loss aversion.
Hypothesis 1 To test Hypothesis 1, i.e. if the effect of income uncertainty on the
saving decision for loss averse individuals is unambiguously positive, we run the
following regression:
Savingsi =β1si + ζXi + β0 + εi, (Model 1)
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where Savingsi is the first period income minus c1 (first period consumption), si
is the individual’s income uncertainty, Xi is a vector of socioeconomic character-
istics for individual i and εi is the error term; β1 and ζ are regression coefficients
corresponding to income uncertainty and socioeconomic characteristics, respec-
tively, and β0 is the intercept of this model.
The data would support Hypothesis 1 if β1 > 0.
Hypothesis 2 To test the second hypothesis, postulating that the higher loss
aversion, the higher saving when facing income uncertainty, we run the following
regression:
Savingsi = β2λi + ζXi + β0 + εi, (Model 2)
where λi is the degree of loss aversion of individual i with corresponding regres-
sion coefficient β2 and Savingsi, Xi, ζ , β0 and εi are defined as before. We run
this regression for the complete sample considering that this population group is
highly exposed to income uncertainty. A positive β2 would support Hypothesis 2.
Hypothesis 3 Finally, we test Hypothesis 3, claiming that the effect of uncer-
tainty on saving is an increasing function of the degree of loss aversion by esti-
mating the following equation:
Savingsi =β3(si × λi) + β1si + β2λi + ζXi + β0 + εi, (Model 3)
where β3 is the regression coefficient of the interaction term of individual loss
aversion λi and individual income uncertainty si, and Savingsi, Xi, β0, β1, β2, ζ
and εi are defined as before. Hypothesis 3 is supported if β3 > 0.
Note that we center income risk measures around mean values and loss aver-
sion around 1. Hence, β1 is the main effect of uncertainty for a loss-neutral indi-
vidual while β2 is the main effect of loss aversion estimated at a mean level of in-
come uncertainty. The theoretical model does not provide definitive predictions
on savings for loss-neutral individuals facing income risk. We report marginal
estimations following from this regression for the effects of loss aversion and
income uncertainty at different levels of income uncertainty and loss aversion,
respectively, which allows these results to be interpreted within the contexts of
Hypotheses 1 and 2.
The definitions of loss aversion, savings and income uncertainty, as well as
the methods used to estimate them are presented in Section 2.4.
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2.4 Data and Definition of Variables
The data used in the study was collected between October and November 2013
as part of the project ‘Savings for the Old Age’. The objective of the study was
to investigate the expectations of the poor population living in Bogota, Colombia
regarding their old age and their degree of preparedness for it. The study was
comprised of an extensive survey of the financial situation of the households and
incentivized economic experiments on risk and time preferences.
We conducted a two-step sampling process. First, low-income neighborhoods
were identified by assessing the proportion of people belonging to the two low-
est socioeconomic strata. Neighborhoods with a larger proportion of low-income
population, and which were assessed as safe for the team to visit, were eligible
for the study. Participants for the study were then selected from a list compro-
mised of these low-income households. Enumerators visited the randomly se-
lected households and confirmed that they belonged to the target group. If it was
not the case, enumerators visited their neighbors, assuming that they shared sim-
ilar socioeconomic characteristics. The criteria for selecting participants was that
they should be beneficiaries of the social health insurance, SISBEN. This condi-
tion would guarantee that the participants were from a low socioeconomic strata.
In total, 640 participants completed the survey and the experiment. The survey
lasted around 90 minutes. The experiment was completed at a different location
few days later and took about 20 minutes.
In the analysis, we consider the relation between savings, income risk and loss
aversion. Below, we define the measures used and explain how the variables
were calculated.
2.4.1 Savings
We measure savings as the value of an individual’s assets in the analysis. This
includes total savings in checking accounts, certificates of deposit, mutual funds,
savings in cash or in other currencies, the value deposited in savings plans (i.e.
money to buy a house or to pay for the education of their children), and the
net value of loans given. We use the sum of those categories since in cases of
emergency it is possible to withdraw money from all of these savings devices.
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2.4.2 Income Uncertainty
In the analysis, income uncertainty is measured by the unemployment rate aggre-
gated at the locality level or the neighborhood level. We use this measure since
unemployment is one of the main sources of income risk that our population
group is confronted with. In addition, unemployment is quite high in Colombia.
DANE estimated the unemployment rate at 8.64 percent in Bogota for 2013.
The advantage of this measure is that this variable can be considered to be ex-
ogenous for a single individual who cannot affect the unemployment risk. The
assumption that we use is that individuals observe when neighbors lose employ-
ment, which makes their individual risk of income loss salient.
In the analysis, we use two different sources of information to compute un-
employment figures as explained in greater detail below.
Income Uncertainty Based on Data from DANE This measure corresponds to
the unemployment rate aggregated at the locality level (Localidad in Spanish). We
use the multipurpose survey from Bogota (Encuesta Multipropósito para Bogotá) for
the source of information to construct the unemployment data at the level of lo-
cality, which was conducted by Colombia’s Statistical Department (DANE) and
the District Planning Department (SDP). The figures correspond to the 2011 un-
employment rate10 published in ‘Índices de Ciudad’ by the Secretaría de Planeación,
Alcaldía Mayor de Bogotá. The unemployment rate ranged from 6.86 percent in the
Localidad ‘Suba’ to 11.31 percent in ‘San Cristobal’.
Average Unemployment Risk Based on Survey Data All individuals that took
part in the experiment and that were working at the time of the interview an-
swered the question, “What is the probability that you will lose your job next
year”. All those stating a positive probability where asked to also answer the
question: “If you lose your job, what is the probability of finding a new one next
year?” Since the vast majority were confident of being able to find a new job
within a year in the case of unemployment, and since this new job could poten-
tially be better paid than the last one, we interpret the unemployment risk as
income uncertainty and not just as the risk of a negative income shock.
In order to reduce problems of endogeneity associated with this measure, we
use the average probability at the local planning unit, UPZ. This measure has
lower aggregation than the measure based on Localidad but a larger degree of
10. The figure coming closest to what is commonly referred to as ‘unemployment’ is the ‘Tasa de
Desocupadas’, the rate of unoccupied persons.
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aggregation than Barrios.11 Typically, a Localidad consists of several UPZ; for ex-
ample, the Localidad Suba consists of 12 UPZs.
Using the average unemployment risk has two practical advantages. First, self-
employed individuals cannot lose their job but they can be exposed to income
risk. By using averages, we can assign a level of income uncertainty that is likely
to be close to the reality of those individuals. Furthermore, the income risk an
individual is exposed to might not only be driven by his or her own income risk,
but also by the income risk their partner is exposed to as an example.
2.4.3 Loss Aversion
For the experimental elicitation of loss aversion, we used the non-parametric
method introduced by Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt, and Paraschiv (2007). This method
is based on simple lottery choices where individuals compare two lotteries over a
series of decision tasks that vary payoffs and probabilities of good and bad states
of the world. Hence, it is cognitively equally demanding as other methods, e.g.
Holt and Laury (2005). The method applied corrects for the misperception of
probability. In addition, using these choices, it estimates the utility points itera-
tively over a large range of values. The utility points can be connected to yield a
utility function over the gain and loss domain.
The advantage of this method is that it is very flexible as it does not require
any parametric assumptions over a utility function or probability weighting. Com-
peting methods mostly focus on the elicitation of preferences at just one or a few
(arbitrarily) selected points in the interval of interest (e.g. Holt and Laury, 2005;
Binswanger, 1980; Eckel and Grossman, 2002).
The definitions of loss aversion we apply build on utility functions. Following
Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt, and Paraschiv (2007), we use five different definitions of
loss aversion, as there is no agreed upon definition of loss aversion so far, and
measures differ considerably. In the general version of the model introduced
in Section 2.2, that is presented in Section A.1.1), loss aversion enters into the
instantaneous utility via the “universal gain-loss utility” µ.
Kahneman-Tversky (KT) Kahneman and Tversky (1979) define an individual
as loss averse, if for all amounts of money x the utility of receiving this amount is
lower than the disutility of losing that same amount, i.e. if ∀x > 0 : −µ(−x) > µ(x).
A natural coefficient of loss aversion emerging from this definition is−µ(−x)/µ(x)
11. UPZs with less than 25 observations were grouped with their neighboring UPZ(s).
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for every elicited amount x > 0. If µ(−x) for any of these 8 elicited amounts of
money x > 0 was not elicited, it was linearly interpolated. Then, we took the
median of these thus computed coefficients as the coefficient of loss aversion.
Neilson (N) Neilson (2002) proposes computing the ratio of ‘relative steepness’,
which is the utility value µ(x) divided by the corresponding x-value. This figure
incorporates information about steep parts of the utility function at any point of
the interval of interest—even in flat regions. If the relative steepness of the utility
function over the loss domain is bigger than the one on the gain domain at any
point, the individual is classified as loss averse, i.e. µ(−x)/x ≥ µ(y)/y, ∀x, y > 0.
For this definition, we computed the coefficient of loss aversion as the ratio of the
infinum of µ(−x)/(−x) over the supremum of µ(y)/y.
The remaining definitions rely on the steepness of the utility function as ex-
pressed by the derivative of the latter on both domains.
Wakker-Tversky (WT) Wakker and Tversky (1993) suggest to apply the con-
cept of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) to the derivative of utility, i.e. to compare
the value of the derivative of the utility function for gains and losses ‘point-wise’
at certain absolute values: µ′(−x) > µ′(x), ∀x > 0. At every elicited utility point
x > 0 on the gain domain, the derivative µ′(x) was operationalized as the mean of
the two connecting slopes to the left-hand side and to the right-hand side. µ′(−x)
was operationalized as the slope of the linearly interpolated utility function at
the point −x. Similar to the case for the definition by Kahneman and Tversky
(1979), a natural coefficient emerging from the definition µ′(−x) > µ′(x), ∀x > 0,
is µ′(−x)/µ′(x) for x > 0. In this case, we also took the median of the thus com-
puted coefficients.
Bowman (B) Bowman, Minehart, and Rabin (1999) propose to perform this
comparison ‘domain-wise’, that is µ′(−x) > µ′(y), ∀x, y > 0. As in the case for
the definition by Neilson (2002), the definition µ′(−x) > µ′(y), ∀x, y > 0 can be
transformed into a coefficient of loss aversion by computing inf µ′(−x)/ supµ′(y)
for x, y > 0, where the derivatives where operationalized as just described.
Köbberling-Wakker (KW) Finally, Köbberling and Wakker (2005) define an in-
dividual as loss averse if the slope of the utility function on the left-hand side of
the reference point is steeper than the slope of the utility function on the right-
hand side of the reference point: µ′(0−)/µ′(0+). The definition of loss aversion
µ′(0−)/µ
′(0+) was transformed into a coefficent of loss aversion by computing
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the ratio of slopes connecting 0 with the elicited utility points that are closest to 0
on both domains.
To incorporate the different definitions of loss aversion, and to ensure that our
results are independent of the exact definition of loss aversion, we compute dif-
ferent meta measures of loss aversion based on data availability. The first meta
measure is the geometric mean of the coefficients resulting from the definitions
by Neilson (2002) and Köbberling and Wakker (2005), available for all individu-
als. The second meta measure additionally includes the coefficient based on the
definition by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), which we can compute for 579 par-
ticipants of the experiment. Finally, we compute a measure relying on all five
definitions. We apply the geometric instead of the arithmetic mean, since all co-
efficients are ratios, thus centered around 1, where it is desirable that coefficients
of .5 and 2 have a mean of 1 instead of 1.25. Additionally, the geometric mean is
the adequate choice when ranges of single components differ, which is the case
for the loss aversion coefficients resulting from the different definitions.
2.4.4 Risk Preferences
The experimental data was also used to estimate risk preferences corresponding
to the curvature of consumption utility m and probability weighting that we may
use as control variables. Although in the theoretical model, m is assumed to be
a concave function, for empirical elicitation of curvature, we relax this assump-
tion. We use similar procedures as Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt, and Paraschiv (2007).
First, we re-scaled monetary amounts x to lie in the interval [−1, 1]. Second, we
rescaled the utility function such that m(−1) = −1, m(0) = 0 and m(1) = .5,
consistent with the elicitation method. Taking into account the rescaling of mon-
etary amounts and the utility, in the third step we estimate the curvature of utility,
estimating the following power utility function for the gain and loss domains:
m(x) =
{
− (−x)a for a > 0, −1 ≤ x < 0
0.5 · (x)b for b > 0, 0 ≤ x ≤ 1.
Finally, the estimated parameters, referred to as coefficients of risk aversion in
expected utility (EU) theory, are used to classify utility curvature. For x > 0, the
utility function is strictly concave if 0 < b < 1, linear if b = 1 and strictly convex
if b > 1. For x < 0 we have that the function is strictly concave if a > 1, linear if
a = 1 and strictly convex if 0 < a < 1. For more details see Appendix A.2.1.
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The experimental method proposed by Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt, and Paraschiv
(2007) also allows a non-parametric estimation of subjective probabilities. Using
this method, we estimate the objective probability corresponding to a subjective
probability of 50%.
2.4.5 Time Preferences
To elicit the near future impatience or interest rate, which we also use as control
variables, we followed the experimental design by Andersen et al. (2008). People
were asked whether they would prefer receiving an amount x in 30 days or an
amount x(1 + r/12) with r > 0 in 60 days. This question was asked for different
and increasing values of r and people normally switched from choosing x in 30
days to x(1+r/12) in 60 days for a sufficiently high r. This switching point allows
the calculation of a lower and an upper bound of the interest rate, but since people
are making choices dealing with the concept of receiving money, interpreting the
results as impatience is likely more accurate.
In addition, we let participants perform the same task with a more distant time-
framing. In that setting, participants had to choose between receiving the lower
amount in 180 days or receiving the higher amount in 210 days. This allows
us to consider consistency in intertemporal choice. We compute the difference
between interest rates or impatience for the two time frames. If people behaved
consistently, we would expect impatience to receive a monetary amount 30 days
earlier to be unaffected by the timely distance in the future. If people became
more patient, impatience in the more distant future should be lower.
2.4.6 Other Control Variables
In the empirical analysis, we also control for other covariates that have been
found to affect the likelihood of saving or the amount of savings:
• Age has been found to affect savings positively (e.g. Conley and Ryvicker,
2004; Finke, Huston, and Sharpe, 2006) but also negatively (Devaney, Anong,
and Whirl, 2007).
• Female headed households tend to accumulate less wealth (Conley and
Ryvicker, 2004) and are less likely to have longer term saving motives such
as retirement savings, instead of short term saving motives such as emer-
gency savings (Devaney, Anong, and Whirl, 2007).
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• The number of children in a household decreases the likelihood of hold-
ing assets (Sanders and Porterfield, 2010; Fisher and Montalto, 2011) and
also the amount of wealth accumulated (Conley and Ryvicker, 2004), but
not necessarily the amount of conditional investment in assets (Sanders and
Porterfield, 2010).
• Family size has been found to increase the likelihood of saving for safety
and security reasons, such as emergencies or retirement, instead of saving
for basic needs and safety reasons, respectively, in a hierarchy model of
saving motives (Devaney, Anong, and Whirl, 2007).
• Marriage and inheritance have been reported to positively affect wealth
(e.g. Conley and Ryvicker, 2004).
• Homeownership increases the odds of saving and the amount of savings
(Finke, Huston, and Sharpe, 2006; Fisher and Montalto, 2011).
• Education and income are positively associated with higher wealth (Finke,
Huston, and Sharpe, 2006; Conley and Ryvicker, 2004; Fisher and Montalto,
2011).
• Van Rooij, Lusardi, and Alessie (2012) report a positive effect of financial
literacy on accumulated savings. In the survey we asked 18 questions on
financial literacy related to topics such as interest rate, asset classes, basic
math and financial math. The variable included in the regression contains
the number of correctly answered questions.
• Interestingly, health status has been reported to have a positive influence on
the likelihood of saving (Fisher and Montalto, 2010, 2011).
• Short-term planning and saving horizons, sometimes referred to as time
preference for the present, have been found to negatively affect the like-
lihood of saving, but also net wealth (Devaney, Anong, and Whirl, 2007;
Fisher and Montalto, 2010, 2011).
• The size of the safety net according to the number of individuals available
for financial help can indicate the possibilities of households to cope with
income shocks. We expect that as more individuals have access to a safety
net, they would decrease their savings rate.
TABLE 2.1: Summary Statistics
Mean s.d. Min Max Obs.
Individual Information
Age 49.0 13.4 24 87 640
Male (=1) 0.28 0.45 0 1 640
Relationship to head of HH
Head of household (=1) 0.64 0.48 0 1 640
Partner (=1) 0.23 0.42 0 1 640
Son/Daughter or their partner (=1) 0.07 0.25 0 1 640
Other (=1) 0.06 0.24 0 1 640
Household Characteristics
Number of adult household members 2.8 1.4 1 12 640
Number of adolescent household members 1.2 1.3 0 7 640
Father still alive (=1) 0.31 0.46 0 1 640
Mother still alive (=1) 0.51 0.50 0 1 640
Exercising
Every day (=1) 0.17 0.37 0 1 640
At least once a week (=1) 0.18 0.38 0 1 640
At least once a month (=1) 0.09 0.28 0 1 640
Never or hardly ever (=1) 0.57 0.50 0 1 640
Other Health Indicators
BMI 25.7 4.3 12.9 43.0 640
Education
Highest year passed 5.8 3.3 0 11 640
Financial Literacy Score (max. 18) 9.3 3.4 0 16 640
Financial Situation of the Household
SISBEN Level 2 (=1) 0.50 0.50 0 1 640
Size of Safety Net (# persons) 2.5 3.5 0 60 640
Monthly HH income per capitaa 3.19 2.26 0.01 18.00 640
Market Price of Housea 180.10 408.86 0.00 3000.00 640
Debta 17.24 65.68 0.00 588.04 640
Savingsa 2.56 13.91 0.00 200.00 640
Engaging in saving (=1) 0.15 0.35 0 1 640
Conditional Savingsa 17.61 32.82 0.20 200.00 93
Planning Horizon
Day to day (=1) 0.74 0.44 0 1 640
Next months (=1) 0.18 0.38 0 1 640
Next year (=1) 0.05 0.21 0 1 640
Next two to five years (=1) 0.02 0.14 0 1 640
Next five to ten years (=1) 0.01 0.11 0 1 640
Note: a Figures reported in 100,000 COP.
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TABLE 2.2: Summary Statistics of Income Risk Measures
Mean s.d. Min Max Obs.
Regional Unemployment Rate (in pc) 8.5 1.7 6.9 11.3 640
Regional Unemployment Risk (in pc) 24.7 6.0 15.2 36.5 640
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Descriptive Statistics
Summary statistics are reported in Table 2.1. Participants in the study were be-
tween the ages of 24 to 87 with a mean age of 49 years. Our sample consists
of roughly 70 percent women. The education level of the sample was quite low
even in a developing context. On average, the highest educational attainment
was passing the sixth year of school. Financial literacy was also relatively low:
The average individual was able to answer roughly only half of the 18 questions
concerning, for example, simple math or interest rate related topics correctly.
Mean monthly income in an average household was 319,000 COP, which at
that time was roughly 170 USD. The poverty line at the date of the interview was
approximately 155 USD. Half of the sample was assigned to the lowest socioeco-
nomic strata according to the SISBEN classification.
Around 85 percent of the sample does not engage in saving money and the
overall mean of savings is less than the per capita household average monthly
income of 256,000 COP—approximately 130 USD. The mean savings of those who
were actually saving was around 1,761,000 COP, which corresponds to roughly
900 USD. Those reporting non-zero savings save exclusively in cash (27 percent),
in a savings account (20 percent) or exclusively for housing (34 percent). The
majority of the sample (74%) reported carrying out their financial planning on a
day by day basis and more than half of the sample never, or hardly ever, exercises,
which is reflected in a mean BMI of 25.7, corresponding to an overweight person.
Summary statistics on income uncertainty are reported in Table 2.2. Secondary
data reveals an average unemployment rate of 8.5%. This is substantially lower
than the mean perceived risk of unemployment based on subjective data (25%).
This difference can be due to a high degree of pessimism for the future or sim-
ply the commonly observed overweighting of small probabilities. The Pearson’s
correlation coefficient for the two measures of unemployment is r = 0.505 with
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TABLE 2.3: Summary Statistics of Experimental Measures
Mean s.d. Median IQR Obs.
Single Measures of Loss Aversion
Bowman (B) 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0, 0.0 564
Kahneman-Tversky (KT) 1.1 2.7 0.4 0.1, 1.1 579
Köbberling-Wakker (KW) 10.9 76.6 0.2 0.0, 1.0 640
Neilson (N) 0.2 0.5 0.0 0.0, 0.1 640
Wakker-Tversky (WT) 12.3 110.9 0.1 0.0, 0.3 564
Meta Measures of Loss Aversion
Meta Measure 1 (KW, N) 1.1 4.6 0.1 0.0, 0.4 640
Meta Measure 2 (KT, KW, N) 1.0 3.1 0.1 0.0, 0.6 579
Meta Measure 3 (all) 0.3 1.0 0.1 0.0, 0.2 509
Impatience
Near future impatience 29.6 15.2 22.0 16.0, 50.0 640
Increase in patience over time 0.3 16.3 0.9 -2.9, 0.9 640
Risk Preferences
Utility Curvature: Gain Domain 6.0 29.9 0.7 0.2, 2.5 640
Utility Curvature: Loss Domain 8.0 16.0 1.1 0.5, 3.5 640
Probability Weighting: Gain Domain 41.5 32.9 40.6 9.4, 71.9 640
Probability Weighting: Loss Domain 68.5 28.5 78.1 46.9, 96.9 640
p < .0001, which indicates a positive and large correlation according to Co-
hen’s classification (see e.g. Cohen, 1992). Since the number of Localidades is
limited, one could interpret the regional unemployment rate as an ordinal vari-
able. In that case, the more appropriate Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient is
rs = 0.4886 (p < .0001).
Experimental measures of the time and risk preferences are reported in Ta-
ble 2.3. The measure of time preference indicates the mean annual interest rate
r demanded to receive an amount x · (1 + r/12) in 60 days instead of an amount
x in 30 days. This mean annual interest rate is valued at 29.6 percent. On av-
erage, the interest rate, or mean impatience, stays approximately constant when
the timing of receiving the monetary amounts changes from 180 to 210 days, as
indicated by the increase in patience over time, expressed in percentage points.
The observed impatience is in line with estimates from recent experiments that
used the general population in Denmark, which seem best suited for compari-
son since our data also uses a general population (Harrison, Lau, and Williams,
2002). However, individual estimation of time preferences when accounting for
risk preferences is not possible with our data due to the limited amount of data
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points for a single individual. Then, our estimates are to be compared to the
estimates assuming ‘risk-neutrality’.
In Prospect Theory, the attitude towards risk can be expressed by the curva-
ture of the utility function and probability weighting. The reported measure of
utility curvature corresponds to the parameter of a power utility function, as ex-
plained in Section 2.4.4. On the gain domain, the median subject exhibits a con-
cave utility curvature, indicated by a median curvature parameter of 0.7, which
corresponds to risk aversion in expected utility theory settings. On the loss do-
main, the median curvature parameter is 1.1 and again indicates concave utility
curvature, which corresponds to slightly risk averse behavior in an expected util-
ity framework. For gains, subjects tend to overweight probabilities around 40%,
as reflected by a median value of pg = 40.6% s.th. w+(pg) = 1/2. In lotteries in-
volving losses, probabilities around pl = 80% are underweighted by the median
individual in our sample, since w−(pl) = 1/2.
It has generally been found that large probabilities are underweighted, whereas
smaller probabilities, up to around 33%, are overweighted, which results in an S-
shaped probability weighting function (e.g. Tversky and Kahneman, 1992; Camerer
and Ho, 1994; Gonzalez and Wu, 1999; Abdellaoui, 2000). Probability weighting
in our study, however, seems to be more pronounced than what has been found
in the literature with comparable methodology (e.g. Abdellaoui, 2000): Probabil-
ities around 40% for the gain domain are still overweighted in our study. Sim-
ilarly, probabilities of about 80% for the loss domain are more underweighted
than, for example, in the study by Abdellaoui (2000), who find w−(78%) = 2/3.
These probabilities were elicited for the larger outcome in a lottery in absolute
terms; therefore, these findings could be due to the optimism of the Colombian
people. With respect to utility curvature, our findings are in the range of previ-
ous results: For the gain domain, Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt, and Paraschiv (2007)
report a median coefficient of utility curvature of 0.71, although less heterogene-
ity. Others have found less pronounced curvature (Schunk and Betsch, 2006;
Booij and Kuilen, 2009). Etchart-Vincent (2004) report a median coefficient of 0.97
for the loss domain, although most reported coefficients are lower (e.g. Schunk
and Betsch, 2006; Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt, and Paraschiv, 2007; Booij and Kuilen,
2009).
Table 2.3 shows summary statistics for the different measures of loss aversion
applied in this study. For all individuals, we can compute loss aversion coef-
ficients based on the definitions by Neilson (2002) and Köbberling and Wakker
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(2005). Other definitions are more difficult to operationalize, in particular, the
ones relying on derivatives. Because some choice tasks involved stochastic dom-
inant options for some individuals, which was a result from the iterative char-
acteristic of the protocol, the number of available utility points differs. We ex-
clude choices resulting from such choice tasks from the analysis, following e.g.
Bleichrodt and Pinto (2000), who elicit probability weighting functions non-par-
ametrically with a comparable protocol. As a result, this hinders the operational-
ization of the loss aversion coefficients in some cases.
Putting the coefficients of loss aversion resulting from our experiment into con-
text with other experimental results is less straightforward, since few studies use
the same definition of loss aversion with the exception of Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt,
and Paraschiv (2007). They find higher mean and median values for all defi-
nitions.12 Other studies focusing on monetary or health outcomes have found
mean or median values between 1.43 and 4.8, relying on different definitions of
loss aversion (e.g. Fishburn and Kochenberger, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman,
1992; Bleichrodt and Pinto, 2002; Schmidt and Traub, 2002; Pennings and Smidts,
2003; Booij and Kuilen, 2009).
In summary, the coefficients of loss aversion in this study are considerably
lower than in other studies. This can be explained by a lower share of loss aver-
sion and a higher share of gain-seeking behavior in our experiment. We elabo-
rate on these characteristics in Section 2.6 and discuss how this could affect our
results.
2.5.2 Econometric Model
The outcome variable used in our analysis—savings (in 100,000 COP)—does not
include negative values and is therefore a limited dependent variable according
to the definition in Wooldridge (2013, Chapter 17). Furthermore, the empirical
frequency of zeros in the distribution of the amount of savings in our sample
12. Loss aversion coefficients based on the definitions by Bowman, Minehart, and Rabin (1999)
and Neilson (2002) have the lowest mean (0.74 and 1.07) and median values (0.74 and 0.43) in their
study, where the latter is even below 1 for both definitions. The highest value for the mean and
median they obtain for loss aversion as defined by Köbberling and Wakker (2005), with a mean of
8.27 and a standard deviation of 15. This indicates that the loss aversion coefficients below 1 are
not just the result of our sample, but are observed in other studies as well. Furthermore, and also
in our experiment, the lowest mean and median values for the loss aversion coefficients are based
on the definitions by Neilson (2002) and Bowman, Minehart, and Rabin (1999); and similarly, the
mean and median values of the coefficients based on the definition of loss aversion by Köbberling
and Wakker (2005) are amongst the highest in our experiment.
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exceeds the frequency of zeros according to any commonly used theoretical dis-
tribution in such cases (e.g. the Poisson distribution or the Negative Binomial
distribution). This is to be expected, since not everybody actually engages in sav-
ing. Thus, the outcome variable is a so-called Corner Solution Response.13
The distribution of the saving amounts in our sample is skewed, and values
are reported repeatedly and usually are divisible by 100,000 COP. Therefore, we
should assume a discrete rather than a continuous dependent variable. Given
these characteristics of the outcome variable, we apply a Negative Binomial Hur-
dle model to study the relationship between income uncertainty, loss aversion
and savings. The Poisson Hurdle model is nested in the Negative Binomial Hur-
dle model we fit, and differences between the log-likelihoods of both models
mostly exceed 100 by far. This indicates that a likelihood ratio test (conservatively
assuming the test statistic to follow a chi-square distribution with one degree of
freedom) would reject the hypothesis of no overdispersion.
This model is a so-called two-part model, where the probability of engaging
in saving and the amount of savings is estimated separately by different mod-
els. For the Hurdle models applied here, the likelihood of both equations can
be calculated separately. Using a logit-model, the probability ‘that the hurdle
is passed’ and that a person engages in saving is estimated. The second model
estimates the amount of savings once the hurdle is passed, using a Truncated
Negative Binomial model. In Appendix A.3.1, we discuss alternative models and
their suitability in this context.
Following Grogger and Carson (1991) we compute marginal effects of loss aver-
sion and uncertainty on the predicted amount of unconditional savings using the
estimates resulting from fitting Model 3 with a Negative Binomial Hurdle model.
Denoting savings for individual i with Yi, the overall marginal effect of Xih, i.e. of











13. The options to deny the response or to indicate that they did not know about the amount
of savings were allowed and treated separately. Four respondents denied answering and five
respondents did not know the amount of savings they held at the time of the interview. Together,
this corresponds to about 1% of the respondents whose savings amount we could not observe.
These cases were excluded from the analysis.
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where 1 − F (0) is the share of the population for which we observe Yi > 0. This
means the overall effect can be decomposed into two effects: The effect on those
that are saving, weighted by the probability of saving, plus the effect on the pro-
portion that ‘passes the hurdle’ and is saving, weighted by the mean amount of
savings in the saving population. We compute marginal effects using mean val-
ues of covariates, unless otherwise indicated.
2.5.3 Empirical Results
The estimated coefficients for Model 1, Model 2 and Model 3 are presented in
Table 2.4. Model 1b reports coefficients for an estimation with the loss-averse
subpopulation only. The columns labeled ‘DANE’ present the results for the mea-
sure of uncertainty based on secondary information obtained from DANE, while
the columns labeled ‘Survey’ present the results for the measure that uses survey
data. Given that Model 2 is estimated without controlling for the degree of un-
certainty, this column has no label indicating a measure of income uncertainty.
We present the results separately by the likelihood to save and the amount of
savings, given that an individual is actually saving (i.e. the intensive margin of
saving or conditional saving) for each of the models in the upper and lower panel
of Table 2.4, respectively.
The results from estimating Model 3 are presented in columns 6 and 7 labeled
‘Model 3’. We find that the likelihood to save does not depend on uncertainty but
is slightly positively correlated with loss aversion in one of the models. With re-
gard to the amount of conditional savings, we find a negative coefficient for loss
aversion for both sources of information; the coefficient is significantly different
from zero when using the survey measure for unemployment risk. As the coeffi-
cient of loss aversion is centered around 1, the coefficient of income uncertainty
shows the correlation between uncertainty and the likelihood to save or savings
for a loss-neutral agent. We find that this coefficient is positive and statistically
significant in one of the models. The coefficients of the interaction terms between
loss aversion and income uncertainty are positive and significantly different from
zero for the two measures of uncertainty that we use in the analysis.
This result supports the prediction that we derived from the model of Kőszegi
and Rabin (2009) in this respect and is consistent with Hypothesis 3. The first
result is thus:
Result 1. The relationship between uncertainty and savings is an increasing function
of the degree of loss aversion. Equivalently, the relationship between loss aversion and
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savings is an increasing function of the degree of income uncertainty. This result strongly
supports Hypothesis 3.
Estimation results of a direct test of Hypothesis 1 using Model 1 are presented
below ‘Model (1)’ and ‘Model (1b)’ in Table 2.4. The first two columns present
the results for the entire sample, while the columns labeled ’Model (1b)’ present
the results for the subpopulation of loss-averse individuals in the sample using a
subset of control variables. We find that the results partly support Hypothesis 1.
The likelihood to save is uncorrelated with uncertainty in three of the models.
Yet, uncertainty is positively related with the amount of savings, given that an
individual is actually saving. This result holds both for the complete sample and
for the subpopulation of loss-averse individuals.
In addition to the results obtained from estimating Model 1 and Model 1b, we
may use the insights from Model 3 to evaluate Hypothesis 1: The coefficients of
uncertainty resulting from estimating the likelihood to save become less negative
or even positive, but are both statistically insignificant, once we control for the
degree of loss aversion and include an interaction term of loss aversion and in-
come uncertainty (see column ‘Model 3’). The coefficients of uncertainty in the
equation modelling conditional saving are positive and statistically significant for
the survey measure.
To assess the overall effect, we compute the marginal effects (at mean values)
on the predicted amount of (unconditional) savings, resulting from estimating
Model 3. We compute these marginal effects for gain-seeking to loss-neutral be-
havior (λ = 1), moderate loss aversion (λ = 1.5) and high loss aversion (λ = 2).
Figure 2.1 displays the corresponding marginal effects of income uncertainty
on predicted total savings.14 We find that an increase in income uncertainty is al-
ways associated with an increase in total savings—independent of the degree of
loss aversion and the level of uncertainty. Furthermore, we find that the increase
associated with an increase in income uncertainty is larger, the higher uncertainty
and the higher the degree of loss aversion. Hence these results also confirm Hy-
pothesis 3. This result holds for both measures of income uncertainty. This effect
is mainly driven by an increase in conditional savings rather than by changes in
the likelihood to save.
14. The marginal effects on the intensive and extensive margin with confidence intervals are
printed in Appendix A.4, see Figure A.2.
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TABLE 2.4: Results from Estimating Model 1, Model 2 and Model 3 Using a Neg-
ative Binomial Hurdle Model and Different Measures of Income Uncertainty
Model (1) Model (1b) Model (2) Model (3)
DANE Survey DANE Survey DANE Survey
Likelihood of Saving
Uncertainty -0.052 -0.004 -0.395? -0.001 -0.041 0.025
(-0.72) (-0.18) (-1.93) (-0.01) (-0.55) (0.66)







Uncertainty 0.196? 0.057?? 0.883??? 0.130??? 0.096 0.150???
(1.89) (1.96) (3.37) (6.02) (1.12) (3.35)






AIC 1232 1231 194 195 1244 1240 1225
Controls 25 25 6 6 25 25 25
Region No Yes No No Yes No Yes
Occupation Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 640 640 97 97 640 640 640
? p < 0.1, ?? p < 0.05, ??? p < 0.01. t-values in parentheses.
Note: The dependent variable is the sum of all self-reported savings data in various
saving devices, see Section 2.4.1. In this Negative Binomial Hurdle model, the par-
ticipation equation estimates the likelihood to engage in saving money, while the
second equation estimates conditional savings—the amount of savings, given that
a person is saving money. The coefficient of loss aversion is centered at 1 and mea-
sured by a continuous and experimentally elicited meta measure, based on the def-
initions of loss aversion by Neilson (2002) and Köbberling and Wakker (2005), see
Section 2.4.3. Income uncertainty is centered at the mean and is based on different
measures, partly building on secondary data; see Section 2.4.2 for details. We control
for variables listed in Tables 2.1 and 2.3. Furthermore, we control for regional and
occupational effects at the Localidad level and for the working sectors according to
the ISIC classification of economic activities, if indicated. We account for potential
heteroskedasticity by robust standard errors.
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(a) Regional Unemployment Rate (DANE) (b) Regional Unemployment Risk (Survey)
FIGURE 2.1: Conditional Marginal Effect of Income Uncertainty on Predicted
Savings for Different Degrees of Loss Aversion
Note: Marginal effects computed according to (2.3) using mean values for remaining
covariates and estimates from fitting Model 3; see Table 2.4 for the corresponding
coefficients and Figure A.2 for the marginal effects with confidence intervals for the
intensive and extensive margins. Vertical lines indicate mean values of the corre-
sponding measure of income uncertainty. Income Uncertainty is expressed in per-
cent and the predicted increase in savings in 100,000 COP.
In terms of the magnitude of the effect, the result depends on the type of data
we use. The estimations for the secondary data imply that when the average
regional unemployment rate rises from 8.5 to 9.5 percent, for a moderately loss-
averse sample, there is an increase in the average total savings of about 10,000
COP or roughly 5 USD. This corresponds to a relatively small increase in savings
of 4 percent, which is due to the small proportion of individuals engaging in
saving money. However, when the model is estimated using survey data on the
average personal perception of unemployment risk, the predicted effect of a one
percentage point increase at the mean level of income uncertainty has an effect
that is nearly twice as large.
Summarizing, we find support for Hypothesis 1:
Result 2. An increase in income uncertainty is associated with an increase in savings.
Estimation results of a direct test of Hypothesis 2 using Model 2 are reported
in column 5 (‘Model 2’) of Table 2.4. In this specification, no measure of income
uncertainty is included, since it may be assumed that the entire sample is exposed
to income uncertainty due to a lack of a social protection system (see Section 2.3).
We deduce that an increase in loss aversion is associated with an increase in both
the likelihood to save and the amount of conditional savings.
When controlling for the degree of uncertainty, including an interaction term
between loss aversion and uncertainty (see column ’Model 3’), we see that this
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result is driven by those facing a high level of income risk. The coefficient of
loss aversion in the equation for the likelihood to save is positive and so is the
coefficient of the interaction term. However, in the equation for conditional sav-
ings, the coefficient of loss aversion is negative and significant for the survey
measure. Yet, the interaction terms are both positive and significant. The coeffi-
cients of loss aversion correspond to an average level of income uncertainty, as
uncertainty measures are centered around the mean. For an individual that is
exposed to a high income uncertainty, the effect of loss aversion on savings is
positive, as can be deduced from estimated marginal effects shown in Figure 2.2
(marginal effects on the intensive and extensive margin with confidence intervals
are printed in Figure A.3 in the Appendix). We consider different levels of income
uncertainty: The average level of income uncertainty, a high level of income un-
certainty, defined as the third quartile of the distribution of income uncertainty,
a very high and an extremely high income uncertainty corresponding to the 90%
and 95% quantile of the income uncertainty distribution. The marginal plot re-
lying on the secondary DANE data (Figure 2.2(a)) indicates a positive effect of
loss aversion on predicted savings even for average levels of income uncertainty.
Yet for the survey data (Figure 2.2(b)) the effect is negative even at a high level
of income uncertainty. For very high levels of income uncertainty, the effect is
positive. We summarize our findings with respect to Hypothesis 2:
Result 3. An increase in loss aversion is associated with an increase in savings for indi-
viduals facing a high to a very high level of income uncertainty.
2.5.4 Robustness Tests
In the literature, various definitions of loss aversion have been proposed. Yet,
it is unclear which definition of loss aversion is best and should be considered
standard (Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt, and Paraschiv, 2007). To address this issue,
we have constructed different meta measures of loss aversion compromising two
or more definitions. Our results are robust to using any of the different meta
measures of loss aversion. This increases the validity of our results in comparison
to using a single measure.
To test the robustness of our results in comparison to alternative measures of
loss aversion, we reestimate Model 2 and Model 3 using different measures of
loss aversion. Results of the estimated coefficients for Model 2 using different
definitions of loss aversion are presented in Table 2.5. Column 2 shows the results
when restricting the sample to those for which the meta measure compromised
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(a) Regional Unemployment Rate (DANE) (b) Regional Unemployment Risk (Survey)
FIGURE 2.2: Conditional Marginal Effect of Loss Aversion on Predicted Savings
for Different Levels of Uncertainty
Note: Marginal effects computed according to Equation (2.3) using mean values for
remaining covariates and estimates from fitting Model 3; see Tables 2.4 for the corre-
sponding coefficients and Figure A.3 for marginal effects with confidence intervals
for the intensive and extensive margins. The predicted increase in savings is ex-
pressed in 100,000 COP.
of three measures of loss aversion is available, and columns 3 and 5 show the
results for similarly restricted samples, in order to be able to draw comparisons
between the different meta measures of loss aversion. The results confirm our
previous findings. Independent of the measure of loss aversion, we find that
there is a significant increase in conditional savings associated with an increase
in loss aversion. Loss aversion, however, does not affect the likelihood to save
with one exception. The estimated coefficients for Model 3 using different meta
measures of loss aversion are presented in Table 2.6. Although significance levels
vary, the results are consistent with previous findings.
2.6 Discussion
Our empirical results support the predictions formulated by Kőszegi and Rabin
(2009), as well as those derived in our paper, and we do find that savings are
larger for loss-averse individuals who are exposed to income risk and that the
larger the degree of loss aversion, the larger is the amount of savings for those
exposed to income risk. This finding, however, does not unambiguously estab-
lish causality. Our intention here was to explore if asset accumulation provides
supportive evidence of the predictions of this model. Future work should, for ex-
ample, focus on establishing causal relationships through the use of panel data.
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TABLE 2.5: Results from Estimating Model 2 Using a Negative Binomial Hurdle










(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Likelihood of Saving
Loss Aversion 0.0414 0.0415 0.0276 0.0777* 0.0606 0.267
(1.68) (1.65) (1.00) (2.00) (1.42) (1.93)
Amount of Savings
Loss Aversion 0.0583* 0.0655** 0.0883*** 0.0885*** 0.103*** 0.247*
(2.55) (2.84) (3.62) (3.44) (3.43) (2.09)
AIC 1244 1140 1019 1138 1019 1021
Controls 25 25 25 25 25 25
Region Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occupation Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 640 579 509 579 509 509
? p < 0.1, ?? p < 0.05, ??? p < 0.01. t-values in parentheses.
Note: The dependent variable is the sum of self-reported savings data in various sav-
ing devices, see Section 2.4.1. In this Negative Binomial Hurdle model, the par-
ticipation equation estimates the likelihood to engage in saving, while the second
equation estimates conditional savings—the amount of savings, given that a per-
son is saving. Loss aversion is measured by continuous and experimentally elicited
meta measures. The meta measure compromising two measures of loss aversion is
the geometric mean of loss aversion coefficients according to the definitions of loss
aversion by Neilson (2002) and Köbberling and Wakker (2005). The measure includ-
ing three measures is the geometric mean of the former two loss aversion coefficients
and in addition the one building on the definition of loss aversion by Kahneman and
Tversky (1979). Finally, for the last measure, the coefficients based on definitions by
Bowman, Minehart, and Rabin (1999) and Wakker and Tversky (1993) are also in-
cluded. For more details on the applied measures of loss aversion, see Section 2.4.3.
We control for variables listed in Tables 2.1 and 2.3. Furthermore, we control for
regional and occupational effects on the Localidad level and for the working sectors
according to the ISIC classification of economic activities. We account for potential
heteroskedasticity by robust standard errors.
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TABLE 2.6: Results from Estimating Model 3 Using a Negative Binomial Hurdle
Model and Different Meta Measures of Loss Aversion
Regional Unemployment Rate Regional Unemployment Risk




0.00774 0.0120 0.0609 0.0121 0.0174? 0.0459??
(0.83) (0.82) (0.86) (1.55) (1.79) (2.48)
Loss Aversion 0.0353? 0.0698?? 0.273?? 0.0319 0.0635 0.131
(1.76) (2.12) (2.00) (1.15) (1.43) (0.80)
Uncertainty -0.0410 -0.0316 0.0336 0.0253 0.0547 0.0959??




0.0315?? 0.0315 0.0611 0.0224??? 0.0199?? 0.0465
(2.12) (1.22) (0.78) (4.47) (2.21) (1.54)
Loss Aversion -0.0382 -0.0204 0.0893 -0.177??? -0.129 -0.169
(-0.88) (-0.26) (0.58) (-3.25) (-1.22) (-0.64)
Uncertainty 0.0955 0.0573 0.108 0.150??? 0.167??? 0.186???
(1.12) (0.68) (0.75) (3.35) (3.69) (2.95)
AIC 1240 1137 1023 1225 1125 1015
Controls 25 25 25 25 25 25
Region No No No Yes Yes Yes
Occupation Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 640 579 509 640 579 509
? p < 0.1, ?? p < 0.05, ??? p < 0.01. t-values in parentheses.
Note: The dependent variable is the sum of self-reported savings data in various sav-
ing devices, see Section 2.4.1. In this Negative Binomial Hurdle model, the par-
ticipation equation estimates the likelihood to engage in saving, while the second
equation estimates conditional savings—the amount of savings, given that a per-
son is saving. Loss aversion is measured by continuous and experimentally elicited
meta measures. The meta measure compromising two measures of loss aversion
is the geometric mean of loss aversion coefficients according to the definitions of
loss aversion by Neilson (2002) and Köbberling and Wakker (2005) (Measure 1). The
measure including three measures is the geometric mean of the former two loss aver-
sion coefficients and in addition the one building on the definition of loss aversion
by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) (Measure 2). Finally, for the last measure, the co-
efficients based on definitions by Bowman, Minehart, and Rabin (1999) and Wakker
and Tversky (1993) are also included (Measure 3). The coefficients of loss aversion
are centered at 1; for more details on the applied measures of loss aversion, see
Section 2.4.3. Income uncertainty is centered at the mean and is based on different
measures, partly building on secondary data; see Section 2.4.2 for details. We control
for variables listed in Tables 2.1 and 2.3. Furthermore, we control for regional and
occupational effects at the Localidad level and for the working sectors according to
the ISIC classification of economic activities, if indicated. We account for potential
heteroskedasticity by robust standard errors.
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The measure for loss aversion that we use in this study is, on average, lower
than that estimated by Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt, and Paraschiv (2007) using a sim-
ilar approach. However, other studies also find considerably lower shares of loss
aversion at the individual level. For example, Schmidt and Traub (2002) and
Bleichrodt and Pinto (2002) report that between 33 percent and 5 to 30 percent
of their participants could be classified as loss averse, respectively. In addition,
Schmidt and Traub (2002) report that 24 percent of their participants exhibit gain-
seeking behavior at the individual level. Against this background, our findings
do not seem unrealistic and even less so when we consider that our experiment
was conducted with a non-student sample in a development setting, where the
mean household per capita income ranges near the poverty level and the prospect
of losing money might be very familiar and not frightening enough to make an
effort to avoid these losses at the price of forgoing gains.
We observe considerable heterogeneity in our measures of loss aversion, as ex-
pressed in standard deviations (see Table 2.3), which is to be expected in field set-
tings. Should we assume that—for some reason—our sample is more loss averse
in reality than our measures indicate, we should expect a higher coefficient of loss
aversion for every individual in the sample. This would not affect our results
with respect to Hypothesis 3, as they are independent of the absolute value of
the coefficient of loss aversion. Furthermore, as our results regarding Hypothesis
1 based on marginal effects also hold for what we label loss-neutral individuals
and slightly gain-seeking individuals, we also consider the results regarding Hy-
pothesis 1 to be unaffected by a possible miscalibration of our measures of loss
aversion. Lastly, for the direct test of Hypothesis 2, we can assert that the results
are unaffected by such a transformation. Given similar findings in other studies,
however, we are quite confident in our measures of loss aversion.
In this study, we use the official regional unemployment rate and the perceived
regional unemployment risk as a measure of income risk. These measures can be
interpreted as exogenous as one single individual cannot affect the labor market.
Unfortunately, they are average measures and one of the measures relies on self-
reported data. Therefore, they are likely to contain errors—be it because of their
coarse nature or their incorrect assessment of unemployment risk. Therefore, the
precautionary saving motive might be imperfectly captured in our data. Another
limitation of this measure is that the labor market can generally be considered
as integrated since individuals in urban areas can commute to other Localidades
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to find employment. On the other hand, we find substantial variability in un-
employment levels for the different units of analysis, which suggests that the
labor market is fragmented. While unemployment risk is an important source of
income uncertainty for our population group, future work should also explore
other sources of income risk affecting households such as health risk and price
changes.
Although the theory in Section 2.2 focuses on future income uncertainty, con-
temporaneous unemployment figures are a good prediction of future unemploy-
ment rates and thus future income uncertainty. In addition, a higher unemploy-
ment rate in the past is likely to induce a certain feeling of uncertainty about
future income. Lastly, labor income risk affects overall income risk, because re-
tirement income depends on savings built up during an individual’s working
years or the income of family members in the absence of a formal social secu-
rity system. The latter, however, can be assumed to be limited if the household
has been in monetary need during their education years, reducing the priority of
education and increasing the priority of earning money.
All of our results are based on one particular sample: People from low-income
households in Bogota and approximately two-thirds are female. It would there-
fore be of great interest to validate this study’s findings with other data from
other countries which have other socio-demographic characteristics.
Despite the limitations, this study is to be considered as a first step in deter-
mining the role of loss aversion in financial decisions of the poor.
2.7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have tested if the theoretical predictions of the intertemporal
model of consumption and saving by Kőszegi and Rabin (2009) can be empiri-
cally supported. More specifically, we have tested if loss averse individuals that
face income uncertainty hold higher savings, which would be consistent with a
loss-aversion based precautionary savings motive (Hypothesis 1). Our results
support this hypothesis and the increase in savings for a moderately loss averse
sample associated with a one percentage point increase in income uncertainty is
modest and amounts to between 4 and 8 percent of total savings. Secondly, we
have tested whether individuals that exhibit a higher degree of loss aversion hold
more savings than individuals with a lower degree of loss aversion, given that
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they face income uncertainty (Hypothesis 2). Our results support this hypothe-
sis, on average, and a detailed analysis shows that this is driven by individuals
facing a high level of income uncertainty. Lastly, we have investigated whether
the increase in savings associated with an increase in income uncertainty is larger,
the higher the degree of loss aversion (Hypothesis 3). For this last hypothesis, we
find very strong support.
These findings can be used to inform policy makers. Savings and pension cam-
paigns could stress the uncertainty of future income to boost savings. Moreover,
if future income is uncertain, a higher degree of loss aversion can be expected to
induce an additional savings motive compared to a lower degree of loss aversion,
so people should be reminded that it is unlikely they will be able to maintain their
current standard of living when their income drops.

Chapter 3
Higher Order Risk: An Application
To Savings of the Poor in Bogota
This chapter is joint work with Marcela Ibañez and Gerhard Riener.
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3.1 Introduction
Understanding motivations for savings’ decisions is fundamental for policy mak-
ers and academic economists alike. In the recent decades several behavioral chan-
nels that determined subjects’ savings decisions have been explored, especially
emphasizing potential short sightedness of agents resulting in a present bias. In
this work, we reconsider a less explored channel, that only recently received more
attention (Noussair, Trautmann, and Kuilen, 2014): the relation between uncer-
tainty and higher order risk attitudes. In his seminal work, Leland (1968) shows
that uncertainty of future income can generate a precautionary savings motive.
As a consequence, prudent individuals, i.e. agents who prefer taking risks in a
state of higher wealth,1 have an incentive to accumulate wealth in order to be
better prepared to confront uncertainty. Hence, this model predicts that savings
do not depend on risk aversion but on the intensity of prudence.
We extend the model by Leland (1968) to show that precautionary savings
are not incompatible with risk-seeking behavior when individuals are prudent.
We show that the demand for savings is proportional to the intensity measure of
prudence advocated for by Crainich and Eeckhoudt (2008). In previous empir-
ical literature the standard measure for prudence relied on the definition intro-
duced by Kimball (1990). As this measure depends on the second derivative of
the utility function, it can never be interpreted as a measure for the strength of
the precautionary saving motive independent of the level of risk aversion. Our
simple extension allows to rationalize the empirical finding that risk-loving, pru-
dent individuals save a fraction of their income while previous theoretical mod-
els (Crainich, Eeckhoudt, and Trannoy, 2013) predict that risk-loving individuals
would save all of their income when facing uncertainty, given that they are pru-
dent.
To test the prediction of the model we develop a method to obtain a param-
eter-free estimate of the intensity of prudence from binary lottery choices. This
measure does not impose a relationship between risk aversion and prudence,
as commonly used parametric forms do. The experimental procedure builds on
the design by Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt, and Paraschiv (2007). Individuals made
pair-wise comparisons of simple lotteries that vary by the size of the rewards. By
finding the values of income that give mid-point utility levels, that method allows
to obtain a mapping of income to utility levels. We advance these non-parametric
methods of utility point elicitation by providing a suitable and flexible way of
1. In expected utility (EU) theory, this is equivalent to a positive third derivative of the utility
function (Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger, 2006).
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linking the income-utility points to a continuous and differentiable function. In
particular, we introduce a way of incorporating value constraints in estimating a
P-spline utility function. We propose a way of jointly penalizing different orders
(i.e. jointly smoothing different derivatives) using a data-dependent weight. One
advantage of this method is that it allows to compute intensity measures and
classify individuals over a large variation of stakes. The method we propose is to
our knowledge the first one to allow the non-parametric computation of theory-
based intensity measures; in particular the intensity measures by Kimball (1990)
and Crainich and Eeckhoudt (2008).
We empirically test the relation between risk preferences, prudence and sav-
ings among a representative sample of 693 individuals from poor households in
Bogotá, Colombia. This population group is subject to a large degree of income
uncertainty, hence precautionary motives are an important motivation for saving.
We combine answers from an extensive financial household survey with lab-in-
the-field experimental data conducted in October and November 2013.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to study the correlation of ex-
perimental measures of prudence and real saving in a development setting. Most
closely related work to this part of our study is Noussair, Trautmann, and Kuilen
(2014), who found a positive relation of prudence and savings. In the spirit of
Cardenas and Carpenter (2013) and Noussair, Trautmann, and Kuilen (2014), we
collect financial information and other socioeconomic characteristics of house-
holds using a survey and relate this behavior with our incentivized measures of
risk aversion and prudence.
We find that between 37% to 58% of our sample can be classified as pru-
dent and 21% to 48% as risk averse, depending on the measure used. For pru-
dence, these numbers lie within the range of previous studies (Tarazona-Gomez,
2004; Deck and Schlesinger, 2010; Maier and Rüger, 2011). However, we find
considerably more risk-loving behavior. The fraction of prudent individuals is
similar among risk-averse and risk-loving individuals (60% and 55%, respec-
tively). While planning horizon is positively correlated with prudence, other
demographics seem to play a minor role in predicting prudence.
The empirical analysis strongly supports Leland’s (1968) model. We find a
strong positive correlation between saving and prudence. This relation becomes
even stronger when we include a measure of income risk—based on secondary
data measuring the ratio of shut down to existing businesses in 2013 in Bogotá in
the sector an individual was usually employed. We also find some support for a
precautionary saving demand for the subset of risk-loving individuals. However,
probably due to a lack of power, this finding is less robust. Our study adds to the
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extended research on household savings by theoretically and empirically estab-
lishing the link between risk aversion, savings and prudence. Previous studies
used survey data to determine the share of savings that is due to income un-
certainty and in that way assess the importance of prudence (Guiso, Jappelli,
and Terlizzese, 1992; Dynan, 1993; Lee and Sawada, 2010; Fagereng, Guiso, and
Pistaferri, 2017). However, those papers face the problem that the data does not
allow for separately identifying individual risk aversion and prudence (see Ap-
pendix B.1 for an illustration of this point and its consequences). To deal with
that limitation another branch of studies uses experimental measures of prudence
and risk aversion (Tarazona-Gomez, 2004; Deck and Schlesinger, 2010; Maier and
Rüger, 2011; Ebert and Wiesen, 2011). While those studies make a methodolog-
ical contribution in the measurement of prudence, they focus on a student pop-
ulation and do not examine saving decisions. In addition, these studies have
the methodological problem that risk-apportionment tasks cannot inform about
theory-based intensity measures of prudence but simply classify individuals as
prudent or imprudent. We contribute to this research by extending the analysis
to consider measures of intensity of prudence without relying on parametric util-
ity functions. Unlike previous studies that use compound lotteries that involve
gains and losses, we present our participants simple lottery choices that only in-
volve positive outcomes. In this way we simplify the decision problem and avoid
confounding prudence with loss aversion.
The study closest to ours is Noussair, Trautmann, and Kuilen (2014) who, us-
ing a representative sample of the Dutch population, find support for the relation
between prudence and the precautionary motive for saving. We contribute to
this research by examining savings for both risk-averse and risk-loving individ-
uals. While the theoretical model by Leland (1968) predicts that this relation is
independent of the level of risk aversion, the empirical evidence has not yet ex-
amined the relation between risk-loving behavior, prudence and savings.
Alternative theoretical models examining the relation between uncertainty and
savings were proposed by Bowman, Minehart, and Rabin (1999) and Kőszegi
and Rabin (2009). These models consider reference-dependent utility functions
and show that due to loss aversion there is an asymmetric response to good and
bad news. In addition, Kőszegi and Rabin (2009) show that in case of uncertain
future income there is a precautionary saving motive among loss-averse individ-
uals who have a higher utility loss from lowering expected consumption than
from comparable increases of it. In Chapter 2, Ibanez and Schneider empirically
validate this conjecture and find strong support for it.
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3.2 Theoretical Framework
We build upon the model by Leland (1968). In the first part of this section we
modify the assumption on the relationship between the first and second period
consumption utility giving up strict additive separability and show the conse-
quences on the savings decisions. In the second part we discuss how two well-
known measures of intensity of prudence relate with the theoretical model. We
show that the measure of prudence popularized by Crainich and Eeckhoudt (2008)
directly indicates the strength of such a saving motive while being defined inde-
pendently of the second derivative of the utility.
The assumption of first and second period consumption utility being perfect
substitutes that is implied by additive, time-separable overall utility has been
empirically debated at least since Loewenstein (1987). Different models of deci-
sion over time, starting with Gilboa (1989), have been axiomatizing a utility path
dependence (see also Wakai, 2008, Axiom 3 for a more recent example). We in-
troduce a ‘linking function’ of first and second period consumption. In the spirit
of Gilboa (1989), we assume that individuals dislike variation in consumption
and experience increasing disutility when consumption differs over time. This
extension allows for risk-loving individuals to save a non-trivial fraction of their
income as opposed to the predictions derived by Crainich, Eeckhoudt, and Tran-
noy (2013).
3.2.1 An Extension of Leland’s Precautionary Saving Model
Following Leland (1968), we assume that an agent lives for two periods and re-
ceives income wt for t ∈ 1, 2. The income in the first period is deterministic,
whereas in the second period, w2, is random with known expectation and vari-
ance given by E[w2] = w̄2 and E[(w2 − w̄2)2] = σ2, respectively.
The agent has access to financial markets, where the fraction of income saved
in t = 1, k ≤ 1, receives an interest rate r > 0.2 Consumption in t = 1 is
c1 = (1− k)w1 and consumption in t = 2 is c2 = w2 + (1 + r)kw1.
The agent’s objective is to maximize the expected inter-temporal utility of con-
sumption E[U(c1, c2)] by deciding on the fraction of income, k, that they would
save in t = 1. The inter-temporal utility of consumption is given by
U(c1, c2) = u1(c1) + u2(c2) + g(c2 − c1), (3.1)
2. In case of negative savings, k is restricted such that c2 will always be non-negative.
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where ut(ct) is the three times differentiable utility function of consumption for
t ∈ 1, 2 and g denotes a three times differentiable linking function of first and
second period consumption. We assume that the linking function is concave. By
incorporating this linking function, we modify the assumption of additive time-
separable utility previously adopted by Kimball (1990). Such an additive term
relating consumption of the two periods has been applied before in the context of
intertemporal consumption and saving models by Bowman, Minehart, and Ra-
bin (1999) or Kőszegi and Rabin (2009). Unlike those models we do not assume
reference-dependent utility preferences. We assume positive marginal utility of
consumption (u′t > 0) but do not make any assumption about the second deriva-
tive of the utility function and allow u′′t to be either positive indicating risk aver-
sion or negative indicating risk-loving behavior.
The first- and second-order condition for an interior solution imply that in
absence of uncertainty, the following conditions are satisfied for the optimal con-
sumption bundle (c∗1, c∗2) resulting from the optimal saving rate k∗:
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2 + g′′(c2 − c1)(2 + r)2 < 0.
Clearly, in case u1 and u2 are strictly concave in ct (corresponding to a risk-averse
individual) and when g′′ ≤ 0, the second order condition is satisfied. Moreover,
if g′′ is negative and the absolute value of the last term is bigger than the first two
in (SOC), then overall utility is concave in k. Hence, the second order condition
(SOC) is satisfied, even if u1 and u2 are convex as in the case of a risk-loving
individual.
To study how income uncertainty affects the optimal level of the saving deci-







first-order condition around the optimal consumption bundle in absence of un-
certainty indicate that the effect of uncertainty on the optimal saving rate depends
on the sign of (
∂3U∗
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where U∗ is defined as U evaluated at the consumption bundle resulting from
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the optimal saving rate in absence of income uncertainty.3 Leland (1968) infers
that if (3.2) is negative, we may “[u]nder reasonable regularity assumptions [. . . ]
say that the optimal [saving rate] will be larger [. . . ] when uncertainty is present,
and the more uncertainty, the greater will be the optimal [saving rate].” This im-








This corresponds to (3.2) for utility as given in (3.1). Thus, uncertainty results
in a positive precautionary demand for saving for prudent individuals (those
for which u′′′2 > 0) when g′′′ ≥ 0, provided that the necessary condition of a
negative second derivative of overall utility with respect to the saving rate (SOC)
is satisfied. We summarize this in the following proposition:
Proposition 2. Let U(c1, c2) = u1(c1) + u2(c2) + g(c2 − c1) be the overall intertem-
poral utility of an agent. Assume g such that d2U/dk2 < 0. Then a non-negative third
derivative of the linking function g and a positive third derivative of the second period
utility, i.e. g′′′ ≥ 0 and u′′′2 > 0, are a sufficient (though not necessary) condition for a
positive precautionary demand for saving under the assumption of the model of precau-
tionary saving by Leland (1968). This statement holds independently of the sign of the
second derivative of the second period utility.
3.2.2 Examplary Linking Function
So far the ‘linking function’ has been characterized as a concave function of the
difference of consumption in the first and in the second period and hence as a
concave function of the proportion k of income saved. We now provide an exam-
ple of a particular linking function. We assume that
g(x) := −lx2 (3.4)
with l ≥ 0; for l large enough, d2U/dk2 < 0 and the extreme of the utility function
at the critical point satisfying the first-order condition is a utility maximum (for a
risk-averse individual, l = 0 is large enough).
Introducing a function g(c2 − c1) = −l(c2 − c1)2 for l > 0 decreases over-
all utility with an increasing difference between consumption in the first period
3. More generally, for a function f(k), we define f∗ as f evaluated at the optimal saving rate
k∗ in absence of uncertainty.
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and consumption in the second period. This special choice of the linking func-
tion incorporates variation aversion or a preference for spreading good outcomes
evenly over time (for l > 0) as observed empirically by Loewenstein and Prelec
(1993), which challenged time-separable utility. Gilboa (1989) axiomatically de-
rived a utility function with path-dependence, where overall utility is decreased
as the difference between consumption in the first and consumption in the second
period grows, holding any of the two constant. More specifically, Gilboa (1989)
proposed a linking function of the form |u(c2) − u(c1)|. In a more recent work,
Wakai (2008), translates the idea of variation aversion in a setting where negative
variation is more unpleasant than positive variation is pleasant.
The way we incorporate variation aversion is an analytically convenient varia-
tion of the utility function proposed by Gilboa (1989), which also decreases over-
all utility as the difference between consumption in the first and consumption
in the second period grows, but our function does so independently of the ab-
solute levels of consumption. This simplification might seem strict, as for high
consumption levels, a relatively small difference might loom less than the same
absolute difference for low consumption levels or vice versa. As the scaling pa-
rameter l might capture these individual wealth levels, however, we argue it is
appropriate.
With respect to life-time saving, our choice of the linking function is a way
to incorporate the aim of consumption smoothing as predicted by the permanent
income hypothesis (Friedman, 1957) or simply the commitment of living and con-
suming in the next period.
This choice of utility could, additionally to any risk-averse individual, also
represent an individual that is willing to take risk in each period, but only as long
as the difference between consumption in both periods does not get too large—
impeding ‘ruthless’ over-consumption in any one of both periods.





From this we see that just as in the case of simple additive, time-separable util-
ity, a positive precautionary saving demand results solely from a positive third
derivative of second period utility with respect to k.
We summarize these findings in a corollary:
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Corollary 2. Let U(c1, c2) = u1(c1) + u2(c2)− l(c2 − c1)2 be the overall intertemporal
utility of an agent. Assume l large enough such that d2U/dk2 < 0. Then a positive third
derivative of the second period utility, i.e. u′′′2 > 0, is both a sufficient and a necessary
condition for a positive precautionary demand for saving under the assumption of the
model of precautionary saving by Leland (1968). This statement holds independently of
the sign of the second derivative of the second period utility.
Corollary 2 states that—given the linking function, and thus the overall util-
ity, is of the most simple form allowing for a regular utility maximum—a positive
third derivative of the second period utility alone causes a positive precaution-
ary demand for saving, for risk-loving and risk-averse individuals, where for the
latter, l = 0 is large enough.
Unfortunately, the existence of a linking function and its particular shape is
not directly testable. This drawback is also inherent in the models by Kőszegi
and Rabin (2009) and Bowman, Minehart, and Rabin (1999).
3.2.3 Measuring the Strength of the Precautionary Saving Mo-
tive
We now show, building on the model by Leland (1968), that the measure by
Crainich and Eeckhoudt (2008) can also be directly interpreted as a measure of
intensity of a precautionary savings demand whereas the measure by Kimball
(1990) is restricted to the case of risk-averse individuals. This second measure is
adequate when comparing risk-averse individuals only, but cannot generally be
used in the framework of Leland’s model or the extension of the model that we
present here.
Crainich and Eeckhoudt measure Building on previous work on downside risk
aversion,4 Crainich and Eeckhoudt (2008) suggest to measure the degree of pru-
dence by π = u′′′/u′ (Modica and Scarsini, 2017; Keenan and Snow, 2002). The
intuitive interpretation they give of this measure is the analog to the utility pre-
mium for compensating the pain of a zero-mean risk. When there is ‘misappor-
tionment of risk’ (meaning risk added to a state of lower wealth instead of to
the state of higher wealth), π = u′′′/u′ is proportional to the money equivalent of
pain induced by this misapportionment. One advantage of this measure is that it
is independent of the sign of the second derivative. Hence, it is closely related to
4. Downside risk aversion is equivalent to prudence for three times differentiable utility func-
tions.
52 Chapter 3. Higher Order Risk and Savings of the Poor in Bogota
the theoretical prediction of the model by Leland (1968) as it can be computed for
both risk-averse and risk-loving individuals leading to a similar interpretation.
To see how the measure by Crainich and Eeckhoudt (2008) can be incorpo-
























where we used the first-order condition (FOC) and rearranged terms.
If the utility is additively time-separable (i.e. g ≡ l ≡ 0), (3.6) can be written as
−u∗1
′π∗σ2. (3.7)












Let us now turn to the case of a utility with an additive linking function of the
form−l(c2−c1)2 relating consumption in the two periods. (3.6) in this case equals
(3.3) with g′′′ ≡ 0. We focus on the second term,
−(1 + r)u∗2
′′′(c2) (3.8)
and find that the larger u∗2
′′′, the larger the precautionary savings demand under
the conditions derived before. Also in this case, π is a good measure of the pre-
cautionary savings demand. First, because dividing u∗2
′′′ by u∗2
′ leaves the sign
unchanged. Second, following the rationale by Pratt (1964) when justifying his
measure, multiplying u with a positive constant does not change behavior, but it
changes u′′′. The measure π is unaffected by such a transformation.
We summarize these findings:
Proposition 3. Let U(c1, c2) = u1(c1) + u2(c2)− l(c2 − c1)2 be the overall intertempo-
ral utility of an agent. Assume l large enough such that d2U/dk2 < 0. Then, all else






indicates the strength of a precautionary demand for saving un-
der the assumption of the model of precautionary saving by Leland (1968), including
regularity assumptions. This statement holds independently of the sign of the second
derivative of the second period utility.
Note that for risk-averse individuals, Proposition 3 holds for l = 0, i.e. under
the usual assumption of time-separable utility.
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Kimball (1990) measure The first measure of the degree of intensity of prudence
was proposed by Kimball (1990). Using a close analogy to the Arrow-Pratt mea-
sure of risk aversion, the intensity of prudence is defined as −u′′′/u′′. In a simple
two-period model with additive time-separable utility, Kimball (1990) shows that
the savings function of a globally more prudent individual at a given level of sav-
ing moves upward at a lower level of risk. This measure thus is directly related
to the intensity of the precautionary saving motive.
The measure by Kimball (1990) has two shortcomings that are especially rele-
vant when trying to apply the concept empirically, see Appendix B.1 for an exam-
ple. First, since the measure depends on the second derivative of the (per-period)
utility function, it implies that precautionary savings depend on risk aversion.
However, Leland (1968) shows that the precautionary demand for savings is in-
dependent of the degree of risk aversion.
Second, when focusing on precautionary savings, Kimball (1990) neglects the
possibility of a convex utility function. Hence, the proposed measure is only
meaningful for risk-averse individuals, as for them, it shows a positive value
when prudent, but not for risk-loving individuals, for whom its value is negative
if prudent. Similarly, this measure yields a positive intensity of prudence for an
imprudent individual (negative third derivative) that is risk loving. This is clearly
a contradiction.
3.3 Methodology
In this section, we introduce the procedure for the joint and consistent elicita-
tion of (higher order) risk preferences. This method is particularly suitable for
the computation of intensity measures of (higher order) risk preferences. To this
end, we combine well-established methods to elicit utility points with the statis-
tical approach of P-spline regression. The experimental elicitation and estimation
procedure consists of these three steps:
1. Elicitation of utility points using any suitable method, such as the certainty
equivalent method or the trade-off method used in Wakker and Deneffe,
1996.
2. Estimation of a differentiable individual utility function and their deriva-
tives based on elicited utility points using a penalized spline (P-spline) ap-
proach (P. H. Eilers and Marx, 1996).
3. Derivation of higher order risk preferences with intensity measures to indi-
vidual utility functions
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The preferred procedure to estimate continuous and differentiable utility func-
tions is to specify a parametric utility function and then estimate these parameters
by maximum likelihood or generalized method of moments. A limitation of this
approach is that parametric functions often impose restrictions on the higher or-
der derivatives linking them to lower order derivatives. In this respect, already
Fuchs-Schündeln and Schündeln (2005) note that individuals are nearly always
assumed to be prudent and specifications allowing for imprudence cannot be
combined with risk aversion.5 An alternative to this is approach is to apply a
fully non-parametric procedure that does not restrict the relation between lower
and higher order derivatives. P-splines offer such an alternative. This method
is suited in situations where (potentially with error) elicited utility points should
be interpolated and smoothed to yield a continuous and possibly p-times con-
tinuously differentiable utility function including smoothed derivatives. This
allows us to derive intensity measures of prudence and risk aversion. For its
non-parametric character, this procedure can be seen as the natural completion of
non-parametric elicitation methods for utility points to a non-parametric elicita-
tion method for utility functions.
3.3.1 Elicitation of Utility Points
In the expected utility (EU) framework, one established and accepted method to
non-parametrically elicit utility points is the trade-off method (Wakker and Den-
effe, 1996).6 The method elicits certain payoff (xi) that imply indifference between
two outcome gambles. Denote a binary lottery with (x, p; y), where x is the up-
side, occuring with probability p > 0 and y is the downsidewith corresponding
probability (1 − p). The participant first states the value x1 that makes her in-
different between (x1, p; r) and (x0, p;R) where x1 > x0 and R > r. Then the
participant is asked for the value x2 that makes her indifferent between (x2, p; r)
and (x1, p;R). Assuming EU, and denoting the utility7 of a monetary outcome x
with U(x), these two indifferences imply that
pU(x1) + (1− p)U(r) = pU(x0) + (1− p)U(R) and
pU(x2) + (1− p)U(r) = pU(x1) + (1− p)U(R).
5. We derive these limitations in Appendix B.2 for the exponential (CARA), the power (CRRA)
and the expo-power utility family.
6. Note that it is also possible to use the less complex certainty equivalent method for the
elicitation of utiltiy functions as introduced in this paper.
7. Note that for this method, no further specification of the utility function are needed.
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From these equations, we derive
p(U(x1)− U(x0)) = (1− p)(U(R)− U(r)) = p(U(x2)− U(x1)).
Since p > 0, we can conclude that
U(x1)− U(x0) = U(x2)− U(x1).
This gives an equality of utility differences that can be used to elicit different
utility points by repeating this iterative process leaving the researcher with the
desired number of utility points between r and R. 8
3.3.2 P-Spline Interpolation and Error Correction for Utility Func-
tions and Their Derivatives
How does penalized spline (P-spline) regression connect these utility points? A
first approach to non-parametric estimations is linear interpolation(see e.g. Fen-
nema and Van Assen, 1998; Abdellaoui, 2000; Etchart-Vincent, 2004; Abdellaoui,
Bleichrodt, and Paraschiv, 2007). This approach is suited if distances between
subsequent utility points are small, decision or measurement errors are unlikely,
precision of interpolation is of lower priority, and if enough points are elicited.
For computing a fourth derivative, one needs at least five utility points.
Linear interpolation is also relatively ‘costly’ in terms of non-classifiable utility
functions , as inconsistencies in one decision carry over to the estimation of other
utility points and in some cases have to be excluded from the analysis (see for
example Bleichrodt and Pinto, 2000). Moreover, and important for applications,
a linear interpolation generally does not establish a differentiable function.
Penalized spline estimations smooth the data in a ‘global’ way, thus incor-
porating all information available. This results in estimates for the utility and its
derivatives in one single fit. Therefore, there is no need to additionally smooth the
derivatives or compute them numerically. Similarly to the parametric approach,
this method is very parsimonious. One point between the fixed limit points is
enough to determine the sign of at least the third derivative.
Spline Regressions Spline regressions generalize the concept of linear regres-
sions. Instead of using only the x-value of elicited utility points in a regres-
sion, they add higher powers of those values—up to degree p. This approach,
8. This procedure can be extended to elicit utility on the loss domain, to elicit probability
weighting (both in the gain and the loss domain) and to elicit loss aversion, as proposed by Ab-
dellaoui, Bleichrodt, and Paraschiv (2007).
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polynomial regression and interpolation, leads to a polynomial of order p, and
roots in the strong theoretical foundation of the Stone-Weierstrass theorem. The
Stone-Weierstrass theorem states that every real, continuous function defined on
a closed interval can be uniformly approximated arbitrarily close by a polynomial
function. In practice, however, the order is limited by available data points and
the data will be underfit. Further, even when the order of polynomial functions
is high, interpolation quality can be very poor for some functions (e.g. Runge’s
phenomenon Runge, 1901) and at the boundaries of the interval under study, the
interpolation function becomes unstable. In general, a global basis approach of-
ten lacks the flexibility to adequately adjust the degree of curvature to different,
possibly asymptotically constant regions. The resulting function would thus in
many cases either underfit or overfit the data.
Splines are an established solution in this case. The global basis (e.g. the poly-
nomial basis 1, x, x2, x3, . . . , xp) is exchanged for (or extended by) a local basis and
the result is a smooth combination of piecewise polynomial functions of degree p,
that is, with common implementation, (p− 1) times continuously differentiable.
To that end, the domain of definition [xmin, xmax] is divided into k − 1 subinter-
vals, where the k boundaries are called inner knots. Local basis functions, defined
depending on the knots, are placed (often equidistantly, thus independent of the
data) such that they cover the domain of definition.
One such choice of basis functions, so called B-splines, have proven to be nu-
merically stable and efficient for computation.9 A single B-spline of degree10 p
is a combination of p + 1 polynomial pieces of degree p that are joined smoothly
(i.e. p− 1 times continuously differentiable) at the knots. It is different from zero
only on a small subinterval of the domain of definition (spanned by p + 2 knots)
and zero otherwise.
Figure 3.1 illustrates single B-splines of degree p = 1 and degree p = 2. For
illustration purposes, the first p+ 2 inner knots are indicated by the gray vertical
lines at x = 0.1, 0.2 and for the B-spline of degree 2 additionally at x = 0.3.
We use a B-spline basis consisting of k+p−1 equally spaced B-splines spanned
by k+2p knots; see 3.2(a) for an illustration of an exemplary B-splines basis. Also
9. De Boor (1987) gives a recursive formula for computation of B-splines from a lower degree
B-spline Since a B-spline of degree 0 is just a constant between subsequent knots, this facilitates
computation. However, B-splines can also be constructed as linear combinations of truncated
power functions. P. H. C. Eilers and Marx (2010) show that it is numerically stable. We use the
latter approach for computation of our B-spline basis.
10. Note that, in the B-spline literature, usually order is used instead of degree,
where order = degree + 1. In the P-spline literature however, degree is preferred, as order mostly is
referring to the degree of differences used in the penalty.
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(a) B-spline of Degree p = 1 (b) B-spline of Degree p = 2
FIGURE 3.1: Illustration of a Single B-spline and the Corresponding
B-spline Basis
in 3.2(a) we see that at any point x in the interval [xmin, xmax], a B-spline basis
decomposes 1, i.e. ∀x ∈ [xmin, xmax] :
∑k+p−1
j=1 Bj(x, p) = 1.
We denote the value of the jth B-spline (the B-spline with support interval
starting at knot j) at x with Bj(x, p), where p is the degree of the B-spline. For
regressing the y-values of a set of N data points (xi, yi) on the B-spline basis
(Bj)j=1,...,k+p−1, we evaluate the k + p − 1 B-splines at the given x-values, which
yields the (N × (k + p − 1)) design matrix B. In matrix notation, the regression
approach is to minimize
QB(α) = ‖y −Bα‖2, (3.9)
and the result is a fitted curve ŷ(x) =
∑k+p−1
j=1 âjBj(x, p).
A particularly useful feature of B-spline regression for our problem is es-








where h is the knot distance, and 4maj = 4(4m−1aj) with 4aj := (aj − aj−1).
For a derivation of this result, see Appendix B.3.1 or De Boor (1987, Ch. 10).
Equation (3.10) illustrates that the derivatives of a spline function can be com-
puted conveniently by differencing its B-spline coefficients. Once a fitted curve is
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(a) B-spline Basis of Degree p = 2 (b) Regression on B-spline Basis
FIGURE 3.2: Illustration of Simple (Non-Penalized) Spline Regres-
sion with B-splines of Second Degree Where the Interval [0, 1] is Di-
vided Into Three Intervals
established, its derivatives are automatically obtained without the need to deter-
mine them numerically.
Although B-splines possess several advantages over other function fitting tech-
niques, one weakness is that the fitted curve depends crucially on the knot choice.
A higher amount of knots allows a higher flexibility, sometimes resulting in over-
fitting the data. Furthermore, knot placement also influences the fitted curve
considerably.
An additional challenge is the degree of the function to be fitted: To obtain a
p−1 times continuously differentiable curve, we need B-splines of degree p. Thus,
in order to have the fourth derivative at least quadratic, B-splines of degree 6 are
necessary. With barely more than 6 elicited utility points, a pure spline approach
with local bases of degree 6 is impossible.
P-spline Regression P-splines solve these challenges and in addition to smooth-
ing the utility function itself, they also smooth at least one derivative. P-splines
combine the regression approach on a B-spline basis as just derived using an ex-
cessive number of (mostly equally spaced) B-splines with penalties (mostly on the
curvature) to prevent the fitted curve from oscillating or fluctuating more than
needed when too many knots are chosen11. Technically, these penalties increase
11. When introducing P-splines, P. H. Eilers and Marx state that generally the number of B-
splines is moderate (10-20). In a more recent work, they note that “the size of the basis can be
anywhere from 10 to over 1000”, depending on the application (P. H. C. Eilers and Marx, 2010). In
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the number of conditions for the equation system to solve, and hence higher de-
grees can be combined with choosing a high amount of knots. Formally, the d-
order differences of the B-spline coefficients is penalized by adding these differ-
ences to the objective function. We will refer to this summand as the dth-order
penalty. When Dd denotes the matrix representation of the dth difference opera-
tor4d (as used above), the objective function of the regression approach writes
QB(α) = ‖y −Bα‖2 + ω‖Ddα‖2, (3.11)
where again, as in (3.9), B denotes the design matrix consisting of the k + p− 1
B-splines evaluated at the x-values of the N given data points, and y denotes
the vector of length N containing the respective y-values. The objective function
(3.11) is minimized by α̂ = (B′B + ωD′dDd)−1B
′y.
The non-negative tuning parameter ω allows controlling the smoothness of
the predicted function. Choosing ω = 0 results in the classical linear regression
of y on B as formulated in (3.9) with the well-known solution â = (B′B)−1B′y.
Therefore, as laid out above, a low value of ω will result in a fitted function that
over-fits the data and possibly oscillates considerably. Depending on the order of
the penalty, a linear (d = 2) or quadratic (d = 3) or more general, a polynomial
function of order d − 1 will be the result in the limit of an increasing ω (P. H. C.
Eilers and Marx, 2010).
Choice of Penalty In this study and more generally in the context of the elici-
tation of higher order risk preferences, we are interested in smoothing the utility
function itself, but also in smoothing the third and possibly higher derivatives
of the utility function. Moreover, we would like to have continuous derivatives
with a suitable interpolation quality at least for the derivatives of interest.
Here, we use an approach to jointly smooth the third and fourth derivative,
suited for the joint elicitation of prudence and temperance, which is defined by a
negative fourth derivative. This requires the balanced use of penalties of orders
d = 3 and d = 4, as laid out in Appendix B.3.2. Penalization of multiple orders
has been applied before in other studies with a focus on the quality of interpo-
lation (see Marx and Eilers, 2002; Aldrin, 2006). However, both studies rely on
visual inspection for determining the relation between the two penalties. In our
setting, this would be too time consuming, since we consider a couple of hun-
dreds of utility functions. Furthermore, this way of implementation could affect
the classification and intensities of risk preferences and should be independent of
our application, using 15 inner knots leads to underfitting in a considerable share of cases, which
is why we chose 20. This choice leads to the desired flexibility without overfitting the data.
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subjective judgment. Therefore, we develop a data-driven approach to jointly use
multiple orders of penalties, which we present in Appendix B.3.2 together with
the details on its implementation and on the choice of the penalty orders.
Incorporating Constraints Monotonicity, or more precisely, utility as a mono-
tone increasing function of monetary units, is a common assumption for utility
functions. We follow the approach introduced by Bollaerts, Eilers, and Meche-
len (2006) to incorporate a monotonicity constraint in P-splines regression. In
the spirit of P-splines, this constraint is approximately enforced using a discrete,
asymmetric penalty. We elucidate this approach and its implementation in Ap-
pendix B.3.3.
Normalization Due to using the certainty equivalent or the trade-off method
for elicitation of utility, the points (0, 0) and (1, 1) are fixed and non-defective.
They should therefore be exactly predicted, thus the interpolating spline function
has to meet the following conditions: f(0) = 0 and f(1) = 1. We achieve this
approximately by iteratively increasing weights at the points x = 0 and x = 1
until the conditions are met.12
Choosing the Degree of Smoothness
With perfect fidelity to the data with few data points results in a fitted P-spline
function resembling a linearly interpolated function. In some cases though, it will
oscillate heavily and fail to describe the true overall shape of the function. These
cases are examples of overfitting: Fidelity to the data is high, but the quality of
predictions is most likely poor. On the other hand, when smoothness is over-
weighted, the resulting function might miss important changes in curvature and
also fail to describe the overall shape of the function, i.e. the function is underfit-
ting.
In some cases it is unnecessary to determine an optimal smoothness parame-
ter. Consider for example the case, where interest is only in the sign of a deriva-
tive of the utility function to determine whether an individual is risk averse, pru-
dent or temperant. To that end, it might be enough to determine the sign of the
respective derivative for a large number of pre-specified parameters covering a
certain interval and proceed in an appropriate way. We investigate this approach
further in Section 3.3.4, which is dedicated precisely to the pure classification of
12. The same effect can probably be realized with a penalty term in an iterative approach such
as the one presented by Bollaerts, Eilers, and Mechelen (2006) to incorporate shape constraints.
However, the existence of a solution to the minimization problem for the modified objective func-
tion has to be investigated, see Bollaerts, Eilers, and Mechelen (2006).
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individuals into risk averse and risk loving, prudent and imprudent, or none of
the aforementioned.
Choosing the Degree of Smoothness by Optimizing Predictive Quality When
studying intensities, the precise shape of the utility curve and its derivatives are
needed. Then, we wish to have a curve that perfectly balances fidelity to the data
and smoothness. How should we choose a value for ω? We apply a leave-k-
out cross validation (CV)—an objective datadriven decision criteria that focuses
on the quality of prediction and that is robust to overfitting the data in case of
correlated observations13 (Arlot and Celisse, 2010, Chapter 8.1). Using cross vali-
dation, the model is fit with only a part of the data and the remainder, the k points
left out, is used to compute prediction errors. According to CV, the smoothness
parameter that minimizes the average prediction error is the preferred.
Leave-k-out CV can be seen as a mean of error correction: The more points left
out when fitting the model, the more important becomes the predictive quality
and the higher the smoothness parameter will be, in case some points deviate
from the common trend. Since reversal rates of one third are common in choice
tasks as the ones applied in this study,14 we perform “leave-at-least-1/3N -out”
cross validation, which results in leave-3-out CV, in case the maximum number
of utility points was elicited for the individual under study.15
However, overfitting the data is still possible, if the distance between points is
large, that is in case of sparse information per knot. The reason is that the penal-
ized derivative of the function can change over wide intervals, thus the change
needed from knot to knot to predict every point exactly may only be marginal,
and is thus not sufficiently penalized. Therefore, we develop and apply a way
to determine a data-driven minimum for the penalty parameter to rule out this
reason of overfitting. We discuss our choice of the data-driven decision criteria
and present the developed approach to rule out overfitting in case of sparse in-
formation per knot in Appendix B.3.4.
3.3.3 Intensity Measures of Risk Aversion and Prudence
Having established continuous utility functions from the elicited utility points,
we can now apply well-known intensity measures of risk aversion and prudence.
13. Due to the chain structure of the experiment applied, the measurement error of single utility
points might be correlated.
14. See e.g.Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt, and Paraschiv (2007), Fennema and Van Assen (1998), Ab-
dellaoui (2000), and Etchart-Vincent (2004)
15. Note that we excluded the points (0, 0) and (1, 1) for computing the average prediction error.
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Degree of Risk Aversion We measure the degree of risk aversion by the well-
known and widely used Arrow-Pratt measure of (absolute) risk aversion, defined
as ρ(x) = −u′′(x)/u′(x) (Pratt, 1964). For this measure, we compute the mean over
the interval [0, 1] based on 1000 points.
Naturally, steep increases are associated with a higher intensity than a con-
stant, slow increase. We therefore summarize the measure of risk aversion over
the interval [0, 1] by taking its mean to capture such steep parts of the second
derivative, even if vast parts of this derivative are actually zero. The median in
such a case would be zero, which certainly is not the right measure of risk aver-
sion in comparison with individuals exhibiting a steady, but slow increase.
Degree of Prudence We compute the measure by Kimball (1990), commonly
stated as−u′′′/u′′, for (strictly) risk-averse individuals and π = u′′′/u′, the measure
by Crainich and Eeckhoudt (2008), for all individuals. As for the degree of risk
aversion, we aggregate this information by averaging these measures over the
interval [0, 1].
3.3.4 Classification of Risk Aversion and Prudence
In addition to computing the intensity measures discussed above, we classify
individuals as risk averse and prudent. We follow two strategies: One is based on
the optimal smoothing procedure described above. Then, to account for possible
overfitting, we classify a derivative as positive, if 95% of the total area between
the utility curve and the x-axis are positive, and as negative, if the contrary is the
case.
The second strategy resembles the popular non-linear least-squares fitting of a
parametric function that ‘forces’ individuals to be risk averse or risk loving (and
equivalently for higher order preferences), but does not leave subjects unclassi-
fied.16 However, here, we still allow the data to ‘reject’ a classification, thereby
following the spirit of a confidence interval.
We do so by applying the P-splines approach in (3.11) with different fixed
and increasing smoothing parameters ω as opposed to a single optimal one as
in the first approach. More precisely, when classifying individuals as prudent
or imprudent, we apply a third-order penalty (i.e. d = 3) penalizing fluctuations
of the third derivative and vary ω. Risk aversion is determined similarly and a
16. For the utility function u(x) = xb for example, the estimated parameter determines the sign
of the second derivative and thus also determines the classification of an individual as risk averse
or risk seeking (see e.g. Appendix A.2.1), independently of how good the fit actually is.
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derivative is classified as positive (negative) if 95% of the total area between the
utility curve and the x-axis are positive (negative).
The common pattern is that for low values of the penalty parameter, a classi-
fication is not possible due to fluctuations caused by overfitting the data. When
the penalty parameter increases, classification gets more likely, until finally the
data is underfit and the third derivative will vanish, as laid out above. We thus
increase the penalty until for some individuals, the third derivative starts van-
ishing; we find that for ω of around 10,000 already a considerable share vanishes
and set this as upper limit for the smoothing paramter. The lower limit is set to .1
and this results in virtually no smoothing.
If the classification changes with increasing penalty between risk averse and
risk seeking, or prudent and imprudent, we set the respective classification to
non-classifiable. Conveniently, the classification is relatively robust with respect
to the smoothing parameter, so this is the case for only very few individuals.
The interpretation of the second classification approach thus is: Given enough
smoothing, which classification would be the most fitting while still allowing
to reject a classification? It is in some sense an alternative to confidence inter-
vals, which we cannot compute in our setting, since standard error bands rely on
asymptotic arguments. These asymptotic arguments are not likely to hold with
less than 10 observations.
In some cases, we are unable to visually distinguish a derivative from a straight
line. Its corresponding derivative however will never be a constant, since the nu-
merical ‘precision’ of the procedure is too high. In those cases, where we are
unable to distinguish the first derivative from a straight line, we decrease the
precision artificially and ‘snap’ its second derivative, i.e. the third derivative of
the utility function, to zero.17 Formally, this means that we set a derivative to
zero if its value is smaller than approximately the biggest absolute value of that
derivative observed for any individual divided by 1000 (for a fixed ω = 50).
3.4 Data and Definition of Variables
Our main data was collected as part of a larger study ‘Savings for the Old Age’.
The survey gathered financial information for a sample of 1200 subjects benefi-
ciary of the social protection program SISBEN. The program targets the popula-
tion in low social strata. We recruited the participants in a two-step procedure.
First, we selected neighborhoods based on shares of the population belonging to
17. The utility curve itself is non-linear and clearly distinguishable from a straight line for all
individuals in our sample.
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the required strata. Neighborhoods that contained a large fraction of low income
individuals and that were assessed as safe for the team to visit, were included in
the study. In the second step, enumerators visited randomly selected households
and verified whether they were belonging to the target group. If this require-
ment was not fulfilled, the enumerators visited the neighboring household. We
oversampled older females to obtain a better picture of the potential vulnerabil-
ities women are exposed to in the old age. Interviews took place in October and
November 2013 and lasted on average 90 minutes.
The survey consisted of 16 sections on general demographics, wealth, general
savings, pension savings, financial literacy, health behavior, expectations and hy-
pothetical questions on psychological traits. The experiment was conducted with
a subsample of 693 participants. A team of enumerators conducted the experi-
ment on tablet computers. To meet safety demands, the experiments were con-
ducted in a public space (e.g. communitary houses) that was easily accesible for
participants. The experiment lasted around 20 minutes.
3.4.1 Net Savings
Savings In the survey we asked detailed questions on a comprehensive range
of saving devices: housing, savings plans, savings and checking accounts, certifi-
cates of deposit, mutual funds, loans given out and savings in Colombian Pesos
or other currencies. We use the sum of these assets to construct a savings measure
denoted Sh. This variable intends to capture all liquid assets in the household.18
Debt Debt is defined as all financial liabilities a household has against other
households, enterprises and financial institutions, including money lenders. We
denote total debt as Dh.
Net Savings Following Noussair, Trautmann, and Kuilen (2014) and Fuchs-
Schündeln and Schündeln (2005) we use net savings as our main variable of in-
terest, which we calculate as the difference between Sh and Dh.
3.4.2 Income Uncertainty Based on Economic Activity
In order to obtain measures for the financial riskiness of the sector subjects were
working in we collected measures from the Commercial Register in Bogota in
2013. We calculate for 14 sectors the empirical probability of firm closure within
18. As it is possible to withdraw money from all of these saving mechanisms in case of emer-
gencies, we interpret all of these savings as liquid assets.
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each sector. We match this then with the sector subjects are usually working in,
which has the same resolution as the official statistics. This measure of working
sector dynamics proxies the degree of income uncertainty and hence measures
the idiosyncratic risk for which subjects like to have precautionary savings.
This measure relies on working sectors according to economic activity19 and
bases on data from the Commercial Register of Bogota from the year 2013.20 More
specifically, for all working sectors represented by individuals from our sample,
we computed the ratio of cancelled to existing businesses (including microenter-
prises) in Bogota in 2013. Then, all individuals are assigned the corresponding
ratio of the working sector they are working in.
Thus, a higher level of plant closure in the sector a subject is typically em-
ployed is associated with a higher level of income risk. As unemployment in-
surance is negligible in our sample, firm closure in the sector constitutes a major
threat to personal income. This constitutes a substantial and unavoidable back-
ground risk.
In this sense our sample and the economic circumstances resemble the econ-
omy described in Aiyagari (1994). There are idiosyncratic earnings uncertainties,
effectively no insurance markets and our subjects are borrowing constraint. Back-
ground risk, defined as uninsurable idiosyncratic shocks, is arguably substantial
and not mitigated by wage insurance on the firm level as found by Fagereng,
Guiso, and Pistaferri (forthcoming 2017).
Our measure is closely related for example to the measure of income uncer-
tainty applied by Fagereng, Guiso, and Pistaferri (2017) when studying precau-
tionary saving in Norway: They infer firm performance volatility from compa-
nies’ balance sheets and use this to instrument their measure of income uncer-
tainty. This limits their sample to employees of private firms with balance sheets
available to the public and is arguably not suited in our context. We therefore use
the next aggregation level, namely working sectors, since on this level, we are
able to link individuals to secondary data on economic performance.
The arguments in favor of exogeneity of firm performance volatility given
by Fagereng, Guiso, and Pistaferri (2017) are valid also for our measure: First,
they argue, firm shocks are hard to avoid for most workers, and second, firms
pass over this variation onto their workers’ wages. Clearly, in our case, nega-
tive working sector dynamics will be handed over to employees due to absence
19. Working sectors as provided in ISIC Rev. IIIa A.C. by DANE, based on the economic activity.
20. Data was processed and made available in an ‘Overview of Indicators’ by the Knowledge
Management Board of the Chamber of Commerce (in Spanish: ‘Tablero de Indicadores’, Dirección de
Gestión de Conocimiento, Cámara de Comercio de Bogotá).
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of formal contracts as well. Thus, payment can be adjusted easily, but also em-
ployment itself is more uncertain in working sectors with a higher share of closed
businesses. Regarding the first argument, we acknowledge that it is theoretically
possible to switch the working sector after bad days in order to avoid income un-
certainty. However, the elasticity is certainly lower than the elasticity of hiring at
a different firm. Furthermore, the categorization of working sectors we use relies
on the main task performed, where arguably the share of workers switching from
e.g. servant to construction worker to avoid income uncertainty is considerably
lower than the share of servants increasing their saving to cope with income un-
certainty. Moreover, switching the working sector will most likely take more time
than adapting consumption behavior.
Time Preferences We followed the experimental design by Andersen et al. (2008)
to elicit time preferences: Participants decided on receiving an amount x in 30
days or an amount x(1 + r/12) with r > 0 in 60 days. Values of r were increased
gradually and subjects usually switched from choosing x in 30 days to x(1+r/12)
in 60 days for some r according to their time preferences. Using this switching
point, we calculate a lower and an upper bound for the interest rate. This inter-
est rate can also be interpreted as impatience, as people were deciding about the
timing of receiving money.
We repeated the task with a higher delay of payment: Subjects now decided
about receiving the lower amount in 180 days or receiving the higher amount in
210 days. Similarly to the case for the near future time frame, we deduce a lower
and an upper bound of interest rate or impatience from the switching point.
The difference between both interest rates or impatience for the two time
frames informs about consistency in interest rates. For individuals deciding con-
sistently, the impatience to receive a monetary amount 30 days earlier should be
unaffected by shifting the date of the earlier payment by 150 days. A lower impa-
tience in the more distant future corresponds to an increasingly patient subject.
3.4.3 Further control variables
In the style of comparable, previous studies on precautionary saving (e.g. Fuchs-
Schündeln and Schündeln, 2005; Noussair, Trautmann, and Kuilen, 2014), we
control for other socioeconomic factors within our analysis such as age, gender,
number of adult household members, number of children in a household, edu-
cation and income (we use average per capita household income). To these, we
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add further characteristics that have been found to be important in explaining
savings:21
Moreover, we measured financial literacy within the survey and include its
result in the analysis.22 Van Rooij, Lusardi, and Alessie (2012) find a positive cor-
relation between financial literacy and accumulated savings. Devaney, Anong,
and Whirl (2007) and Fisher and Montalto (2010, 2011) report short term plan-
ning and saving horizons (i.e. time preference for the present) having a negative
effect on the likelihood of saving and net wealth. In our analysis, we use an ex-
perimental measure of impatience, time inconsistency with respect to impatience
and the planning horizon with respect to financial decisions. Furthermore we cal-
culated the BMI from weight and height of subjects. The BMI serves as a proxy
for temptation and self control (Hofmann, Friese, and Roefs, 2009; Moffitt et al.,
2011). It also serves as a proxy for health status that is positively associated with
the likelihood of saving (Fisher and Montalto, 2010, 2011).
3.5 Results
The section is organized as follows: we first give a characterisation of our sample
in terms of socioeconomic characteristics, risk and time measures. Then we use
these measures in order to explain net savings and finally we model individual
precautionary savings motives, i.e. income uncertainty, and relate them to net
savings.
3.5.1 Descriptive Statistics
We obtain the full set of household characteristics from 680 subjects of which
72% were female. The mean age was 49 years and spanned from 24 to 87 years.
The median education level is primary school. In the financial literacy test, sub-
jects answered on average 9.29 questions out of 18 correctly. The average BMI
is slightly above 25, the threshold to mild overweight. The average income
per household member is 319 thousand Colombian Pesos (COP) and the average
debt is 1.64 million Pesos, which leaves an average of -1.36 million Pesos in net
savings.
21. Some studies focused on the likelihood of saving, others on the amount of saving. Since we
use the same control variables for estimating the likelihood and the amount of saving, we include
a variable (if possible) that has been found to either affect the likelihood of saving or the amount
or both.
22. In total, we were asking 18 questions on financial literacy concerning interest rate, asset
classes, basic math and financial math. The variable included in the regression corresponds to the
number of correctly answered questions.
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55 percent of our sample has neither savings nor any debt and average net-
savings amount to -1,361,000 COP (710 USD). Around 85 percent of our popula-
tion has no savings and average savings in the sample are 276,000 COP (140 USD),
which is less than a month’s average per capita household income. Around
27 percent of those reporting non-zero savings save exclusively in cash, another
20 percent save exclusively using other savings technologies. About 34 percent
are saving exclusively for housing, of which roughly the half uses a special fund,
whereas the other half uses any form of saving device. Average debt amounts
to 1,637,000 COP (850 USD) and 38 percent of our sample hold positive debt.
Table 3.1 provides an overview of the demographic characteristics.
TABLE 3.1: Summary Statistics
Mean Med. s.d. Min Max Obs.
Male 0.28 0.00 0.45 0.00 1.00 680
Age 48.87 49.00 13.43 24.00 87.00 680
Education 2.48 2.00 0.70 1.00 4.00 680
Financial literacy 9.29 10.00 3.39 0.00 16.00 680
BMI 25.75 25.51 4.31 12.89 42.97 680
Adult HH members 2.85 3.00 1.41 1.00 12.00 680
Children HH members 1.21 1.00 1.29 0.00 7.00 680
Income 3.19 2.77 2.25 0.01 18.00 680
Savings (100k) 2.76 0.00 15.18 0.00 200.00 680
Debt (100k) 16.37 0.00 61.85 0.00 588.04 680
Net savings (100k) -13.61 0.00 63.94 -588.04 187.00 680
Zero net-savings 0.55 1.00 0.50 0.00 1.00 680
3.5.2 Risk Aversion, Prudence and Time Preferences
TABLE 3.2: Summary Statistics of Risk and Time Measures
Mean Med. s.d. Min Max Obs.
Risk Aversion (A&P) 0.03 -0.01 1.17 -2.43 2.86 588
Prudence (C&E) 7.24 7.61 6.28 -0.50 25.70 588
Prudence (Kimball) 1.59 2.13 1.03 -2.22 3.13 126
Impatience 29.60 22.00 15.41 16.00 52.00 693
Increase in patience 0.13 0.95 16.35 -38.90 36.95 693
Table 3.2 shows the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of risk aversion, measures of pru-
dence and time preferences. The distributions of the measures of prudence is
shown in Figure 3.3. The mean annual interest rate r subjects asked to receive
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FIGURE 3.3: Histograms of Prudence Measures
an amount x(1 + r/12) in 60 days instead of an amount x in 30 days is 29.6 per-
cent. This figure is in the range of estimates from recent experiments with the
general population in Denmark (Harrison, Lau, and Williams, 2002), which seem
best suited for comparisons since our data is from the general population as well.
On average, this interest rate or mean impatience stays approximately constant
when the timing is changed to receiving the monetary amounts in 180 or 210
days, respectively.
We obtained a full set of risk preference measures for 588 subjects. Table 3.3
gives an overview over the classification of risk and prudence as measured based
on optimally smoothed P-spline regression. We observe that all combinations of
risk aversion and prudence attitudes are present, confirming previous findings by
Noussair, Trautmann, and Kuilen (2014) that even risk lovers can be prudent.23
48 percent of the subjects show risk aversion24 and roughly 60 percent are pru-
dent. The most unlikely combination, with below 3 percent, is being risk loving
and imprudent. So utility functions that require risk-loving subjects to be im-
prudent are not sufficiently flexible to describe our data. When considering the
strength of prudence, Table 3.4 reports a substantial correlation between the Kim-
ball measure of prudence and risk aversion, while we do not see this correlation
for the C&E measure—illustrated in Figure 3.4. This difference is important for
empirical work, as the precautionary motive for saving is driven by the strength
of prudence. So in order to attribute savings decisions to a precautionary motive
makes it necessary to estimate these concepts separately.
23. Crainich, Eeckhoudt, and Trannoy (2013) theoretically show that prudent risk lovers devote
all their income to saving.
24. When classifying individuals based on the fitted coefficient of a power utility function,
around 2/3 of the sample are to be considered risk averse.
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TABLE 3.3: Classification of Risk Aversion and Prudence
Risk averse Risk loving Mixed Total
pct pct pct pct
Imprudent 4.76 2.55 0.68 7.99
Prudent 29.25 26.87 1.87 57.99
Mixed 14.46 19.05 0.51 34.01
Total 48.47 48.47 3.06 100.00
Notes: This table reports the share of risk-averse and prudent individuals
according to the classification described in Section 3.3.4. The measures
were computed using optimally smoothed spline functions, evaluated
at and averaged over 1000 points in the support. Risk neutrality and
prudence neutrality is a probability zero event, so none of our subjects
was classified and we omit this category.
TABLE 3.4: Correlation of Risk Aversion, Different Measures of Pru-







Risk Aversion (A&P) 1
Prudence (C&E) -0.0373 1
Prudence (Kimball) 0.671??? 0.757??? 1
Impatience 0.0275 0.0308 0.0930 1
Notes: This table reports the correlation coefficients between risk aversion
and the prudence measures—calculated based on optimally smoothed
spline functions—as well as time preferences. Prudence (C&E) is the
Crainich-Eckhoud measure of prudence. Risk Aversion (A&P) is the
Arrow-Pratt measure of risk aversion. Results of t-tests indicated at
following significance levels ? p < 0.10; ?? p < 0.05; ??? p < 0.01.
3.5.3 Precautionary Savings and Prudence
We now turn to the relationship between our experimental measure of prudence
and wealth. As we laid out in Section 3.2, we expect to observe a positive relation-
ship between our measure of the strength of prudence and people’s accumulated
wealth—given present or past income uncertainty. We run OLS regressions on
net savings on our preferred Crainich and Eeckhoudt-measure of risk attitudes.25
We use several sets of control variables motivated by previous studies (e.g. Nous-
sair, Trautmann, and Kuilen, 2014). We report the results in Table 3.5.
In all specifications including both the risk averse and the risk loving we find
a significant positive relationship between prudence and wealth. When analyz-
ing both subgroups independently, we find a significant positive relationship
25. Robustness checks applying the measure by Kimball (1990) can be found in Appendix B.4.
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FIGURE 3.4: Bin Scatterplot of Risk Aversion and Prudence
TABLE 3.5: Net Savings and Prudence (C&E)
Full Sample Risk Averse Risk Loving
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Prudence (C&E) 1.140??? 1.161??? 1.114?? 1.707??? 1.468??? 0.560 0.651
(0.422) (0.422) (0.431) (0.641) (0.559) (0.601) (0.724)
Risk Aversion (A&P) 3.329? 3.291 0.637 6.038
(2.002) (2.134) (3.120) (5.325)
Controls No No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 567 567 554 270 267 279 271
Notes: This table reports the results of ordinary least squares regressions
on net savings. Classification of risk aversion according to Section 3.3.4.
Prudence (C&E) is the Crainich-Eckhoud measure of prudence. Risk
Aversion (A&P) is the Arrow-Pratt measure of risk aversion. The con-
trols are time preferences, gender, age, financial literacy, body mass in-
dex (BMI), household members (adults and children), income as mea-
sured as the average income per household member, planning horizon
and education. Coefficients of controls can be found in Appendix B.4.
We account for potential heteroskedasticity by robust standard errors.
Results of t-tests indicated at following significance levels ? p < 0.10;
?? p < 0.05; ??? p < 0.01.
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only for the risk-averse subsample. When excluding those that neither save nor
are indebted, however, the relationship is significantly positive also for the risk-
loving (see Table B.3 in Appendix B.4). Furthermore, as reported in Appendix B.4,
we find a positive relationship between the length of the planning horizon and
wealth. People who have a longer planning horizon than the next day have sig-
nificantly higher wealth. Financial literacy is surprisingly negatively related to
holding higher levels of wealth.
3.5.4 Income Risk
We now turn to the analysis of the impact of individual income risk, prudence
and net savings. Several previous empirical studies have identified prudence
parameters from consumption volatility (Guiso, Jappelli, and Terlizzese, 1992;
Dynan, 1993; Fagereng, Guiso, and Pistaferri, 2017). Fagereng, Guiso, and Pista-
ferri (2017) instrument consumption volatility with firm specific shocks that pass
through to wages. We construct a similar measure of income risk by looking at
firm closures by sector, see Section 3.4. Figure 3.5 shows the distribution of our
measure of income risk aggregated at the Localidad level.
We regress net income on the prudence measure interacted with the probabil-
ity of firm closure. The empirical model can be written as follows:
W =α + β1 Prudence + β2 Shock + β3 Prudence × Prudence + β4X + ε
(3.12)
This allows us to answer the question, whether prudent subjects who are con-
fronted with a higher background risk accumulated higher levels of wealth as
predicted by our theoretical framework. Results are presented in Table 3.6.
Column (1) in Table 3.6 shows the raw correlations. The main effect of pru-
dence is positive and highly significant and so is the interaction term of income
risk with prudence. Hence, more prudent people save more when facing higher
income risk. This effect is robust to the inclusion of controls in column (2). When
restricting the sample to only risk averse agents, the coefficients on the interac-
tion term stay positive, however they are not significant at conventional levels
for the interaction term, unless controls are included. For the risk-loving agents,
however, we observe a positive and significant coefficient on the raw correlation
of the interaction term. After including control variables, this coefficient is only
significant if focusing on those that are saving or are indebted (see Table B.6 in
Appendix B.4). When using the Kimball measure of prudence we get large, but
insignificant coefficients (see Table B.4 in Appendix B.4).
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FIGURE 3.5: Income Uncertainty in Bogota: Ratio of Closed to Exist-
ing Businesses in 2013.
Notes: Individuals are categorized based on the economic activity they
perform according to the ISIC Rev. IIIa A.C. categorization as used e.g.
by DANE for their household survey. At this aggregation level, offi-
cial data on firm closure is available e.g. from the Knowledge Manage-
ment Board of the Chamber of Commerce of Bogota. Participants are
assigned a level of income uncertainty corresponding to the ratio of
firm closure in the working sector they are classified.
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TABLE 3.6: Net Savings, Firm Closures and Prudence (C&E)
Full Sample Risk Averse Risk Loving
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Income risk -1.746 -1.479 -1.863 -1.399 0.768 2.146
(2.354) (2.405) (2.870) (3.031) (3.293) (3.412)
Prudence (C&E) 1.240??? 1.115?? 2.224??? 2.036??? 0.298 0.199
(0.461) (0.471) (0.769) (0.739) (0.613) (0.660)
Prudence (C&E)
× Income risk 1.015?? 1.066?? 0.856 1.037? 0.984? 0.925
(0.424) (0.416) (0.600) (0.566) (0.588) (0.566)
Risk Aversion (A&P) 4.644? 2.231 9.500?
(2.408) (4.460) (5.666)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 471 459 218 215 237 230
Notes: This table reports the results of ordinary least squares regressions
on net savings. Classification of risk aversion according to Section 3.3.4.
Prudence (C&E) is the Crainich-Eckhoud measure of prudence. Risk
Aversion (A&P) is the Arrow-Pratt measure of risk aversion. Income
risk is measured as the ratio of closed to existing businesses in 2013 in
the working sector an individual was usually working in at the time
of the survey. Prudence and income risk are centered. The controls are
time preferences, gender, age, financial literacy, body mass index (BMI),
household members (adults and children), income as measured as the
average income per household member, planning horizon and educa-
tion. Coefficients of controls can be found in Appendix B.4. We account
for potential heteroskedasticity by robust standard errors. Results of t-
tests indicated at following significance levels ? p < 0.10; ?? p < 0.05;
??? p < 0.01.
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Fuchs-Schündeln and Schündeln (2005) show that in Germany there is sort-
ing into risky sectors according to risk aversion and line out its implications for
precautionary savings motives. We do not find a correlation with the measure of
risk aversion and the sector where subjects are employed. Moreover, we are able
to control for risk aversion.
3.6 Conclusion
In this study, we have investigated the connection between prudence, income
riks and savings. We have demonstrated how the intensity measure for prudence
by Crainich and Eeckhoudt (2008) is linked to the strength of the precaution-
ary saving demand for risk-averse and risk-loving individuals building on the
model by Leland (1968). Moreover, we have shown that especially for the latter,
a saving rate strictly higher than 0 and strictly lower than 1 may be optimal, con-
trarily to the predictions of previous models (Crainich, Eeckhoudt, and Trannoy,
2013). To test the theoretical predictions from this model, we have introduced
a new method to elicit higher order risk preferences including their intensities
non-parametrically.
Applying our method to a sample of poor households in Bogota, Colombia
we find comparable results with respect to prudence as for example Tarazona-
Gomez (2004) in her experiment with students in Bogota. The results regarding
risk aversion are also in line with previous findings (Tarazona-Gomez, 2004), al-
though we find a higher share of risk-loving individuals.
We find strong support for the theory of precautionary saving, including our
extension: According to the theoretical framework, prudent individuals react to
income uncertainty by raising their saving. This should lead to higher savings,
and those who are more likely to face income uncertainty should hold higher sav-
ings. Those who are more prudent than others with respect to different intensity
measures should hold higher savings, irrespective of them being risk averse or
risk loving, as we have shown.
This relationship can be found in the data and it is robust—even when we pool
risk-averse and risk-seeking individuals. Of course, our finding relies on corre-
lational data only and we cannot draw causal conclusions. However, given that
we use experimental data for prudence, secondary data for income uncertainty
and many control variables that have been found to influence savings before, we
think our findings lead into the right direction.
Although our results are in line with previous findings, it would be interesting
to see how our method compares to the more complicated risk apportionment
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tasks going back to the definition of higher order risk attitudes by Eeckhoudt
and Schlesinger (2006) on the same sample, depending on the cognitive ability of
participants. To that end, it would be helpful to see an implementation of these
tasks that is less prone to probability weighting or the application of reference
points and thus as model free as the definitions itself.
We find prudence to be strongly linked to a higher level of net savings. While
preferences like risk aversion and time preferences have failed to explain a low
level of wealth empirically, prudence seems to be of importance. Further studies
are needed, especially in order to establish causality. Even without causality, po-
litical interventions aiming to use prudence in order to advance the population’s
well-being might be fruitful. Moreover, our results suggests that the sample un-
der study has a high demand for consumption smoothing and would thus profit
from a suitable solution.
Chapter 4
The min MSE Treatment Assignment
Method
This chapter is joint work with Martin Schlather.
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4.1 Introduction
From the early days of experiments involving random treatment allocation, re-
searchers have thought about the methodology used to ensure the decisive funda-
ment of every experiment—similar treatment groups in the absence of the treat-
ment. When discussing Darwin’s experiment comparing the growth of crossed
and self-fertilized plants, Fisher (1935) argues that it is not enough to randomly
assign plots to the treatment or the control, i.e. to crossed or self-fertilized plants.
He explains that an unbiased experiment alone does not “ensure the validity of
the estimates, [...] for it might well be that some unknown circumstance, such
as the incidence of different illumination at different times of the day [...], might
systematically favour all the plants on one [plot] over those on the other.”
Had the experiment have been repeated several times, or had a large number
of plots been used, any difference caused by those “unknown circumstances”
would have been diminished in expectation. The same is of course true for known
or observed circumstances.
Fisher noticed that an increase in the precision of the experiment could also
be achieved differently—by making the groups more similar. His suggestion to
achieve both the validity of the estimates and an increase in precision was to
change the level of randomization by allowing plants from both groups to be
planted in the two available plots, thus being exposed to the circumstances of
both plots.
Hence, not only from the perspective of validity, but also with respect to effi-
ciently estimating the size of an outcome of an experiment, it is desirable to have
similar or balanced treatment groups. More recently, a motivation for seeking bal-
ance across treatment groups comes from the interest in subgroup analysis. Fi-
nally, a quantity often estimated in the recent impact evaluation literature—the
conditional average treatment effect—can formally only be estimated if the so
called overlap condition (Abadie and Imbens, 2006) is satisfied, which can be de-
scribed as a weak criterion of balance.
In this paper, we present a new method to assign experimental units to treat-
ment groups in a way that the resulting groups are balanced. The method falls in
the category of rerandomization methods and builds on a theoretically derived
statistic that aims at balancing the second moments of the covariate distributions
and incorporates dependencies between covariates. Moreover, within a model
where the conditional average treatment effect depends linearly on the covari-
ates, the mean squared error of the estimator for this treatment effect is mini-
mized.
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When relying on randomization alone, balanced groups are not ensured. Fol-
lowing Fisher’s suggestion as an example, it could—by pure chance—be that all
self-fertilized and all crossed plants are still allocated to separate plots.
Therefore, it has long been recognized that group characteristics or circum-
stances should be accounted for when assigning the treatment to experimental
subjects and subsequently analyzing such experiments, see e.g. Cox (1957) for
an early review of the possibilities to do so. Today, several strategies are widely
used, although there is no consent on how treatment assignment should be car-
ried out, even among experts in field research (see e.g. the survey by Bruhn and
McKenzie, 2009). Also from a theoretical perspective, a clear answer is missing;
see e.g. Imbens (2011) for a brief discussion.
Stratification or blocking goes back to Fisher (1935). The idea is to build sub-
groups according to observable characteristics and to randomize within those
subgroups. Although this improves ‘balance’ in comparison to purely random
treatment assignment, it is impractical in several aspects. Using stratification, it
is only possible to balance a very limited number of variables. Furthermore, con-
tinuous variables have to be arbitrarily discretized and are never really balanced
with this approach. Additional problems arise in implementing this method
when the number of participants is not divisible by the number of subgroups.
Pairwise matching is often seen as the limit case of stratification, when the
subgroups consist of only two individuals. The subgroups, called pairs in the case
of matching, have to be created1 such that the two individuals are similar, where
the similarity can be measured e.g. with the so-called Mahalanobis distance of
the covariate vectors of the two individuals. Two types of algorithms are com-
monly used: the so-called greedy algorithm (Imai, King, and Nall, 2009) and an
‘optimal matching’ algorithm (Greevy et al., 2004; Lu et al., 2011). Matching can
be realized with many possible continuous variables and thus eliminates some
of the shortcomings of stratification. This, however, comes at the cost of analyti-
cal difficulties when estimating the variance of the treatment effect (e.g. Imbens,
2011; Abadie and Imbens, 2006; Klar and Donner, 1997). Additional problems
arise when attrition occurs, i.e. when for some units the outcome finally is un-
observed, especially in small samples or when performing randomization at the
cluster level: For every unit, possibly consisting of many individuals, dropping
out of the experiment, its pair should also be removed, which lowers the sample
size and power and can be of major concern. Additionally, we are unaware of an
existing approach to extend matching to multiple treatment arms. Furthermore,
1. Note that this is a different task to the one performed for matching in observational studies:
Finding pairs when groups have already been formed is far less demanding, also from a compu-
tational aspect.
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matching can only be performed when the number of units is even. Finally, the
matching approach implemented by Bruhn and McKenzie (2009), needed several
days to conduct treatment assignment with a sample size of 300 units, so this
approach is inappropriate if time is a limiting factor.
Several so called rerandomization methods have evolved, probably because
of the theoretical or practical limitations of the abovementioned approaches. The
basic idea of rerandomization is to pick a random treatment assignment in some
way, evaluate it with respect to a certain criteria and rerandomize until this cri-
teria meets some condition to be specified or to rerandomize a certain number of
times and choose the best assignment, according to a specified evaluation criteria.
Sometimes, subjective judgment is also used (Bruhn and McKenzie, 2009). How-
ever, we are aware of only one rerandomization approach, the one by Morgan
and Rubin (2012), that relies on a theoretical derivation of the statistical thresh-
old to stop the rerandomization. This threshold, as well as the alternative ad-hoc
thresholds, such as picking the maximum t-value minimizing treatment group
assignment, focuses only on the mean value of one or serveral covariates, ignor-
ing other dimensions of the distributions of the variables to be balanced. Irre-
spectively of this limitation, we are unaware of a software implementation of this
approach or an extension to multiple treatment arms.
Kasy (2016) applies a decision theoretical, Bayesian approach to determine
treatment assignment. To that end, he derives the posterior mean squared er-
ror (MSE) of an estimator for the conditional average treatment effect of interest
as a function of treatment assignment. The posterior MSE, i.e. the sum of bias
and variance, is then to be minimized across treatment assignments. When the
estimator is modeled with a linear model, this leads to a decision criterion that
balances not only the mean of the variables of interest, but also partial correla-
tions.
Based on the introduced decision theoretical framework, Kasy (2016) argues
that a deterministic assignment rule is superior to any random assignment in
terms of minimizing the MSE.
However, the drawbacks of this method are the limitations to only one treat-
ment group and the number and nature of the parameters used; in that to apply
this approach, the researcher has to specify a mean vector and a covariance ma-
trix of the regression coefficient vector in a linear model explaining the potential
outcomes as a function of covariates. In addition, a guess for R2, the coefficient
of determination, of that linear regression model must be specified. Apart from
that, a non-random treatment assignment rules out the possibility to perform a
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conventional randomization inference. To date, the only software implementa-
tion we are aware of is in Matlab (Kasy, 2016).
We develop the approach in a frequentist approach, thereby simplifying the
method considerably for the case when potential outcomes are modeled as lin-
ear functions of covariates. We suggest a way to extend Kasy’s (2016) method to
assign multiple treatments. For the developed method, we provide a software
implementation as an ado-package for Stata and thus increase its usability in the
respective areas of application. Apart from that, we interpret and implement the
method as a rerandomization method, which yields the possibility of randomiza-
tion inference.
Bayesian modeling allows for a greater flexibility in many cases because it
relies on distributions instead of parameters. In this case, however, at least when
using a linear model, disproportionately many parameters have to be specified,
as just explained. We think that even for experienced researchers, it is hard to
come up with a reasonable guess on these parameters. Of course, one could use
a flat prior, inducing nearly no prior information. In this case, however, one can
also resign from using prior information, as it simplifies the objective function
and consequently the method considerably.
Therefore, we introduce the approach in a frequentist setting. This means
that we only get a point estimate instead of a distribution for any result. As the
method is designed to minimize the MSE (a point estimate), this comes without
limitations.
An advantageous side effect is that we can factor out variances of the deci-
sion criteria and thus, it is sufficient to specify ratios of variances relative to a
base variance. The assumption of equal variances is an intuitive assumption that
experienced researchers quickly can confirm or withdraw, and in the latter case,
easily adjust by specifying a good guess for scaling up the variance of a treatment
or an outcome.
Our result works without choosing any technical parameters while still allow-
ing for the needed flexibility. In the treatment assignment mechanism derived
here, the only parameter that must be specified by the researcher is the number
of treatment groups desired; other parameters can be specified, but can be left
constant unless a better guess is available. These default values have an intuitive
interpretation and are not chosen by us, but follow from the theoretical derivation
of the method as laid out in this paper.
Furthermore, this method can be applied irrespective of the number of treat-
ment arms, the number of units in the experiment and its relation to the number
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of treatments and variables (even or uneven, divisibility by the number of treat-
ments, ...). Another feature is its speed: Compared to the Bayesian approach,
but also compared to competing methods of treatment assignment, a reasonably
good balance for a sample size of 100 units and 10 variables is usually achieved
in less than 5 minutes on a 2.3 Ghz dual CPU.
In a simulation study similar to the one by Bruhn and McKenzie (2009), we
compare the performance of our min MSE method in various dimensions to com-
peting methods and find that it is comparable to the matching methods and su-
perior to stratification or pure randomization. In addition, the min MSE method
is tolerant of attrition, i.e. of units whose outcome finally is unobserved, for ex-
ample because treatment is never received although it was planned.
The structure of this paper is as follows: Section 4.2 introduces our approach
to treatment assignment. Section 4.3 describes theoretical characteristics of the
min MSE approach that are put into context of alternative methods of treatment
assignment in Section 4.4. Section 4.5 explains the design of the simulation study
and its implementation. Section 4.6 reports the results. Section 4.7 discusses our
method and concludes.
4.2 The min MSE Treatment Assignment Mechanism
4.2.1 Estimation of the Treatment Effect
First, we define the parameter we are interested in estimating: the conditional av-
erage treatment effect. We do so by introducing the potential-outcome framework
(Rubin, 1974, 1977), as this is the standard notation in the literature on program
evaluation (Imbens, 2004). As we derive the minimizing MSE treatment assign-
ment procedure for various treatment effects and various outcomes, we directly
extend the framework to fit our needs.
Assume, we have N participants, randomly selected for the experiment from
the population. Individual draws of a (random) variable are indicated with a
subscript i = 1, . . . , N and realizations of a random variable or vector will be
denoted by the corresponding lower-case letter.
In the experiment, each individual is randomly assigned to an experimental
group and treated with the corresponding treatment or not treated at all if as-
signed to the control group.
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Definition 1. Assume we have nd treatments indicated by 1, . . . , nd and a control
denoted by 0. Let D1, . . . , DN be random variables with values in {0, 1, . . . , nd}.
Then, the vector D = (D1, . . . , DN)> is called a (random) treatment group assign-
ment.
Irrespective of the treatment group assigned to, each participant has potential
outcomes, observed outcomes and a vector of pretreatment information, which
we call covariates.
Definition 2. Let X = (Xj,i)j=1,...,m;i=1,...,N be a random matrix. Then the vec-
tor Xi = (X1,i, . . . , Xm,i)> is called the vector of covariates of individual i.
Definition 3. Let Y pi = (Y
p,k
i,t )t=1,...,nd;k=1,...,ny be a random matrix for i = 1, . . . , N .
Then the row vector Y pi,t = (Y
p,1
i,t , . . . , Y
p,ny
i,t ) is called the vector of potential outcomes
of individual i in the case of treatment t, where ny is the number of outcomes of
interest.
These potential outcomes of individual i in the case of treatment t exist irrespec-
tive of whether individual i was actually treated with treatment t or not. How-
ever, for every unit and outcome of interest, we only observe the realized outcome.
Definition 4. Let Y r = (Y r,ki )i=1,...,N ;k=1,...,ny be a random matrix. Then the row
vector Y ri = (Y
r,1
i , . . . , Y
r,ny
i ) is called the vector of realized outcomes of individual i.
The realized outcomes Y ri of individual i can be written by means of potential

















The right-hand side of the above formula decomposes the realized outcomes
for an individual in her potential outcomes. The differences Y pi,t − Y
p
i,0, which are
the causal effects of the treatment t, would be of great interest in any study, but
can never be observed.
However, under certain conditions, we can estimate the population average
effect of treatment t:
τt = E
[




, for all t = 1, . . . , nd,
which—depending on the question—is often sufficient.
If the main interest is to study a subpopulation (e.g. the poor), or when one is
not sure whether or not the sample at hand is representative for the population,
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one should focus on the conditional average treatment effect (Imbens, 2004). This
happens frequently in Development Economics, for instance.
Definition 5 (Conditional Average Treatment Effect). Let X , Y pi,t and Y
p
i,0 as in
Definition 2 and 3. For every treatment t ∈ {1, . . . , nd},











is called the conditional average treatment effect of treatment t. The random matrix
T = (τt,k)t=1,...,nd;k=1,...ny contains all of the conditional treatment effects.
For identification of the conditional average treatment effect, further assump-
tions are needed and discussed, e.g. in Imbens (2004) or Abadie and Imbens
(2006). The most important assumption, the Conditional Independence Assump-
tion (sometimes called unconfoundedness assumption), means that potential out-
comes are independent of the group and therefore treatment assignment, condi-
tional on covariates. If the Conditional Independence Assumption holds, any po-
tential selection bias vanishes and the observed difference in average outcomes
conditional on the observables between the treatment and the control group can
be interpreted as the causal, conditional treatment effect.
The second most important assumption is the so called overlap assumption,
which basically says that all characteristics observed in a treatment group have
to be found amongst the individuals in the control group, because otherwise,
a comparison of the expected potential outcomes, given those covariates, is not
possible. It is generally never guaranteed that this is possible, but a powerful
treatment assignment procedure will make it more probable. Formally (Abadie
and Imbens, 2006) we have
Assumption 1 (Conditional Independence Assumption and Overlap Condition).
For every t = 0, 1, . . . , nd, for almost every x ∈ X, where X denotes the support of
Xi and i = 1, . . . , N , the following conditions hold:
Di is independent of Y
p
i conditional on Xi = x; (CIA)
η < Pr(Di = t |Xi = x) for some η > 0. (Overlap)
4.2.2 A Mean Squared Error Based Minimization Function
The Mean Squared Error of an estimator τ̂ conditional on X is defined as
MSE(τ̂ |X) = E
[
(τ̂ − τ)2 |X
]
,
4.2. The min MSE Treatment Assignment Mechanism 85
where τ is the real-valued parameter to be estimated. The MSE can be decom-
posed into the variance and bias of the estimator, conditional on X , and thus
results in a measure of efficiency for unbiased estimators, given a specific set of
data X .
More generally, let wd = (wd1, . . . , wdnd) and w
y = (wy1 , . . . , w
y
ny) be non-negative
vectors that weight treatments t ≥ 1 and outcomes, respectively. Then, for the




wy), we define the conditional
weighted MSE component-wise as
MSE(T̂ , wd, wy |X) = E





where ‖ · ‖F denotes the Frobenius norm. If weights shall not be considered,
wd and wy will be vectors with entries 1 only, so diag(wy) and diag(wd) will be
the ny × ny and nd × nd identity matrix, respectively. We assume wd and wy be
independent of T .
The expectation of the squared Frobenius norm of the matrix T̂ − T with its
corresponding weights is—because of linearity—simply the trace of the expected
‘squared’ weighted error matrix:


























Objective Function The objective is to minimize the generalized MSE (4.1).
Hence, we seek an estimator T̂ minimizing this function for the given weights
wd and wy:
ST (T̂ ) = MSE(T̂ , w
d, wy |X).
As the quantity of interest, the conditional average treatment effect, is a func-
tion of the covariates, it is natural to start from this point: Suppose the estimator
of the treatment effects T̂ is a function of X , so T̂ = m(X). As the weights do
not depend on T̂ , ST (T̂ ) is given by the trace of E
[
(m(X)− T )>(m(X)− T ) |X
]
,
which can be written as
(m(X)− E[T |X])>(m(X)− E[T |X]) + E
[
(E[T |X]− T )>(E[T |X]− T ) |X
]
.
86 Chapter 4. The min MSE Treatment Assignment Method
Since the last summand does not involvem(X), ST (T̂ ) is minimized by setting
m(X) = E(T |X). With that,
E[T |X] ∈ argmin
T̂
ST (T̂ ).
Considering the t-th row of the matrix E[T |X] and using the definition of the
Conditional Average Treatment Effect (Definition 5) yields































treatment groups t = 0, 1, . . . , nd.
4.2.3 A Linear Model for Potential Outcomes
We choose a linear model for the relationship between covariates and potential
outcomes.
Assumption 2 (Potential outcomes are linear functions of covariates).







for i = 1, . . . , N , k = 1, . . . , ny and t = 0, 1, . . . , nd with
Y p,ki,t a random number taking values in R,
Xi a random vector of length m with values in R,
βp,kt the vector of deterministic parameters of dimension m and
εp,ki,t a real-valued random number.
We assume (Y pi , Xi) independent and identically distributed for all i = 1, . . . , N .
For the error terms, we assume εp,ki,t |Xi ∼ N (0, σ2t,k) for all i = 1, . . . , N and all
k = 1, . . . , ny, t = 0, 1, . . . , nd. Moreover, we assume independence between ε
p,k
i,t
and εp,ki,0 for i = 1, . . . , N, k = 1, . . . , ny and t = 1, . . . , nd. The variances are ex-
pressed in relation to a ‘base’ variance: σ2t,k = st,kσ
2
0,k for all t = 1, . . . , nd, k =
1, . . . , ny with st,k > 0 and σ20,k = s0,kσ
2
0 with s0,k > 0 for all k = 1, . . . , ny and for a
σ20 > 0.
Let the submatrix Xt of X contain the covariate vectors of all individuals in
treatment group t, that isXt := (Xi1 , Xi2 , . . . , Xint ) for {i1, i2, . . . , int} = {i : Di = t}.
Then, the objective function can be expressed conveniently in terms of covari-
ates, treatment group assignment and possibly weights, as the following theorem
shows.
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t,kst,k for k = 1, . . . , ny
and t = 1, . . . , ny.
The proof of Theorem 1 is in Appendix C.1.
Corollary 3. Under the condition of Theorem 1 and assuming the same variance for
all outcomes and treatment groups, including the control group (i.e. st,k = 1 for all
t = 0, 1, . . . , nd and all k = 1, . . . , ny) and neglecting any weights (i.e. assuming
wdt = w
y




















Contrary to the result by Kasy (2016), our approach is more applicable as the
researcher is relieved from guessing any (absolute) values. This is because we
do not assume a prior distribution for βp,kt , as such there is no need to specify
its parameters: a mean or—more difficult—a covariance matrix for this parame-
ter vector for every combination of k and t in case of an assumed normal prior
distribution. Furthermore, there is no need of specifying the R2 for the model of
each potential outcome in order to express the model’s variance. Instead, one can
simply specify the relative scaling factors.
4.3 Characteristics of the min MSE Treatment Assign-
ment Method
In what follows, we study the theoretical characteristics of the min MSE treatment
assignment procedure.
Proposition 4. Under the conditions of Corollary 3, (4.3) is constant under a transfor-
mation of the vector (Xj,1, . . . , Xj,N) 7→ (cXj,1, . . . , cXj,N) for any c 6= 0 and for any
j = 1, . . . ,m.
The proof of Proposition 4 is in Appendix C.1.
Proposition 4 states that the min MSE Treatment Assignment Procedure is
scale invariant in the sense that the corresponding minimization criterion (4.3) is
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unaffected by changing the scale of a covariate. This feature is desirable, since it
renders rescaling of the data unnecessary, but at the same time leaves the freedem
to do so.
Proposition 5. Assume Xk,i is orthogonal to Xj,i for k, j = 1, . . . ,m, k 6= j with
respect to the inner product < ·, · >2 of L2, i.e. E[Xk,iXj,i] = 0. Furthermore, assume
all covariates have the same mean, i.e.E[Xi] = c(1, . . . , 1)> for any c 6= 0. Then, for














The proof of Proposition 5 is in Appendix C.1.
Proposition 5 states that—provided the covariates are orthogonal and have
equal mean—the MSE for nd = 1 is decreased, if the sum of squared observations
of the covariates are increased in both groups and among all covariates. That is,
the absolute deviation from 0 is ‘balanced’ for all covariates across groups. In
the simple case of one treatment and one control group, equally sized, with one
covariate considered for treatment assignment, this is equivalent to balancing the
second moment of the distribution of the covariate of interest. This makes the
min MSE procedure a unique method in the sense that ’balance’ incorporates not
just the mean, but a higher moment of the distribution of covariates. It is exactly
this property that makes the groups comparable in the sense that the different
subgroups–if any–are to be found in all experimental groups.
Proposition 6. Under the conditions of Corollary 3, now allowing for arbitrary mean
values of the covariates and arbitrary relationships between covariates, the diagonal ele-
ments of the matrix
(
X0X0
>)−1 + (XtXt>)−1 in (4.3) are given by










(X0j,i − X̄0j )2]
(4.5)
for every t ≥ 1 and every j = 1, . . . ,m, where ∝ denotes equality up to a multiplicative
constant and the value of the j-th covariate of individual i in treatment group t is denoted
by X tj,i and X̄ denotes the mean. Rtj
2 is the coefficient of determination of a regression
between the variable X tj as response and all X tp for p = 1, . . . ,m, p 6= j as explanatory
variables; for all t = 0, 1, . . . , nd. The number of individuals in treatment group t and
the control group is denoted by nt and n0 respectively.
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The proof of Proposition 6 is in Appendix C.1.
The sum on the right-hand side of (4.5) is decreased for every t ≥ 1 and ev-
ery covariate j = 1, . . . ,m, if the linear dependencies between covariates within
groups are decreased. This introduces a certain orthogonality criterion, with
Rtj = 0 when all other covariates in the group are (partially) uncorrelated with
the covariate Xj . When covariates are perfectly collinear, we would have Rtj = 1
(however, in this case, the covariance matrix of the estimator of the parameter
vector does not even exist, as XtX>t is not invertible). Thus by having this crite-
rion in the objective formula, we reward a grouping that avoids multicollinearity
and punish a high level of similarity amongst the combination of covariates in a
group. Note, however, that this grouping might not minimize off-diagonal en-
tries of the sum of the covariance matrices.
Would the off-diagonal entries be minimized in the same way than the diago-
nal entries according to (4.5), then, when balancing the covariates age and house-
hold income for example, a family’s twin children living in the same household
should not be placed in the same group. Consider the extreme case with two twin
pairs and two groups: If twin pairs are in the same group, within each group, both
variables are perfectly predictable by the other. The more combinations of covari-
ates can be found in a group, the smaller Rtj
2. However, a reduction in R1j
2 might
lead to an increase in R0j
2. Therefore, (4.5) is decreased for every t ≥ 1 and ev-
ery covariate j = 1, . . . ,m, if for one group, more combinations of covariates can




The second part influencing (4.5) is the within-group variation of variable j
around its mean. The higher the variation, the lower the variance. Again, an
increase in overall variance can only be achieved if an increase in a variable’s
variation in one group does not lower that variable’s variation in the other to the
same extent or more.
Especially the first part is interesting, as it shows a characteristic that is also
inherent in matching: Two very similar subjects should not be allocated to the
same group. This characteristic additionally distinguishes the min MSE proce-
dure from other rerandomization methods, as it considers the complete composi-
tion of covariate values in a group instead of considering all covariates indepen-
dently.
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4.4 Comparison of the min MSE Treatment Assign-
ment Method with Alternatives
4.4.1 Pair-Wise Matching
Consider treatment assignment for a treatment and a control group, where for
every individual i, one covariate xi is observed and the treatment should be
assigned such that this covariate is balanced across the treatment and control
groups.
Theorem 2. Pair-wise matching before treatment assignment is a ‘max min sum of vari-
ances’ approach.
The proof of Theorem 2 is in Appendix C.1.
In essence, this theorem shows that also matching aims at balancing a higher
moment of the covariate distribution than the mean, as does the min MSE ap-
proach. Basically, it ensures that the most similar observations are assigned to
different groups.
4.4.2 An (Alternative) Linear Model for Potential Outcomes
The criteria considered by Greevy et al. (2004) to compare the efficiency of treat-
ment assignment could also be used as an optimization criterion for treatment
assignment.








where the subscript t of Yt, Zt and Xt indicates that row entries are from individ-
uals of {i : Di = t ∨ Di = 0}. Yt contains the potential outcomes for the control
group or treatment group t, depending on Zt, which is the treatment status, with
Zi,t = 1{Di=t} for those in treatment group t and Zi,t = −1{Di=0} for the control
group. Xt contains the covariate vectors X>i of individuals in treatment group
t and in the control group. In this model, 2τt is the estimate for the conditional
average treatment effect.
Under the Gauss-Markov assumptions (additive errors, that are uncorrelated
conditional on Xt with constant variance σ2), the MSE of the estimated treatment




X>t and is mini-
mized for X>t Zt = 0 (Greevy et al., 2004). Thus, with the assumption of constant
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variances across treatments and without imposing weights, an alternative objec-
tive function for minimization would be




In this model, the treatment effect is assumed to be constant across individu-
als, so potential outcomes of the control group and the treatment group of inter-
est are assumed to differ only by a constant. Contrarily to a simple difference in
means estimator for the average treatment effect, here covariates are controlled
for, which induces a criterion of balance for covariates. As this criterion is min-
imized by X>t Zt = 0, it is enough to have equal mean values of a covariate to
minimize this criterion (given equal group sizes), independent of the distribution
in the respective groups.
Thus, comparing this result with the results derived in Section 4.3 shows that
if there is reason to assume that any of the treatment effects might differ across
individuals and be a function of the covariates, it is necessary to focus on more
distributional characteristics of the covariates than their means.
4.4.3 Morgan and Rubin (2012)
The approach by Morgan and Rubin (2012) considers the Mahalanobis distance
between the vector of covariate means of the control group and the vector of
covariate means of the treatment group. When group averages are equal, the dis-
tance is minimal. For the derived statistic, a threshold to stop re-randomization is
derived. This approach is closely related to the omnibus test for multivariate co-
variate balance by Hansen and Bowers (2008); in fact, for the case without strata
or matching pairs, the statistic is the same. It is related to Hotelling’s T-test, but
it treats treatment assignment instead of covariates as random and thus follows
a χ2-distribution, rather than an F-distribution under the null of no difference
between groups (Hansen and Bowers, 2008).
With respect to the notion of balance, the statistic shares its properties with
the objective function (4.6) of the just discussed alternative linear model as con-
sidered in Greevy et al. (2004). Balance in these approaches equals balancing
group means,2 thus balance is limited to the first moment of the distribution of
covariates.
2. For (4.6) this holds when the treatment and control groups are of equal size.
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4.5 Simulation Study
In order to investigate the performance of the treatment assignment procedure
described in Section 4.2, we perform a simulation study similar to the one by
Bruhn and McKenzie (2009), henceforth cited as BK09, to compare our new mech-
anism to established ones.
BK09 compare five treatment assignment methods (purely random assign-
ment, pairwise greedy matching, stratification and two rerandomization schemes)
in terms of ’balance’ of relevant observable and “unobservable” variables when
creating one treatment and one control group. To rule out the possibility that
results depend on the characteristics of a specific dataset or sample size, they
consider several data sets.
We extend this study by adding the scenario of multiple treatment arms and
a scenario where attrition occurs randomly. In terms of treatment assignment
mechanisms, we also include an ‘optimal matching’ approach (Lu et al. (2011) as
introduced by Greevy et al. (2004)) and our new min MSE procedure, as intro-
duced in Section 4.2 of this paper.
4.5.1 Study Design
Data
We use the same data as BK09 for reasons of comparability. It consists of four
panel datasets, with different data from different contexts.
The first dataset contains data on microenterprises in Sri Lanka and is from
an actual randomized experiment by De Mel, McKenzie, and Woodruff (2008).
The outcome variable of interest is firms’ profits, and data on firm and owner
characteristics at the time of the baseline study is available. It is either used for
treatment assignment or treated as “unobservable” and studied after treatment
assignment to assess the effect of the different methods on “unobservables”.
The second dataset consists of a subsample of the Mexican employment sur-
vey (ENE), where we used the same subsamples as BK09. In this dataset, the
outcome of interest is the income of household heads that were employed and
between age of 20 and 65 when the baseline survey was conducted in 2002. In
addition to this, the dataset includes additional characteristics on the household
and its head, which again are used either for treatment assignment or as “unob-
servables”.
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The third dataset is comprised of subsamples with two waves (IFLS 2 and
IFLS 3) from the Indonesian Family Live Survey (IFLS):3 The year 1997 (IFLS 2) is
used as the baseline and the data from 2000 (IFLS 3) is treated as the follow-up.
We only use data on household expenditure from this survey.4
The fourth dataset is from the Learning and Educational Achievement project
in Pakistan, which is also used by Andrabi, Das, and Khwaja (2015). It contains
child and household data, and the outcome variables of interest are math test
scores and z-scores of children between the ages of 8 to 12 at the baseline.
It is noteworthy that the subsamples of 30 and 100 observations sometimes dif-
fered considerably: The share of the variation in the follow-up variable explained
by the group used for treatment assignment in the dataset on firms’ profit for
the small subsample is around 6 percent, whereas it amounts to 18 percent for
the subsample of 100 observations. A larger difference is observed in the dataset
from Mexico5 and in the data on height z-scores, in the smaller subsample, an
even higher share of variation in z-scores could be explained than in the larger
sample (64% and 51%, respectively). For the remaining datasets, however, no
meaningful differences are found.
Nevertheless, this observation gives rise to a method for drawing comparative
samples of a ‘universe’. The treatment assignment procedure derived in Section
4.2 can also be used in this setting.6
Treatment Assignment Mechanisms
A number of treatment assignment mechanisms is common (BK09).
In this study, we additionally consider the minimal MSE procedure as intro-
duced in this paper, and the matching method called ‘optimal matching’ as imple-
mented in the R package nbpMatching (Lu et al., 2011), going back to the work of
Greevy et al. (2004). We give a short overview over the assignment mechanisms
applied in this study. In Section 4.7, we discuss the weaknesses and strengths of
the different treatment assignment mechanisms in comparison with our min MSE
method.
3. See http://www.rand.org/labor/FLS/IFLS.html.
4. BK09 also use data on the schooling of children from this dataset. Given that they do not
report results for this dataset in all graphs and tables, we limited ourselves to the inclusion of
household expenditure.
5. Roughly 7 and 32 percent (for the subsamples of 30 and 100 observations, respectively) of
the variation in household expenditure is explained by “observable” variables.
6. A Stata software package for this purpose can be obtained from the author.
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Pure randomization refers to the realization of a single random draw, per-
formed by using anything from a coin to a random number generator on a com-
puter. Stratification, also known as blocking, is attributed to Fisher (1935). The
idea is to build subgroups according to observable characteristics (covariates) and
randomize within those subgroups.
Pairwise matching is in a certain sense the limit case of stratification, with
only two units per strata, which are then randomly assigned to the treatment or
the control group. BK09 apply a ’greedy algorithm’ laid out in Imai, King, and
Nall (2009), an approach popular in the literature on matching observational data
at least since Rubin (1973). This implementation of the greedy algorithm com-
putes pairwise Mahalanobis distances7 between two units for the whole sample
and pairs the two with the smallest distance; those then are taken out of the sam-
ple of units to be matched and the procedure is repeated. Overall distance is
not necessarily minimized by this approach, because it is not ‘forward-looking’
(Rosenbaum, 1989; Greevy et al., 2004). The approach called ‘optimal matching’,
as introduced by Rosenbaum (1989) for observational and Greevy et al. (2004) for
experimental studies aims at achieving this goal.8 We use both implementations
in our study.
Finally, different rerandomization methods have evolved and are widely used
(BK09). A rerandomization approach is basically any method that performs a
somehow random treatment assignment, and repeats randomization until a cer-
tain condition is reached. This condition might either be a certain number of iter-
ations or a statistical threshold or even subjective judgment. In the first case, the
“best” assignment is chosen; in the second, usually the first to reach the statistical
threshold is kept. In this sense, the “best” assignment can be determined in var-
ious ways. A representative of the first group is, for example, the min max t-stat
method, in which 1000 random assignments are made, and the one chosen is the
one in which the maximal t-statistic on any variable to consider is the smallest.
A variant of the second group is the ‘big stick’ method in BK09, in which a new
treatment assignment is drawn if any difference in means between treatment and
control group is significantly different from zero. A more sophisticated approach
is the one by Morgan and Rubin (2012, 2015), where the Mahalanobis distance be-
tween the group means of the covariates is considered and a theoretical threshold
7. The use of Mahalanobis distance in matching for observational data has been discussed e.g.
in Cochran and Rubin (1973).
8. Forming pairs is referred to as non-bipartite matching in the optimization but also the match-
ing literature. This procedure (non-bipartite matching) is different than finding matches in al-
ready existing groups (bipartite matching) and is considerably more difficult (Lu et al., 2011).
Therefore, not all results for matching, and more importantly, software implementations, can be
applied in this setting.
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is derived. Since the ad-hoc approaches lack a theoretical foundation and as for
the last method, a software implementation is missing, we do not consider these
approaches in this study.
Min MSE Method The Min MSE Method can be considered as a rerandom-
ization method, in which a certain number of iterations is drawn. Unlike the
rerandomization approaches considered in BK09, our implementation of the min
MSE approach improves on previous draws, as we use the stochastic simulated
annealing optimization algorithm (Kirkpatrick, Gelatt, and Vecchi, 1983): Given
a treatment assignment, a new one is obtained by randomly exchanging the treat-
ment status for a certain number of units. The new assignment is then evaluated
according to the formula derived in Section 4.2 and either kept or withdrawn.
Thus, the min MSE method maximizes the balance in a more efficient way with
respect to time than the other discussed approaches of rerandomization.
Furthermore, apart from the approach by Morgan and Rubin (2012), we are
not aware of a rerandomization criterion that has a theoretical foundation and is
not an ad-hoc measure. For their approach—to the best of our knowledge—there
is no extension to multiple treatment groups9 and the criterion is only based on
the mean differences of the treatment groups. Additionally, we were unable to
find any software implementation of their approach.
Variables for Balancing
We used the same variables for treatment assignment as BK09. They include the
baseline outcome of an outcome of interest, and add six other variables that may
affect the outcome of interest, with the exception of stratification, where only
subsamples are used. This means, however, that the results of the study regard-
ing stratification can only be conditionally compared to the other results, since
stratification is tested with a lower number of variables and thus has a higher
likelihood to achieve balance on those, and in particular, the baseline outcome
variable. For reasons of comparability, we stick to this approach despite its short-
comings. For the exact reasoning for the choice of variables to be balanced, we
refer to Bruhn and McKenzie (2009).
We use the same variables with the newly added treatment assignment mech-
anisms as we did for greedy matching: the baseline outcome and six additional
variables.
9. Although they name a possible way of extending their criteria in this sense.
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Attrition
Researchers might be concerned about the consequences of attrition when a so-
phisticated method of treatment assignment has been applied. In case obtaining
the outcome from a unit fails when having used a matching approach, it is com-
mon to also exclude its pair from the analysis (Imai, King, and Nall, 2009). While
mostly perceived as a disadvantage for the diminished sample size—especially
when performing cluster randomization—Imai, King, and Nall (2009) consider
this practice an advantage, as they argue the remaining sample is still balanced.
We investigate this claim by randomly removing 1, 3, 5 and 7 units after the
treatment groups have been assigned with a sample size of N = 30. While we
exclude the pair of a randomly removed unit from the treatment groups assigned
by the matching approaches, for the other treatment assignment methods, such a
possibility is missing and we leave the groups unaltered after simulated attrition.
Subsequently, we investigate how attrition has affected balance.
4.5.2 Comparing Treatment Assignment Mechanisms
Pre-Treatment Balance
We investigate balance using the measures of pre-treatment balance on baseline
variables as BK09 for the cases of one treatment arm. In the main text, we will re-
port suitably aggregated results over all variables used for treatment assignment,
as our interest lies rather in overall performance than in performance on an arbi-
trarily selected variable. Results for the latter case are printed in Appendix C.2
For reasons of comparability, we also assess balance in follow-up outcomes.
However, we think that balance on follow-up outcomes is rather important when
assessing the general value of covariate based treatment assignment mechanisms
in panel studies, which is beyond the scope of this study. We therefore report
those results in Appendix C.2.
For the cases of multiple treatment arms, we extend the measures used by
BK09 in a suitable way.
Balance in a single variable, one treatment arm To assess balance in a single
variable for the case of one treatment and one control group, BK09 compare the
difference in means for one draw, expressed in the variable’s standard deviation.
Of all draws, they then graphically compare the distribution of the differences
and report the average, and the 95% quantile of the distribution of (absolute) dif-
ferences in the group means. Additionally, they perform a t-test to assess whether
or not estimates for differences are “significantly” different from zero, and report
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the share of draws in which this was the case. We assess balance using these
measures and report results in Appendix C.2 for comparison reasons.
Balance in a group of variables, one treatment arm First, standardized differ-
ences in means are calculated for every single variable of the group of variables
for one draw. Then, for the average (absolute) difference and for the share of esti-
mates significantly different from zero as calculated for a single variable, overall
averages are built. For assessing the 95% quantile of differences, first the 95%
quantile of every single variable in the group is determined. Then, the maximum
among the variables in the group is reported as the 95% quantile. To detect ex-
treme imbalances, we also compute the maximum difference of group means of
a group of variables and evaluate the distribution of these maximal differences
across 10,000 iterations graphically.
Balance in a group of variables, several treatment arms When aggregating the
balance of several treatment arms, taking the average difference of the means be-
tween the several treatment groups and the control groups before taking the av-
erage over all variables of interest in all performed draws is one option. Another
possibility is to take the overall average over the largest difference in the means
between the treatment and control groups in one variable and in one draw. We
think both are relevant and perform both.
4.6 Results
All results are based on 10,000 simulations, unless otherwise stated. The sample
size, which was used for the tables and graphs, is indicated in the respective
caption. For sample sizes, where results are not reported in the text, we provide
the respective tables and graphs in Appendix C.2.
4.6.1 Scenario 1: One Treatment Group
We first present the results for the scenario considered in BK09: Units have to
be assigned to either one treatment or the control group. In the main text, we
focus on aggregate measures over all variables considered for treatment assign-
ment, since no single variable has received a higher focus or a higher weight. In
Appendix C.2, we present results for one single variable, as BK09 report these
results.
Table 4.1 shows the average differences between the group means, average ab-
solute differences between group means and the 95% quantile of the differences
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in group means among the 10,000 iterations performed. A lower measure indi-
cates a better balance in group means. The main message of Table 4.1(a) is that,
on average, all differences equalize and we observe balance (note that results are
reported in 1000 standard deviations and thus are zero to the third or fourth digit
in the upper panel of Table 4.1(a)).
A measure that is informative with respect to imbalance in a single random
draw is the absolute difference in group means. The averaged absolute difference
is reported in Table 4.1(b) for every treatment assignment mechanism and every
dataset. On average and for the variables of every single dataset, the min MSE
method performs better than all competing methods. Compared to the second
best method, ‘optimal matching’, it reduces the average absolute difference in the
balance of group means by nearly 30%.
Finally, Table 4.1(c) shows the average over all 95% quantiles of the absolute
differences in a single variable considered for treatment assignment. Averaging
all of the datasets, the min MSE method again performs superior to competing
methods.
In summary, the min MSE method not only performs better than to competing
methods on average, but also reduces extreme differences in the mean values be-
tween the treatment and control groups the most as compared to a single random
draw. This last finding is supported by the results in Figure 4.1, which shows the
distribution of the largest differences between the group means of any variable
for a single draw. In all graphs, we see that the mass of differences close to zero
is largest for the min MSE approach, which also always yields a favourable mass
in the tails as compared to competing methods.
4.6.2 Scenario 2: Multiple Treatment Arms
The second scenario we consider is an experiment, in which multiple (variants
of) interventions are tested. Units shall be assigned to the control or one of the
treatment groups while keeping all groups comparable.
For this scenario, we were unable to find a software implementation of a com-
peting method, so we compare the min MSE procedure to a single random draw.
The findings are graphically presented in Figure 4.2. We first compute the
maximum and the mean difference between the treatment group means and the
control group mean of one variable for a single draw. We aggregate the mea-
sure over the variables of one draw and over all iterations by averaging over the
mean or maximal difference. The first aggregate measure is shown by the dashed
lines, the latter aggregate measure by the solid lines. Both lines, the solid and the
dashed one, start at the same point, as for only one group, the maximum and the
TABLE 4.1: Comparison of Treatment Assignment Methods Regard-
ing Balance in a Group of Baseline Variables (N=30)



















Indonesia 0.025 0.444 1.134 -1.010 1.729 3.101
Pakistan (height scores) -0.875 0.785 -0.872 1.035 -0.489 -0.062
Pakistan (test scores) 1.944 -1.579 0.949 -0.653 -1.903 -0.138
Mexico 2.191 1.996 -0.477 0.481 -0.021 -0.310
Sri Lanka 0.624 2.111 -0.748 -0.328 -1.594 -1.667



















Indonesia 295.9 198.1 174.0 126.2 233.5 243.8
Pakistan (height scores) 291.0 180.1 172.3 134.6 235.4 230.5
Pakistan (test scores) 293.1 287.9 180.3 103.0 244.7 257.3
Mexico 299.1 223.8 174.1 147.8 258.5 262.1
Sri Lanka 292.4 253.9 170.9 93.4 248.8 267.0
Total 294.3 228.8 174.3 121.0 244.2 252.1
(c) 95% quantile of the difference in baseline group means between the treatment and the control


















Indonesia 788.3 655.5 579.9 643.4 742.6 702.3
Pakistan (height scores) 802.8 655.5 535.2 393.8 783.3 722.9
Pakistan (test scores) 715.2 905.4 628.4 533.8 729.3 715.2
Mexico 701.3 677.1 445.0 348.2 727.7 702.3
Sri Lanka 802.8 863.6 535.2 311.8 792.3 744.7
Total 762.1 751.4 544.7 446.2 755.1 717.5
Note: Statistics based on 10,000 iterations. Details on the study and the
computation of each measures are explained in Section 4.5.2. For every
dataset, several variables were considered for treatment assignment.
The results in this table report aggregate measures of differences in
treatment group means for the group of considered variables. Differ-
ences are weighted by standard deviation. Lower values indicate better
balance with respect to equality of group means.
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Note: Distributions of the (maximal) differences in treatment group
means among the group of variables to consider for treatment assign-
ment are based on 10,000 treatment assignments. Differences in group
means are expressed in standard deviations. A high mass around a dif-
ference of 0 indicates a good balance with respect to equality of group
means.
FIGURE 4.1: Distributions of the Maximal Differences in Group
Means (N=30)
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mean difference in group means is the same, as there is only one group difference
to consider.
When applying the min MSE procedure, the maximum difference—typically
the one a researcher is worried about—is always increasing at a lower rate with
an additional treatment group to assign than when drawing completely random.
For 9 treatment groups, which means 10 groups of 10 units, the average maxi-
mal difference (in SD) is—for all datasets—between .4 and .6, whereas when ran-
domly drawing, the average maximal group difference is mostly around .75 or .8
SD. In one case (household expenditure in Indonesia), this average maximum dif-
ference for 6 treatments (thus 7 groups) when using the min MSE procedure was
as high as the average mean difference when relying on a single random draw.
In all datasets, the min MSE procedure was able to lower the average maxi-
mum difference across group means compared to drawing randomly by between
.1 SD (height z-score in Pakistan and labor income in Mexico) and up to .3-.4 SD
(math test score in Pakistan and household expenditure in Indonesia).
It is also worth noting that with the min MSE procedure, we can assign be-
tween 2 to 5 more treatments compared to randomly drawing with the same
maximum difference in group means to be expected.
4.6.3 Scenario 3: Attrition
The third considered scenario corresponds to the first scenario, where units have
to be assigned to either the treatment or the control group. After treatment as-
signment, however, some units fail to provide the outcome of interest, i.e. the
study suffers from attrition. We randomly remove 1, 3, 5 and 7 units after the
treatment groups have been assigned with a sample size of N = 30. We “correct”
for attrition in case matching approaches were used for treatment assignment,
see Section 4.5.1 for details.
Table 4.2 reports the results of the attrition scenario. Table 4.2(a) shows the
absolute difference between group means, averaged over variables considered
for treatment allocation, datasets and iterations. We report the average absolute
difference instead of the average difference, since average differences are close to
zero for all mechanisms, and imbalances obtained for the different attrition levels
could average out.
The first observation is that attrition always strictly worsens balance for all
treatment assignment mechanisms. Except for the case when 7 units (roughly
25% of the sample) drop out, balance achieved with the min MSE mechanism
is best for all levels of attrition, as indicated by the lowest average absolute dif-
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Note: Multiple Treatment Assignment. Evolution of the (mean and max-
imal) difference in group means between the treatment groups and the
control group among the group of variables to consider for treatment
assignment. X-axis: Number of treatment groups to assign. For each
dataset, the difference in group means in all variables used for treat-
ment assignment are computed. The line labeled ‘max’ shows the av-
erage over all iterations and variables of the maximum of these differ-
ences amongst the treatment groups. The line labeled ‘mean’ shows
the differences amongst the group differences by building the average.
Distributions are based on 10,000 treatment assignments. Differences
in group means are expressed in standard deviations. Lower mean and
maximal differences in group means between the treatment groups and
the control group indicate a better balance with respect to equality of
group means.
FIGURE 4.2: Multiple Treatment Assignment: Evolution of the
Differences Between Treatment Groups and Control Group in the
Group of the Baseline Variables for an Increasing Number of Treat-
ments to Assign (N = 100)
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case, and the difference between both mechanisms in that case is only marginal,
compared to the balance of the other mechanisms. However, the sample assigned
with the min MSE mechanism then still consists of 23 units, whereas for the
matching approaches, it diminishes to 16 (see Section 4.5.1). On average, how-
ever, it is the min MSE mechanism, that performs best when attrition happens
with respect to the absolute difference between group means. Compared to the
min MSE mechanism and ‘optimal matching’, stratification and greedy matching
cannot considerably improve balance compared to a single random draw.
The second panel of Table 4.2 shows the worst case scenario across 10,000 it-
erations. For every method, every level of attrition and every variable in every
dataset, we compute the 95% quantile of the absolute difference in group means
of all iterations. This measure is then averaged across all variables and datasets
and reported for every method and level of attrition. When assessing balance ac-
cording to this measure, again the balance strictly worsens when attrition occurs.
On average, it is again the min MSE approach yielding the most favorable results,
and with exception of the ‘optimal matching’ approach, other mechanisms only
provide a limited improvement on a single random draw.
In Appendix C.2, we report results for individual datasets and when assessing
balance using t-tests.10
Summing up, we cannot confirm the claim by Imai, King, and Nall (2009) that
the practice of removing the matched pair of a unit dropping out an experiment is
actually beneficial. Only when using the ‘optimal matching’ approach, is balance
in cases of attrition comparable to the min MSE approach. On average, however,
the min MSE approach outperforms all competing mechanisms in our study in
cases of attrition, while mantaining the maximal possible sample size in contrast
to the matching approaches.
10. Testing for equality of group means in a single variable of a random draw is often mistaken
as a test for successful randomization. BK09 report the share of treatment assignments for every
mechanism, where a test for equal group means yields a p-value below .1. In Table C.4(a) in
Appendix C.2, we report corresponding results as these tests are frequently conducted. However,
we think that it is misleading to assess the probability that a statistic excesses a certain value by
pure chance when actually knowing that it is pure chance that drives the differences and thus the
statistic. Therefore, we forgo presenting these results in the main text. Figure C.6 in Appendix
C.2 shows the results of Panel (b) of Table 4.2 for the individual datasets.
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TABLE 4.2: Comparison of Treatment Assignment Methods Regard-
ing Balance in a Group of Baseline Variables in Cases of Attrition
(N=30)



















No attrition 294.3 228.8 174.3 121.0 244.1 252.1
1 (2) unit removed 300.7 235.9 179.9 139.1 252.0 258.5
3 (6) units removed 312.3 263.8 187.2 163.3 265.6 271.3
5 (10) units removed 328.3 277.0 198.4 186.9 280.5 285.7
7 (14) units removed 352.7 294.3 205.3 211.7 297.8 302.9
Total 317.6 259.9 189.0 164.4 268.0 274.1
(b) 95% quantile of the differences in baseline group means between the treatment and the control


















No attrition 705.8 520.7 356.3 231.2 575.4 600.2
1 (2) unit removed 723.6 544.4 372.0 289.1 593.3 614.5
3 (6) units removed 765.6 601.7 381.8 377.1 634.9 650.8
5 (10) units removed 781.1 636.2 395.6 437.5 674.7 687.6
7 (14) units removed 844.8 676.1 408.9 503.6 714.9 730.0
Total 764.2 595.8 382.9 367.7 638.6 656.6
Note: Statistics based on 10,000 iterations. Details on the study and the
computation of each measures are explained in Section 4.5.2. For ev-
ery dataset, several variables were considered for treatment assign-
ment. After treatment assignment, units were randomly removed from
the study to simulate attrition. The results in this table report aggre-
gate measures of differences in treatment group means for the group of
considered variables. Differences are weighted by standard deviation.




4.7.1 Treatment Assignment Mechanism
In what follows, we discuss the strengthes and weaknesses of the min MSE ap-
proach as compared to alternative mechanisms.
Pure Randomization Depending on the transparency of the actual implemen-
tation, randomization can be considered to be the fairest method for treatment
allocation and it certainly is the fastest.
When comparing the means of randomly allocated groups across 20 variables
with a conventional t-test and a significance level of 5%, we have to expect that for
one variable, the hypothesis of no difference will be rejected. Pure randomization
does not yield any device for controlling undesired imbalances that may happen
by chance.
Furthermore, it is not guaranteed, especially when the sample size is small,
that all characteristics of a variable appear in all experimental groups at all and
additionally with the same frequencies; this is a problem when subgroup analysis
is desired to study heterogeneous treatment effects.
Stratification The main advantage of stratification is to ensure the possibility
of subgroup analysis while ideally increasing the efficiency of the analysis. The
idea is to build subgroups according to observable characteristics (covariates) and
randomize within those subgroups. This design is probably still considered rela-
tively fair.
One problem of this approach is that continuous variables have to be dis-
cretized arbitrarily, and that stratification is only possible for a limited number
of variables: Consider a sample of 50 units, where subgroup analysis for age, in-
come and gender is desired. If three categories for age and income are desired,
18 strata have to be created, where at most 3 persons are in one strata. Strati-
fication on another variable is thus not feasible with a comparable sample size.
This example points to another drawback: Difficulties arise in implementation if
sample size is not divisible by the number of strata. Although solutions to this
have been suggested, a simple implementation is no longer possible. Moreover,
building the strata requires expertise on both the data and the question under
investigation.
The time needed to conduct treatment assignment using stratification depends
on the actual implementation, but in simple cases, e.g. with two dichotomous
variables, it takes only slightly longer than pure randomization.
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Matching Pairwise matching resolves the problems of stratification. Theoreti-
cally, pairwise matching may be performed with an unlimited number of vari-
ables considered for treatment allocation. Moreover, the possibility to balance
continuous variables is an advantage (e.g. Greevy et al., 2004). It is arguably con-
sidered to be fair and the design is relatively clear and easy to explain.
Subgroup analysis, however, is not ensured in cases, where balance on a cer-
tain variable could not be achieved, which, however, should not be the case in
moderate sized samples and a moderate amount of variables to balance.
Implementation of pairwise matching may take considerable time11 when re-
lying on the ‘greedy algorithm’ used by BK09. Yet, the software implementation
of the ‘optimal matching’ algorithm in the R package nbpMatching (Lu et al., 2011)
is considerably faster.
However, the biggest disadvantage is probably attrition, but also with per-
fect compliance, analysis is a major concern. Regarding the analysis, Abadie and
Imbens (p. 236, 2006) note that matching estimators for the average treatment ef-
fect “include a conditional bias term whose stochastic order increases with the
number of continuous matching variables”. They show that the simple matching
estimator is not N1/2 efficient and propose an alternative. Imai, King, and Nall
(2009) claim that the variance can be consistently estimated, but they refer to the
variance not conditional on covariates (Imbens, 2011). Imbens (p. 17, 2011) writes
that “this variance is larger than the conditional one if treatment effects vary by
covariates. In stratified randomized experiments we typically estimate the vari-
ance conditional on the strata shares, so the natural extension of that to paired
randomized experiments is to also condition on covariates.” In contrast to this,
BK09 estimate the variance conditional on pair dummies, but not conditional on
covariates. It thus seems that even among experts, it is unclear how to correctly
assess the variance of estimates.
With respect to attrition, Imai, King, and Nall (2009) note that an advantage of
matching is that if a unit drops out, its pair can also be taken out of the experiment
while the remaining sample still remains balanced. In the simulation study, we
have seen that even with attrition, the matching techniques perform, on average,
worse than the min MSE approach, which by design is unable to “correct” for
attrition in this way. It thus might be perceived an overall disadvantage that for
every unit dropping out of the experiment, its pair also has to be discarded, as
this leads to a lower sample size, and consequently, lower power—irrespective of
the exact nature of the treatment effect.
11. BK09 note that in the 300 observation sample, the algorithm takes several days to run and
that ample time is needed to perform matching techniques.
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Rerandomization Methods Bruhn and McKenzie (p. 210, 2009) name a key ad-
vantage of ad-hoc rerandomization methods: “[They] may offer a way of obtain-
ing approximate balance on a set of relevant variables in a situation of multiple
treatment groups of unequal sizes.” As pointed out before, for the approach by
Morgan and Rubin (2012), an extension allowing the assignment of multiple treat-
ment groups is theoretically possible, but missing to date.
Furthermore, implementation time may differ considerably—depending on
the approach. Drawing a thousand treatment assignments may take some time,
and in small samples with many variables, the ‘big stick’ method that aims at
finding a treatment assignment where no difference in group means exceeds a
certain t-value might need even more time.
Yet, all of those rerandomization methods aim at balancing group means, and
with the exception of Morgan and Rubin (2012), fail to consider dependencies
of the different variables included in treatment assignment. However, in their
approach, the dependency between variables is constant accross treatment as-
signments.
Nevertheless, all of the rerandomization methods discussed here are able to
consider continuous, categorial and binary variables in a theoretically unlimited
number.
The approach by Kasy (2016) In a Bayesian setting, Kasy (2016) analyzes the
task of treatment assignment from a decision theoretical perspective, where the
mean squared error of an estimator is to be minimized. Kasy (2016) argues that
randomization never increases precision. In the technical appendix of his paper,
he discusses several modelling aspects of conditional expectations of potential
outcomes, which are the basis of his analysis. One of the discussed models for
potential outcomes is the bayesian linear model, which gives rise to a treatment
assignment mechanism using the framework of his paper.
While Kasy (2016) provides software implementation in Matlab, an exten-
sion to treatment assignment for multiple groups is neither discussed nor imple-
mented. Moreover, the Bayesian setting requires the choice of parameter values
that are hard to guess without analyzing the pre-treatment version of the out-
come of interest such as the covariance matrix of the estimator of the parameter
vector in the linear model or the coefficient of determination of this model. Yet, in
practice, a pre-treatment version of the outcome of interest may be unavailable.
The choices, however, are consequential, as they distort the balance of treatment
groups, which might be desired if the interest is limited to the precision of es-
timation of the specified treatment effect. In case the researcher is interested in
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comparable treatment groups for the sake of credible research, or in treatment ef-
fects for a specific subgroup, the balance in treatment groups might be an equally
important goal.
However, the approach is—as the other rerandomization methods—able to
consider any type of variable and any number of covariates desired. Moreover,
dependencies between variables are taken into consideration and dispersion of
variables within groups is encouraged—if not impeded by the researcher through
an unwise choice of parameter values.
The min MSE Treatment Assignment Mechanism The min MSE Treatment As-
signment Mechanism retains the advantages of the linear model as discussed by
Kasy (2016). In particular, it is able to perform treatment assigment using possi-
bly various continuous, categorical and binary variables. In that aspect, it is as
powerful as all other rerandomization schemes and the matching approach.
Contrarily to the Bayesian model applied in Kasy (2016), we rely on a stan-
dard frequentist model. This relieves the researcher from the obligation to choose
abstract parameters, for which arguably a good guess is sometimes impossible.
Moreover, this setup ensures that dependencies amongst variables are equally
distributed accross treatment groups and that dispersion of variables is maxi-
mized within treatment groups—without any possibly unwanted distortion. Thus,
if possible, subgroup analysis is ensured as the distribution of variables in treat-
ment groups is taken into consideration.
Still, our min MSE approach allows for considerable flexibility if one has rea-
sons to believe that an outcome will have a higher variance than the other in
general; and more specifically, that treatment t, which mainly affects outcome k,
might have compliance problems, resulting in an expected higher variance than
for the control group. By this feature, of all treatment assignment mechanisms we
are aware of, the min MSE approach comes closest to the ability of the ‘optimal
matching’ approach to achieve approximate equality of the distributions of the
covariates in the treatment and control groups—while being able to assign multi-
ple treatment groups. Moreover, the min MSE treatment assignment mechanism
is attrition tolerant in the sense that the balance stays favorable and the sample
size is reduced only by the units dropping out.
Finally, software implementation for Stata is available. Thus, implementation
takes only a few minutes and may easily be performed in the field.
Chapter 5
The min MSE Stata ado-Package
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5.1 Introduction
The min MSE ado-package is the software implementation of the treatment as-
signment mechanism introduced in the paper for the use with the statistical soft-
ware Stata.
When implementing an experiment, researchers can use this software to as-
sign subjects to different treatment groups before treatment is executed. Treat-
ment assignment is conducted based on observed pre-treatment characteristics,
e.g. age, income or education. The created treatment groups are balanced and,
within the model laid out in the paper, the mean squared error of the estimator
for the conditional average treatment effect is minimized. Note that the analysis
of the experiment can be based on a different model than the one used the paper;
in particular, additional variables to the ones used for treatment assignment can
be included in the analysis.
The min MSE ado-package is suited for two use cases: First, for treatment
assignment before any treatment is executed and second, in case treatment is
not implemented at the same time for all units and attrition is happening, the
assignment option can be used for re-balancing the treatment groups, given
the units and their treatment group for which treatment has already been imple-
mented.
The package provides a convenient single command line interface for the
user. Being implemented with the use of Stata’s fast Mata language, this soft-
ware makes treatment assignment possible in less than five minutes and is thus
ideally suited for implementation in the field.
In this article, I provide an overview of the functionality of the package and
briefly explain its usage.
5.1.1 Software Requirements
The min MSE ado-package provides the assignMinMSETreatment command
for Stata.The ado-file has to be read in after starting Stata—either automatically1
or manually. It is available at http://minMSE.sebastianschneider.info. The min
MSE ado-package was written for Stata 13.1 and has been tested with Stata 14.
1. For an ado-file to be automatically loaded, it has to be placed in a folder listed by Stata’s
sysdir command. It is recommended to create a folder for user installed ado-packages (e.g.
Personal) if not already existing.
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5.2 Overview and Reference Manual
The command assignMinMSETreatment takes one or several variable name(s)
as argument(s) and returns treatment group number(s) in a variable to be cre-
ated.2
The number of participants might be uneven and the software deals with
missing values automatically.
Minimization of the statistic derived in the paper is performed by a combi-
nation of random draws to find suitable starting points and a variant of the sim-
ulated annealing (Kirkpatrick, Gelatt, and Vecchi, 1983) optimization algorithm
with default values as implemented in the R command optim3; see details below.
General Syntax
The general syntax for treatment assignment (in the conventional Stata notation)
is
assignMinMSETreatment varlist, generate(newvar) [options]
where
varlist is var1[ var2[...]] and used for covariate input and
newvar is the name of the variable to be created containing treat-
ment group number(s).
Options
Any of the following options might be specified.
treatments(#)specifies the number of treatment groups desired (in addition
to the control group); minimum and default value is treatments(1).
iterations(#)specifies the number of iterations the algorithm performs; the
default value is iterations(50). With small samples and few covariates,
depending on the desired method of inference, a relatively small value is rec-
ommended, see Section 5.3 for details. Depending on the number of units
and the number of covariates to consider for group assignment, a high value
could result in a long run-time.
2. Therefore, the data has to be organized such that rows consist of an individual’s covariates
and columns contain individual values of a single covariate, consistent with the Stata-typical
workflow.
3. As Stata lacks a built-in routine to perform optimization using the simulated annealing al-
gorithm, we relied on default values of an established implementation in R.
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assignment(varname)takes a numerical vector of partial treatment assign-
ment as argument, and assigns the missing units (where varname == .) to a
treatment group while minimizing the objective function. Non-missing val-
ues are copied to the new vector, i.e. treatment group assignment of these
observations is unaffected.
Advanced Options
The following options control the minimization process performed by the simu-
lated annealing algorithm. The plot option might be useful for adjusting these
parameters. Default values (except for the plot option) correspond to the default
values applied in the R implementation of simulated annealing (in the command
optim).
change(#)sets the number of units to exchange treatment in each iteration;
the default value is change(3). In case of big datasets (e.g. with more than
100 units), one might consider increasing the default value.
cooling(#)specifies the cooling scheme for the simulated annealing algo-
rithm to use. cooling(1), which is the default scheme, sets the temperature
to
t0/ log(floor((k − 1)/tmax)tmax + exp(1)),
whereas cooling(2) sets the temperature to the faster decreasing sequence
t0/(floor((k − 1)/tmax)tmax + 1).
In praxis, cooling schemes are mostly of one of these forms. One might want
to change the cooling scheme if the plot indicates a too slow deacrease of
objective values. For a theoretical discussion of cooling schemes Belisle (see
1992, p. 890).
t0(#)sets the starting temperature for the simulated annealing algorithm, see
Belisle (1992) for theoretical convergence considerations. In praxis, a lower
starting temperature t0 decreases the acceptance rate of a worse solution more
rapidly. Specifying a negative number allows values proportional to the ob-
jective function, i.e. t0(−5) sets the starting temperature to 1/5 of the objec-
tive function for the starting point, and thus—for the first tmax iterations of
the algorithm—the difference of the old and the proposed solution is scaled
by 1/5. When changing the default value, it should be considered that also
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worse solutions have to be accepted in order for the algorithm to escape a
local minimum, so it should be chosen high enough. The default value is
t0(10).
tmax(#)specifies the number of function evaluations at each temperature: For
instance, tmax(10) makes the algorithm evaluate 10 treatment assignments
that are found based on the current solution, before the temperature is de-
creased and thus the probability of accepting a worse solution is decreased.
The default value is tmax(10).
plot(#)can be used to suppress drawing a plot showing the value of the ob-
jective function for the last iterations by setting plot(0). The default setting
is plot(1), which shows a plot. While the convergence plot is a helpful
tool for setting the control parameters of the simulated annealing algorithm
and for detecting convergence, it might be less interesting when generating a
big number of alternative treatment assignments e.g. for performing Fisher’s
exact test.
5.3 Remarks and Examples
In case Fisher’s exact test should be applied to evaluate significance of estimates,
a certain number of alternative treatment group assignments are needed. Those
alternative treatment group assignments should be established under the same
conditions as the true (and implemented) treatment group assignment. While
it is in many cases possible to gather the alternative treatment assignments af-
ter having conducted the experiment, it should be noted that especially in small
samples and with few (possibly categorical) variables this could be problematic.
In those cases, it could happen that the algorithm always proposes the same treat-
ment group assignment. Then, computing Fisher’s exact test is impossible and
bootstrap mechanisms have to be applied (see for example Bertsimas, Johnson,
and Kallus, 2015).
Therefore, if computation of Fisher’s exact p-values is desired, it is advised
to have the algorithm run several times (e.g. 10 times in small samples with up
to 30 individuals per treatment groups) and compare the value of the objective
function and compare treatment assignments. If among those treatment assign-
ments duplicates are present, the number of iterations for the algorithm to run is
too high and should be decreased. Alternatively, the number of covariates could
be increased.
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In the near future, a function for automatically establishing alternative group
assignments to compute exact p-values will be implemented. This function will
automatically adjust the number of iterations. For now, this task has to be per-
formed by the researcher—given exact p-values should be computed.
Example 1
The following command creates a treatment and a control group, balancing age
and gender:
assignMinMSETreatment age gender, gen(Treatment)
Treatment numbers 0 and 1 are then stored in the variable Treatment.
Example 2
Partial rebalancing of treatment assignment can be performed using the following
command, where overall balance of age and gender should be achieved (across
units that already have been treated and those still to be treated):
assignMinMSETreatment age gender, gen(Treatment) ///
assignment(treatmentDayOne)
As in Example 1, treatment numbers are stored in the variable Treatment, and
treatmentDayOne contains the treatment group numbers of individuals already
treated (missing for non-treated).
Example 3
Assigning 5 treatment groups in addition to the treatment group (which will have
the number 0), can be achieved with the following command:
assignMinMSETreatment age gender income hasChildren, ///
gen(Treatment) treatments(5) iterations(100) ///
change(5) cooling(2) t0(-3) tmax(50) plot(0)
This will perform 100 iterations of the algorithm, where in each step of the algo-
rithm 5 randomly selected subjects exchange their treatment status. The cooling
scheme of the form 1/n is selected, with starting temperature set to 1/3 of the
value of the first treatment assignment evaluated. In this example, the tempera-
ture decreases every 50 iterations. Plotting the convergence curve is supressed.
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5.4 Conclusion and Future Work
The min MSE ado-package for Stata implements the treatment assignment pro-
cedure as derived in the paper. This method has theoretically appealing features,
such as balance in the dependence of covariates within a group as well as balance
in the dispersion of the covariates. As implemented in the min MSE ado-package,
this method is particularly suited for treatment assignment in the field, as it is
very fast compared to several competing methods.
Furthermore, it features the possibility to ‘rebalance’: For example in inter-
ventions that are implemented over several days and in several locations, attri-
tion might happen and might leave the sample unbalanced. The min MSE pack-
age provides an option to adjust treatment assignment in those cases. Treatment
group assignment of subjects already treated is taken into account while the yet
untreated are possibly assigned a different treatment group to keep overall bal-
ance.
While the implemented features already make the min MSE package a prac-
tical tool for applied researchers, its applicability will be additionally increased.
First, the possibility to weight treatments, outcomes or variances will be imple-
mented. In a second step, the possibility to conveniently prepare randomization
inference using e.g. Fisher’s exact test will be added by gathering a number of
prespecified alternative treatment group assignments under the same conditions





Precautionary Saving, and Loss
Aversion: An Empirical Test
A.1 Theoretical Framework: Details
A.1.1 General Version of the Two-period Model by Kőszegi and
Rabin (2009)
As in Section 2.2, we assume that an individual has to distribute wealth, W , for
consumption across two periods such that W = c1 + c2, where ct denotes con-
sumption in period t for t = 1, 2. As in the main text, we consider the case in
which wealth is stochastic and uncertainty is resolved in the second period.
Consumption in the first period (and thus saving) is determined by maximiz-
ing the expectation of the sum of instantaneous utilities ut in both periods, where
no discounting is assumed, i.e.
U = u1(c1) + E[u2(c2)]. (A.1)
As in the simplified version of the model introduced in the main text, indi-
viduals are assumed to choose their favorite credible consumption plan before
the first period starts (i.e. in period t = 0). Credible means that they anticipate
whether or not they would be able to stick to the plan, and only consider those
plans where they do not see an incentive to deviate from later on.1 Favourite
means that there are possibly several such credible plans, and the decision-maker
1. Details about how these plans are formed are given in Appendix A.1.2 or in Kőszegi and
Rabin (2009).
118 Appendix A. Income Risk, Precautionary Saving, and Loss Aversion
chooses his or her preferred one according to the maximization principle. This
plan is called preferred personal equilibrium (PPE) by Kőszegi and Rabin (2009)
and at the time of planning in period t = 0, it leads to possibly stochastic ‘rational
beliefs’ F0,1 and F0,2 about consumption in period 1 and period 2. Mathemati-
cally, these beliefs are simply probability distributions assigning a probability to
any possible consumption level. Plans about consumption in period t that are
made in the same period (i.e. Ft,t) assign a probability of 1 to the actual con-
sumption level ct. When uncertainty is resolved and consumption decisions are
implemented, plans are updated and lead to new beliefs.
Instantaneous utility in periods t = 1, 2 is given by




where m(·) is consumption utility that is three times differentiable, increasing
and strictly concave and corresponds to a “classical utility function”. The ‘gain-
loss utility’, N(Ft,τ |Ft−1,τ ), reflects utility gains or losses due to changes in current
‘beliefs’ Ft,τ compared to former ‘beliefs’ Ft−1,τ about contemporaneous (τ = t)
and future (τ > t) consumption. Depending on the distance of a period τ ≥ t in
the future, the impact of changes in beliefs about consumption in that period via
the ‘gain-loss utility’ differs, which is reflected by weights γt,τ ≥ 0 with γt,t = 1.
For simplicity, we use the notation γ1,2 = γ. The weight γ1,2 = γ is decisive for an
individual to adhere to her plan, i.e. to resist overconsuming in the first period
relative to the previously set consumption level, as explained below.
‘Gain-loss utility’ N compares every percentile of the distributions of con-
sumption according to ‘beliefs’ Ft,τ and Ft−1,τ , using a “universal gain-loss utility
function” µ. More specifically, for a possibly discrete distribution Fd, cFd(p/100)
is a percentile for 0 ≤ p ≤ 100 with p ∈ N if Fd(cFd(p/100)) ≥ p/100 and
Fd(c) < p/100 for all c < cFd(p/100). Then, gain-loss utility from the change in
beliefs from Ft−1,τ to Ft,τ is defined as
N(Ft,τ |Ft−1,τ ) =
100∑
p=1
µ(cFt,τ (p/100), cFt−1,τ (p/100)),
where
µ(ĉ, c̃) =
η(m(ĉ)−m(c̃)) if ĉ ≥ c̃−λη(m(c̃)−m(ĉ)) if ĉ < c̃.
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for two consumption levels ĉ and c̃, m as defined above and parameters η > 0
and λ > 0.2
The parameter η > 0 simply scales the difference in consumption utility and
λ > 0 may account for loss-averse (λ > 1) or gain-seeking (λ < 1) behavior.
The parameter γ ≥ 0 ‘discounts’ anticipated future gains or losses in ‘gain-
loss’ utility that affect utility already in period 1. For γ > 1/λ, the anticipated
future loss is weighted high enough to prevent the consumer from deviating
from the optimal ex-ante plan, i.e. they resist overconsuming, see Proposition 5 in
Kőszegi and Rabin (2009). When λ > 1, following Kőszegi and Rabin (2009), we
can assume γ < 1. As we allow for gain-seeking behavior, i.e. λ < 1, we leave γ
unrestricted, to allow for γ > 1/λ. Then, the proof of Proposition 8 in Kőszegi
and Rabin (2009) holds for λ < 1, although they do not consider this case.
If the agent resists from deviating from the plan, instantaneous utility in pe-
riod 1 is given by
u1 = m(c1) +N(F1,1|F0,1) + γN(F1,2|F0,2) = m(c1),
as beliefs do not change in the first period (i.e. F0,t = F1,t for t = 1, 2), since in
addition to adherence to the plan, no uncertainty is resolved. In period 2, utility
it is given by
u2 = m(c2) +N(F2,2|F1,2).
With that, the optimization problem can be solved by equalizing the marginal
utility of saving and consumption in the first period.
If the agent cannot resist from deviating from the ex-ante optimal plan, their
PPE specifies a higher consumption level in period 1 compared to the optimal
one, see Proposition 5 in Kőszegi and Rabin (2009).
A.1.2 Rational Beliefs
In this appendix, we explain the intuition behind ‘rational beliefs’. We refer to
Kőszegi and Rabin (2009) for a precise definition.
2. This choice of the “gain-loss utility function” fulfills certain desirable characteristics of a
reference-dependent utility function for λ > 1, see Kőszegi and Rabin (2009, p. 914). In particu-
lar, it fulfills “the explicit or implicit assumptions” about the ‘value function’ by Kahneman and
Tversky (1979) as formulated by Bowman, Minehart, and Rabin (1999).
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‘Beliefs’ are the result of a plan: They “must be rationally based on credi-
ble plans for state-contingent behavior”3. One concept of what a credible plan
could be was termed ‘preferred personal equilibrium (PPE)’ by Kőszegi and Ra-
bin (2009) and was used in their text, although they note that other theories of
forming beliefs could also be combined with their model. Roughly speaking, a
plan is a PPE if it is the preferred “plan among those that are credible”. A plan is
credible if it maximizes the mathematical expectation of the reference-dependent
utility in every period given the beliefs which the plan induced and if continua-
tion plans are consistent. That is: If an individual plans for very low consump-
tion in period 1 in order to save for period 2, but would not make the same choice
if solving the maximization problem in period 1—e.g. because they are present
biased or because they cannot live with such a low level of consumption—this
would not be a credible plan, and it is not a PPE. Using backwards induction,
they would anticipate their behavior in period 1 and consume more in period 1
from the beginning until their entire plan is consistent with solutions evolving
from a similar maximization process in period 1. This PPE reflects the idea that
individuals anticipate the implications of their plans and only make plans they
know they would adhere to.
A.1.3 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. This proof follows the rationale of the proof of Proposition
8 in Kőszegi and Rabin (2009).
We prove that the derivative of the marginal utility of increasing savings with
respect to λ is positive. Equivalent to the argument in the proof of Kőszegi and
Rabin’s Proposition 8, this implies that dc1/dλ < 0 for both γ > 1/λ and γ ≤ 1/λ,
since in the first case, the ex ante optimal plan involves a lower c1 and the person
adheres to this plan. In the latter case, a higher marginal utility in period 2 makes
a lower c1 become consistent. Furthermore, since, for γ ≤ 1/λ, the chosen c1 will
be higher than for γ > 1/λ, see Kőszegi and Rabin (2009), a lower c1 will become
consistent, as the agent adheres to the ex ante optimal plan for a lower γ.
The derivation of marginal utility of increasing savings is due to Kőszegi and
Rabin (2009): Let F be the cumulative distribution function of the (mean-zero)
3. The most simple example of a state-contingent plan could be: “If things go well, I will spent
x$ for consumption in period 1. If things do not work out well, I will only spent y$ in this period”
(where x > y > 0).
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random variable y. The expected utility in period 2 is∫
m(c2 + sy) dF (y) +
∫∫
µ(m(c2 + sy)−m(c2 + sy′)) dF (y′) dF (y)
=
∫





m(c2 + smax{y, y′})−m(c2 + smin{y, y′}) dF (y′) dF (y).
Hence, the derivative of the expected utility in period 2 with respect to c2, i.e. the
marginal utility from increasing savings, is∫






m′(c2 + smin{y, y′})−m′(c2 + smax{y, y′}) dF (y′) dF (y).
Now, unlike in the proof or Proposition 8 in Kőszegi and Rabin (2009), we take





m′(c2 + smin{y, y′})−m′(c2 + smax{y, y′}) dF (y′) dF (y).
This derivative is positive for any strictly concave m, any s > 0, η > 0 and any
non-degenerate random variable y. Thus, the marginal utility from increasing
savings is an increasing function of λ.
Proof of Corollary 1. As in the proof of Proposition 1, the derivative of the marginal





m′(c2 + smin{y, y′})−m′(c2 + smax{y, y′}) dF (y′) dF (y).





|y′ − y| dF (y′) dF (y),
which is positive for any strictly concave consumption utility function m, η > 0
and any non-degenerate random variable y.
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A.2 Data: Details
A.2.1 Parametric Estimation of a Power Utility Function
General Form for Positive Arguments Usually, the power family is defined for
x > 0 by
m(x) =

xb for b > 0
ln(x) for b = 0
−xb for b < 0.
Considering Non-Positive Arguments Since ln(x) is not defined for x < 0, the
case b = 0 must be excluded, if negative arguments are of interest. Furthermore,
b < 0 has to be excluded as well, if the point x = 0 is to be considered.4 Thus,
when allowing for gains and losses, the power family reduces to
m(x) =
−(−x)a for a > 0, x < 0xb for b > 0, x ≥ 0.
Figure A.1(a) illustrates the curvature of the power family for different values
of a and b.
Rescaling Arguments Arguments x of the utility function must be rescaled in
order to lie within the interval [−1, 1] for all the subjects in the study in order to
be able to compare estimated parameters.
Due to the method used, the minimal x-value observed is L1 = −5,000,000.
Thus, for losses, we need a transformation x 7→ − x
L1
, where x ∈ [L1, 0].
For Gains,G0.5 is the maximum x-value for any individual, we therefore trans-
form x 7→ x
G0.5
, where x ∈ [0, G0.5].
Rescaling Outputs By the method chosen, we need to havem(L1) = −1, m(0) =






= −(1)a = −1,
4. Wakker (2008, p.1336) gives a less technical explanation: “With both positive and negative
x present, a negative power a or b generates an infinite distance between gains and losses. Such
a phenomenon is not empirically plausible, so that negative a and b should then not be exptected
to occur.”
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m(x)a = b = 0.5
a = b = 1
a = b = 2
(a) Curvature of the power family for different
values of a and b.






m(x)a = b = 0.5
a = b = 1
a = b = 2
(b) Estimated power utility functions plotted for
different values of a and b.
FIGURE A.1: Illustration of the Power Family Utility Function with
Different Values of a and b







= 1b = 1,
independent of b > 0. Therefore, and also to have estimates comparable for the
negative and the positive domain, we rescale m(x) for x ≥ 0 and set:





for x ≥ 0.
Note that we could also leave the estimation formula untouched and multiply
our outcomes by the factor 2, making them lie within the interval [0, 1] instead of
[0, .5].
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for b > 0, x ≥ 0.
This equation is illustrated in Figure A.1(b).
Curvature In order to classify a utility function as convex or concave based on
the estimated values of the parameters a or b, we can deduct the curvature of the
utility function from Figure A.1 for the given values of a and b. Analytically, for
classifying an individual’s utility function, we calculate the second derivative of


















· b(b− 1) for b > 0, x > 0,
where x = 0 has to be excluded from the domain.
We immediately see that for x > 0,
m′′(x)

< 0 thus m strictly concave if 0 < b < 1
= 0 thus m linear if b = 1
> 0 thus m strictly convex if b > 1,
and for x < 0 we have
m′′(x)

< 0 thus m strictly concave if a > 1
= 0 thus m linear if a = 1
> 0 thus m strictly convex if 0 < a < 1.
A.3 Results: Details
A.3.1 Discussion: Model Choice
In this part, we shortly discuss alternatives to the model chosen and assess their
appropriateness in the setting of Chapter 2
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Usually, OLS regression is a suitable starting point for modelling empirical
relationships. However, a large share of the non-savers with zero COP of savings
could mask relationships observed for the fraction of participants that actually
saves. It seems appropriate to take the large share of the non-savers observed in
our data into account when selecting a suitable model.
A Tobit model is frequently used in similar situations. Here, it is not suitable.
A central assumption of the Tobit model is that the process determining participa-
tion is the same as the process determining the amount of saving. The signs of the
coefficients of the independent variables in Table 2.4 differ in the two equations
where many are significantly different from zero, showing that this assumption
is violated. Second, normality and homoscedasticity of the dependent variable
model is a requisite for using a Tobit model. In contrast to OLS, where depar-
tures from these assumptions still lead to unbiased and consistent estimates, it is
less clear how sensitive the Tobit model is to departures from these assumptions.
The empirical distribution of the outcome variable we observe in our data is dis-
crete. This observed empirical distribution is a rather bad approximation of any
continuous probability distribution, so the assumption of normality is not likely
to hold.
More flexible models for corner solution responses that can model the partici-
pation process and the savings process separately are—in addition to the Hurdle
model applied in this study—so-called inflated models. For example, the Zero-
Inflated Poisson model or the Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial model for the case
of a discrete dependent variable.
Zero-inflated models rely on the assumption that a zero COP value of savings
can be the result of two cases: In the first case, an individual would decide to
save and then chooses a saving amount of zero. In the second case, an individual
would decide not to save at all. We believe that the first case is rather unrealistic,
since we did not ask for changes in savings in a given limited time, but rather
look at the stock of savings. We therefore conclude that these models are not
appropriate in our setting.
It is noteworthy that the excess zeros in the distribution of the outcome vari-
able are not a problem of data observability, where models for censored data or
sample correction models (e.g. the Heckman model) would be adequate. Only
for around 1 percent of the participants is data actually missing, and these cases
were excluded.
When only focusing on the positive amount of savings, no special care is needed
to account for excessive zeros in the distribution of the outcome variable. In such
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cases, a traditional OLS model could be applied, or a log OLS model, if we expect
the relationship to be proportional to the response.
Given the discrete character of the outcome variable, and its heavily non-
symmetric empirical distribution, a model that accounts for this characteristic
should be applied such as the Zero-Truncated Poisson or the Zero-Truncated
Negative Binomial model. The latter is the second part of the two-part model
we apply, the Negative Binomial Hurdle model. Thus, if not accounting for ex-
cess zeroes, we would model conditional savings in the same way that we do in
this study while accounting for a large proportion of non-savers.
A.4 Further Results and Robustness Checks
Figures A.2 and A.3 show conditional marginal effects for the likelihood of saving
and conditional savings with confidence intervals.
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(a) Measure of Income Uncertainty: Regional Unemployment Rate (DANE)
(b) Measure of Income Uncertainty: Regional Unemployment Risk (Survey)
FIGURE A.2: Conditional Marginal Effect of Income Uncertainty on the Pre-
dicted Likelihood to Save (left) and on Predicted Conditional Savings (right) for
Different Degrees of Loss Aversion
Note: Mean values of the covariates used for prediction. Estimates for calculating
the marginal effects result from fitting Model 3; see Table 2.4 for the corresponding
coefficients. Income Uncertainty is expressed in percent and the predicted increase
in conditional savings in 100,000 COP.
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(a) Measure of Income Uncertainty: Regional Unemployment Rate (DANE)
(b) Measure of Income Uncertainty: Regional Unemployment Risk (Survey)
FIGURE A.3: Conditional Marginal Effect of Loss Aversion on the Predicted
Likelihood to Save (left) and on Predicted Conditional Savings (right) for Dif-
ferent Levels of Income Uncertainty
Note: Mean values of the covariates used for prediction. Estimates for calculating
the marginal effects result from fitting Model 3; see Table 2.4 for the corresponding




Appendix: Higher Order Risk: An
Application To Savings of the Poor in
Bogota
B.1 Dynan (1993)
Dynan (1993) assumes a concave utility, which is additive over time and estab-
lishes the following link between expected consumption growth, prudence and






















where Et is the expectation conditional on information available at time t, ci,t rep-
resents consumption, δ is the constant time preference rate, and ri is the house-
hold’s interest rate. ρr = −ci,t(u′′/u′) is the coefficient of relative risk aversion
and ξ = −ci,t(u′′′/u′′) is the coefficient of relative prudence as defined by Kimball
(1990). This equation has been derived using a Taylor series approximation for
u′(ci+1,t) around ci,t:
u′(ci,t+1) ≈ u′(ci,t) + u′′(ci,t)(ci,t+1 − ci,t) +
u′′′(ci,t)
2
(ci,t+1 − ci,t)2. (B.2)
Note that this approximation does not impose any structural constraints on any
of the derivatives. This result is combined with the first order condition Dynan
(1993, Equation 3) resulting from solving the maximization problem as stated in
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Et [u′(ci,t+1)] = u′(ci,t). (B.3)
What is problematic about that approach is that ξ as used in equation (B.1) does
only correspond to Kimball’s definition, when u′′′(ci,t)u′′(ci,t) < 0. Only then, it
can be interpreted as a measure of prudence with respect to a precautionary sav-
ings demand. From the description of the empirical approach applied by Dynan
(1993), it does not seem like this is taken into account. In addition, the estimations
of 1/ρr (the coefficients of (ri − δ)/(1 + ri) and its large standard errors suggest
that the sign of ρr is not necessarily positive.
B.2 Shortcomings of Parametric Utility Functions for
the Study of Higher Order Risk Preferences
Widely used parametric functions are not suited for (empirically) studying higher
order risk preferences, because they are too stylized to possess the flexibility to
combine any shape of the utility function with any shape of the second, third
and higher order derivatives. This is in particular true for utility functions be-
longing to the family of switching sign utilities (i.e. functions where sgn(u(n)) =
− sgn(u(n−1))). According to these functions, a risk-averse individual (negative
second derivative) would always be classified as prudent (positive third deriva-
tive) and temperant (negative fourth derivative), whereas risk-seeking individ-
uals (positive second derivative) would always be classified as imprudent and
intemperant (negative third and positive fourth derivative, respectively).
We illustrate this shortcoming for the power (CRRA) utility family.
Power utility family For x > 0, the family is defined as
u(x) =

xb if b > 0
ln(x) if b = 0
−xb if b < 0.
Note that, if u is an interval scale (meaning u is unique up to unit and level), it
can be multiplied by any positive factor and any constant can be added without
affecting any relevant empirical aspect (Wakker, 2008). This is, in mathematical
terms, a monotonic transformation, that does not affect the maximization process.
In particular, u as defined above is then equivalent to alternative formulations
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1−η if η > 0, η 6= 1
ln(x) if η = 1,
where b = η − 1.
Thus, we analyze the shape of utility and its derivatives according to the













if b = 0
∂
∂x
− bxb−1 = −b(b− 1)xb−2 if b < 0.
Note that as x > 0, the first derivative of u is positive for all b ∈ R. The second
derivative is negative and the utility itself concave for b < 1 and thus, in the
expected utility framework would correspond to a risk averse individual.












if b = 0
∂
∂x
− b(b− 1)xb−2 = −b(b− 1)(b− 2)xb−3 if b < 0.
For b ≤ 0, we see immediately that the third derivative is positive. For 0 < b < 1
and b > 2, we have a positive third derivative. For 1 < b < 2, we have a negative
third derivative.
Thus, only for an b in the interval (1, 2), could the third derivative be negative.
On that interval however, the second derivative is always positive, and thus—
using this utility family—an imprudent individual can never be risk averse. Sim-
ilarly, a risk averse individual can never be imprudent.
Exponential utility family We now turn to the exponential (CARA) utility fam-
ily. Assuming u is unique up to unit and level, the formulation of this family again
does not depend on multiplicative factors or the addition of constants (Wakker,
2008).
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We define the exponential family for x > 0 as:
u(x) =
(1− e−bx)/b if b 6= 0x if b = 0.












0 = 0 if b = 0.
We see that the third derivative can never be negative and thus, assuming this
utility family, we would never classify an individual as imprudent. Further, the
fourth derivative will always have the same sign as the second derivative, and so
we can never classify an individual as intemperant and risk averse relying on the
utility functions of this family.
Expo-Power Family The expo-power family has been proposed by Abdellaoui,
Barrios, and Wakker (2007) and was used e.g. by Holt and Laury (2002). It exhibits
an increasing measure of relative risk aversion in x and a decreasing measure of
absolute risk aversion in x for 0 < b < 1 and x in the interval [0, 1] (resulting from
normalizations of x, see Abdellaoui, Barrios, and Wakker, 2007). On the interval
(0, 1], it is defined by
u(x) =
−e−x
b/b if b 6= 0
−1/x if b = 0.






−xb + b− 1
)
if b 6= 0
∂
∂x
1/x2 = −2/x3 if b = 0.
For b = 0, the second derivative is always negative and the function itself is
concave. For b 6= 0, the sign of the second derivative depends on the sign of
−xb + b − 1. It is negative for b − 1 < xb. As x ∈ (0, 1], this is the case for
b < 1. Contrarily, for b > 2, the above term is always positive and so is the second
derivative, implying a convex utility function.
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Let’s now turn to the third derivative:
u′′′(x) =
 ∂∂xu′′(x) = e−x
b/bxb−3
(
b2 + x2b + 3xb − 3b(xb + 1) + 2
)
if b 6= 0
∂
∂x
u′′(x) = 6/x4 if b = 0.
For b 6= 0, the sign of the third derivative depends on the term b2 + x2b +
3xb − 3b(xb + 1) + 2. Numerically, one finds that this term is uniformly negative
in x ∈ (0, 1] for values of b between roughly 1.27 and 2. That is, for a risk-loving
or a risk-averse individual (i.e. individuals to which a paramter value of r < 1
and r > 2 correspond, respectively) there is at least one point x ∈ (0, 1], for which
the third derivative is positive. Therefore, neither a risk averse nor a risk loving
individual will ever be classified as imprudent according to this utility family.
B.3 Methodology: Details
B.3.1 Derivatives of a B-spline Function
As laid out in De Boor (1987, Ch. 10, Eqs. (12) & (16)), the derivative of a B-spline



























4ajBj(x, p− 1), (B.4)
where h is the knot distance, and 4aj := (aj − aj−1), a0 := 0 and ak+p := 0.
Note that, sticking to the indices, the B-splines Bj(x, p− 1) vanish on the interval














where4maj = 4(4m−1aj) is the m-order difference of the sequence (aj).
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B.3.2 Choice of Penalty: Jointly Smoothing Multiple Derivatives
For their exposition of P-splines, P. H. Eilers and Marx (1996) use an unspecified
order d of penalization. A penalty based on the second derivative was intro-
duced in the smoothing context by Reinsch (1967), mainly “because it leads to a
very simple algorithm”. Probably, a penalty of order 2 is still the most common
penalty used. However, P. H. Eilers and Marx (1996) note that, besides convenient
computation, there is no specific reason for this choice.
Here, we are interested in smoothing the utility function itself, and addition-
ally the third and the fourth derivative of the utility function. In this regard,
P. H. Eilers and Marx (1996) note that the “kth difference penalty is a good dis-
crete approximation to the integrated square of the kth derivative”1. Further, for
a penalty of order d, the fitted curve approaches a polynomial of degree d− 1, as
the penalty increases (P. H. Eilers and Marx, 1996). Lastly, interpolation is affected
by the order of the penalty: With a penalty of order d, interpolation of utility is
of degree 2d − 1. This means that the third derivative of the interpolating curve
has degree 2d− 4 and the fourth derivative has degree 2d− 5 (P. H. C. Eilers and
Marx, 2010).
Considering these aspects suggests using a penalty of order 3 or 4, where the
latter is to be preferred for the limiting behavior of the spline function when the
penalty increases and for the degree of the fourth derivative of the interpola-
tion curve. However, this choice leads to fluctuations in the third derivative not
caused by the data, so additionally introducing a penalty on the third derivative
is necessary.
The objective function then writes
QB(α) = ‖y −Bα‖2 + ω3‖D3α‖2 + ω4‖D4α‖2. (B.6)
Penalization of multiple orders has been applied in other studies, remark-
ably with a focus on the quality of prediction (i.e. interpolation): Marx and Eil-
ers (2002) introduced the use of multiple orders independently, including a ridge
penalty (corresponding to order d = 0) in addition to any penalty order d = 1, 2, 3.
Aldrin (2006) shows in a simulation experiment that the prediction performance
when penalizing both slope (d = 0) and curvature (d = 2) is always at least as
good as penalizing curvature only.
Our goal is to smooth the third and fourth derivative jointly corresponding to
using both penalties of order d = 3 and d = 4. When choosing an optimal parame-
ter with respect to prediction quality, the third order penalty and the fourth order
1. They illustrate this point with a penalty on second order differences.
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penalty are to a high degree exchangeable. As the third order differences of the
B-spline coefficients generally will be much higher than the fourth order differ-
ences, the third order penalty will in general dominate the fourth order penalty,
causing the effect of the latter to vanish and resulting in unnecessary fluctuations
of the fourth derivative. Using a penalty of order d = 4 alone, however, results in
unnecessary fluctuations of the third derivative.
This issue has been dealt with by Eilers and Goeman (2004), who present the
first approach we are aware of to jointly smooth multiple orders d > 0. They
study how signals consisting of largely flat areas combined with a sharp pulse
can be smoothed. This phenomenon resembles to a certain degree the pattern of
a considerable share of our utility functions, where parts of nearly zero marginal
utility follow parts of sharp increases or vice versa. Eilers and Goeman (2004)
use a combination of a first and second order penalty by setting ω2 = νω21 , corre-
sponding to penalty terms of order d = 2 and d = 1, where they found by trial
and error that ν = 1/4 works well.
We consider a couple of hundreds of utility functions, and in this case, visual
inspection is clearly too time consuming. Furthermore, the choice of ν should
be independent of subjective judgment as it could affect the classification and
intensities of risk preferences. Therefore, we develop a data-driven approach.
We propose a solution in which the fourth order penalty ‘drives the shape’ of
the utility function while the third order penalty is limited to avoiding unneces-
sary fluctuations in the third derivative. This is achieved by using one penalty
parameter, appropriately scaled for both orders.
Specifically, we choose the scaling parameter ν such that
ω4‖D4α0‖ ≈ νω4‖D3α0‖,
i.e. such that the penalty terms have approximately equal weight, where we used
ν = 0.001 for a computation of ‖D3α0‖. Then, we set ω3 = νω4/5, to ensure
ω4‖D4α‖ > ω3‖D3α‖.
The choice of ν for a first computation of ‖D3α0‖ practically neglects any third
order penalty and a good fit using solely the fourth order penalty is achieved.
Then, ν is set as a fifth of the ratio of the sum of absolute differences of the fourth
order differences of the B-spline coefficients over the third order differences. The
ratio measures how much stronger a third order penalty will affect the smoothing
process as compared to a fourth order penalty and will in most cases be the max-
imum factor needed to weight both penalties equally. To avoid the third order
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penalty dominating the fourth order penalty, we divide this ratio by five, which
proved to yield the desired behavior.
Thus, we elaborate an approach which is to be preferred when visual inspec-
tion is inappropriate—be it for objectivity reasons or for time constraints imped-
ing the researcher to visually investigate a large amount of individual curves.
B.3.3 Incorporating a Monotonicity Contraint In P-Spline Re-
gression
The rationale of the approach by Bollaerts, Eilers, and Mechelen (2006) to approx-
imately incorporate a monotonicity constraint in P-Spline regression is simple:
Although in P-Spline regression, a penalization term is added to the objective
function, the predicted function is still a B-spline function, and thus, its deriva-
tives are given by equations (B.4) and (3.10). From these formulae, a sufficient
condition for the first derivative to be positive and the utility to be a monotone
increasing function can be easily deduced: Since h, the knot distance, is positive
and B non-negative for all x, p and j, all4aj have to be positive.
Thus, differences of coefficients of the B-splines that are negative have to be
penalized, whereas positive differences do not, which makes the penalty asym-






0, if4aj ≥ 01, otherwise.
The objective function (B.6) now writes
QB(a) = ‖y −Bα‖2 + νω4‖D3α‖2 + ω4‖D4α‖2 + κ‖W 1/2D1α‖2 (B.7)









where y,B,Dd and ω4 are defined as in (B.6) and ν as determined in Section B.3.2.
W andW 1/2 are diagonal matrices with elementsw(α)j and
√
w(α), respectively,
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and the impact of the constraint penalty on the solution is tuned by a sufficiently
high2 (positive) constraint parameter κ.
Bollaerts, Eilers, and Mechelen (2006) show that QB is convex in α and pro-
pose using a Newton-Raphson procedure to find an optimal solution. We follow
this suggestion, stopping the algorithm after 10 iterations, which led to a mono-
tone increasing function in 99.5% of all cases.
B.3.4 Choosing the Degree of Smoothness
P. H. Eilers and Marx (1996) suggest two classical objective and data-driven selec-
tion criteria, AIC and (leave-one-out) cross validation, for the choice of the degree
of smoothness of the P-spline function to be established as tuned by ω in order to
balance between fidelity to the data and smoothness.
Cross validation (CV) is independent of distributional or asymptotic assump-
tions and “should be preferred to any model selection procedure relying on as-
sumptions which are likely to be wrong” (Arlot and Celisse, 2010). In our case, for
the computation of AIC, at least the asymptotic argument that the approximation
of standard errors relies on is unlikely to hold for our moderate number of data
points. We thus apply cross validation as selection criteria for choosing ω4 as in
(B.7). The principle of CV is simple: The model is fit with only a part of the data
and the remainder is used to compute prediction errors. With leave-one-out CV,
for N data-points, the model is fit N times, and each time, one data point is left
out and used for computation of the prediction error. Then, the model—in our
setting the penalty parameter—is chosen that minimizes the average prediction
error over N predictions. For this case, exact formulae for convenient compu-
tation exist without the need to actually fit the model N times (P. H. Eilers and
Marx, 1996; Eilers, Marx, and Durbán, 2015).
In literature, however, it has been noted that leave-one-out CV is not the ideal
choice regarding model choice (see e.g. Kohavi, 1995, and the references therein).
One argument against leave-one-out CV is that the probability of choosing the
model with the best predictive quality does not converge to 1 as the number of
observation increases (Shao, 1993). Further, Eilers, Marx, and Durbán (2015) warn
that leave-one-out CV severly overfits the data in case of correlated observations.
We address this issue with the following strategy: As proposed in literature
for the purpose of model identification (e.g. Shao, 1993; Arlot and Celisse, 2010),
we increase the number of points left out for prediction, which—fortunately,
2. We chose κ = 108, Bollaerts, Eilers, and Mechelen (2006) chose κ = 106 in their application.
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with a maximum of 9 elicited points—is computationally still feasible to do ex-
haustively. More specifically, we perform permuted leave-k-out cross validation













is the number of possibilities to chose k out ofN points for valida-
tion, I(v) is the set containing the vth choice of k points for validation and ŷ−v(xi)
the prediction of yi, obtained by estimating the model using all points but those
in I(v).
Increasing the number of points left out for prediction results in less ‘weight’
for a single point; it can therefore be seen as a mean of error correction, as long
as the remaining points are sufficient to establish a meaningful utility curve. As
pointed out in the main text, reversal rates of one third are common in choice
tasks.3 For this reason, we perform ‘leave-at-least-1/3N -out’ cross validation. In
case the maximum number of utility points was elicited for the individual under
study,4 this choice results in leave-3-out CV. This strategy also accounts for corre-
lated observations (Arlot and Celisse, 2010, Chapter 8.1) possibly resulting from
the chain structure of the experiment.
In addition, we develop and apply a data-driven minimum for the penalty
parameter to rule out overfitting resulting from large distances between utility
points. We compute the number of balls with radius equal to the knot distance
needed to cover the elicited points. For a minimum of two balls, overfitting the
data is impossible and the method has to compromise between data-fidelity and
smoothness. For a maximum of nine balls, however, and for low values of ω4, the
fitted function usually perfectly predicts every data point used for estimation,
and minimizes the prediction error for those points left out for validation. Thus,
according to CV, the minimal ω4 is chosen in those cases—but the fitted function
is considerably overfitting the data. We impede this by setting a higher minimal
penalty parameter in those cases.
Specifically, for individual i, the minimal smoothness parameter is calculated
using the following formula:
ωmin4,i = (bi ∗ (nmax/ni)− 1)2.5 (B.9)
3. See e.g.Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt, and Paraschiv (2007), Fennema and Van Assen (1998), Ab-
dellaoui (2000), and Etchart-Vincent (2004)
4. Note that we excluded the points (0, 0) and (1, 1) for computing the average prediction error.
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where bi is the number of balls with radius equal to the knot-distance needed
to cover all elicited utility points of individual i, nmax is the maximum number
of elicited points possible for all individuals (we have nmax = 9) and ni is the
number of elicited points for individual i.
If the maximum of 9 points are elicited, and all points have a pair-wise dis-
tance above the knot-distance, then the number of balls to cover all points will
be 9, and the minimal value for ω4,i will be roughly 180. This value is still low
enough to allow the fitted function to be a polynomial of degree p > 3 = d − 1,
but in most cases, it is high enough to prevent overfitting. In some cases, the data
is overfit, indicating that the minimal smoothness parameter is chosen conserva-
tively. If all elicited points in (0, 1) lie close together, the minimal smoothness
parameter ω4,i would be 1, i.e. a minimal smoothness parameter that results in
hardly any penalization.
For some individuals, less than 9 utility points were elicited, since due to the
implementation of the protocol followed (Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt, and Paraschiv,
2007), in some choice tasks, one option is stochastically dominated and the result-
ing utility point has to be erased following, (e.g. Bleichrodt and Pinto, 2000). If the
number of elicited utility points is less or equal to the order of penalty, we have
to perform leave-one-out CV according to the formula by P. H. Eilers and Marx
(1996). In those cases, overfitting is only prevented by the increased minimal ω4
in case of sparse information per data knot as expressed by formula (B.9).
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TABLE B.1: Net Savings and Prudence (C&E) Showing Coefficients
on Covariates
Full Sample Risk Averse Risk Loving
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Prudence (C&E) 1.140??? 1.161??? 1.114?? 1.707??? 1.468??? 0.560 0.651
(0.422) (0.422) (0.431) (0.641) (0.559) (0.601) (0.724)
Risk Aversion (A&P) 3.329? 3.291 0.637 6.038
(2.002) (2.134) (3.120) (5.325)
Male -7.647 -9.299 -2.863
(6.847) (8.889) (10.34)
Age 0.101 0.0610 0.426?
(0.152) (0.186) (0.218)
Financial literacy -1.601? 0.390 -3.841??
(0.933) (1.109) (1.702)
BMI -0.161 -0.846 0.783
(0.618) (0.809) (1.000)
Adult HH members -2.588 -5.937? -0.357
(1.868) (3.196) (2.720)
Children HH members 0.192 1.434 0.0408
(2.243) (2.934) (3.564)
Income -0.695 2.053 -2.382
(1.392) (1.909) (2.085)
Impatience 0.0535 0.0442 0.170
(0.169) (0.240) (0.255)
Increase in patience 0.246 0.338 0.196
(0.243) (0.288) (0.396)
Planning horizon ref. ref. ref.
– Next months 9.439? 3.429 16.65?
(5.138) (6.698) (8.949)
– Next year -1.060 2.360 -4.154
(9.930) (15.58) (13.28)
– Next two to five years 13.02? 5.171 31.24??
(6.971) (8.873) (14.90)
– 5 or more years 11.20? 7.431 15.19
(6.667) (11.00) (10.89)
Constant -14.69??? -14.64??? -0.453 -11.78??? 17.46 -17.04??? -44.73
(2.722) (2.705) (22.32) (3.443) (30.90) (4.321) (29.45)
Education No No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 567 567 554 270 267 279 271
Notes: This table reports the results of ordinary least squares regressions
on net savings. Prudence (C&E) is the Crainich-Eckhoud measure of
prudence. Risk Aversion (A&P) is the Arrow-Pratt measure of risk
aversion. The controls are time preferences, gender, age, financial lit-
eracy, body mass index (BMI), household members (adults and chil-
dren), income as measured as the average income per household mem-
ber, planning horizon and education. Income in 100k Colombian pesos.
We account for potential heteroskedasticity by robust standard errors.
Results of t-tests indicated at following significance levels ? p < 0.10;
?? p < 0.05; ??? p < 0.01.
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TABLE B.2: Net Savings and Prudence (C&E & Kimball) Showing
Coefficients on Covariates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Prudence (Kimball) 12.73? 7.236 7.245
(7.428) (4.774) (6.190)
Prudence (C&E) 2.191? 1.096? 1.293
(1.206) (0.619) (0.795)
Risk Aversion (A&P) 12.55 13.47 10.24 10.18









Adult HH members -4.062 -4.327
(4.260) (4.258)






Increase in patience -0.0836 -0.109
(0.219) (0.216)
Planning horizon ref. ref.
– Next months -2.176 -0.177
(15.66) (15.13)
– Next year 32.58 33.40
(20.36) (21.08)
– Next two to five years 10.77 9.571
(17.66) (15.76)
Constant -14.31??? -15.79??? -33.37? -35.49? -37.68 -33.41
(5.178) (5.937) (19.03) (20.54) (42.81) (42.04)
Education No No No No Yes Yes
Observations 120 120 120 120 119 119
Notes: This table reports the results of ordinary least squares regressions
on net savings. The prudence measure by Kimball is only defined for
subjects that are risk averse at all points of evaluation, which reduces
the number of observations to 120. For comparison, columns (2), (4)
and (6) show the results for the C&E measure for the same sample.
The controls are time preferences, gender, age, financial literacy, body
mass index (BMI), household members (adults and children), income
as measured as the average income per household member, planning
horizon and education. Income in 100k Colombian pesos. We account
for potential heteroskedasticity by robust standard errors. Results of
t-tests indicated at following significance levels ? p < 0.10; ?? p < 0.05;
??? p < 0.01.
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TABLE B.3: Net Savings and Prudence (C&E) for Non-zero Net Sav-
ings Showing Coefficients on Covariates
Full Sample Risk Averse Risk Loving
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Prudence (C&E) 2.297??? 2.435??? 2.749??? 2.992?? 2.629??? 1.561 3.565??
(0.861) (0.863) (0.804) (1.168) (0.974) (1.358) (1.712)
Risk Aversion (A&P) 7.030? 10.25?? -0.207 17.00
(4.033) (4.608) (6.468) (11.98)
Male -17.84 -13.73 -13.11
(14.30) (17.98) (23.27)
Age -0.179 -0.660 0.858
(0.380) (0.472) (0.575)
Financial literacy -3.645? 2.987 -7.631??
(2.024) (3.019) (2.963)
BMI 0.379 -0.615 2.338
(1.314) (1.700) (2.451)
Adult HH members -9.435?? -9.395 -9.444
(4.334) (5.929) (7.890)
Children HH members 1.379 4.760 5.386
(4.531) (5.790) (7.426)
Income 0.264 3.970 -1.639
(2.272) (3.577) (3.549)
Impatience -0.0205 -0.360 0.547
(0.358) (0.541) (0.561)
Increase in patience 0.319 0.608 0.329
(0.453) (0.610) (0.748)
Planning horizon ref. ref. ref.
– Next months 14.86 0.637 31.79?
(10.57) (13.85) (18.92)
– Next year -2.107 4.974 -17.91
(17.67) (26.44) (19.41)
– Next two to five years 40.30??? 89.71?? 71.81??
(15.06) (38.82) (34.55)
– 5 or more years 27.02? 35.82
(15.54) (22.27)
Constant -31.94??? -31.54??? -38.58 -23.41??? 51.30 -37.80??? -202.0?
(5.712) (5.586) (67.88) (6.700) (75.05) (9.305) (115.8)
Education No No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 257 257 249 124 124 127 120
Notes: This table reports the results of ordinary least squares regressions
on net savings. The sample is restricted to subjects who have non-
zero net-savings. Prudence (C&E) is the Crainich-Eckhoud measure
of prudence. Risk Aversion (A&P) is the Arrow-Pratt measure of risk
aversion. The controls are time preferences, gender, age, financial lit-
eracy, body mass index (BMI), household members (adults and chil-
dren), income as measured as the average income per household mem-
ber, planning horizon and education. Income in 100k Colombian pesos.
We account for potential heteroskedasticity by robust standard errors.
Results of t-tests indicated at following significance levels ? p < 0.10;
?? p < 0.05; ??? p < 0.01.
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TABLE B.4: Net Savings, Firm Closures and Prudence (C&E & Kim-







(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Income risk -1.746 -1.479 -1.863 -1.399 -4.985 -4.154
(2.354) (2.405) (2.870) (3.031) (6.150) (7.472)
Prudence 1.240??? 1.115?? 2.224??? 2.036??? 18.37? 9.263
(0.461) (0.471) (0.769) (0.739) (9.852) (9.574)
Prudence
× Income risk 1.015?? 1.066?? 0.856 1.037? 9.654 12.99
(0.424) (0.416) (0.600) (0.566) (9.694) (9.948)
Risk Aversion (A&P) 4.644? 2.231 18.98
(2.408) (4.460) (18.73)
Male -10.50 -16.27 10.19
(8.132) (10.95) (13.49)
Age -0.00373 -0.155 -0.269
(0.194) (0.275) (0.468)
Financial literacy -1.469 1.966 3.523
(1.208) (1.465) (3.197)
BMI 0.0508 -1.284 -1.391
(0.721) (1.146) (1.473)
Adult HH members -1.627 -3.763 -1.443
(2.026) (3.145) (3.969)
Children HH members -2.266 -1.202 -2.708
(2.506) (3.452) (5.328)
Income -0.889 3.040 5.866
(1.637) (2.577) (4.058)
Impatience -0.103 -0.127 0.558
(0.181) (0.325) (0.406)
Increase in patience 0.381 0.431 -0.259
(0.297) (0.400) (0.329)
– Next months 9.617 7.929 12.88
(6.426) (9.350) (24.90)
– Next year 1.775 14.00 53.13
(10.76) (17.33) (32.59)
– Next two to five years 14.13 27.74 55.94?
(9.795) (25.44) (29.22)
– 5 or more years 13.87 -6.131
(9.759) (11.93)
Constant -15.33??? -6.033 -12.58??? 20.66 -16.45?? -61.69
(2.995) (29.66) (4.158) (39.63) (6.542) (71.05)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 471 459 218 215 93 92
Notes: This table reports the results of ordinary least squares regressions
on net savings. Prudence is the Crainich-Eckhoud measure of pru-
dence in columns (1) to (4) and the Kimball measure in columns (5)
and (6). Risk Aversion (A&P) is the Arrow-Pratt measure of risk aver-
sion. Income risk is measured as the ratio of closed to existing busi-
nesses in 2013 in the working sector an individual was usually work-
ing in at the time of the survey. Prudence and income risk are centered.
The controls are time preferences, gender, age, financial literacy, body
mass index (BMI), household members (adults and children), income
as measured as the average income per household member, planning
horizon and education. Income in 100k Colombian pesos. We account
for potential heteroskedasticity by robust standard errors. Results of
t-tests indicated at following significance levels ? p < 0.10; ?? p < 0.05;
??? p < 0.01.
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TABLE B.5: Net Savings, Firm Closures and Prudence (C&E) Show-
ing Coefficients on Covariates
Full Sample Risk Averse Risk Loving
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Income risk -1.746 -1.479 -1.863 -1.399 0.768 2.146
(2.354) (2.405) (2.870) (3.031) (3.293) (3.412)
Prudence (C&E) 1.240??? 1.115?? 2.224??? 2.036??? 0.298 0.199
(0.461) (0.471) (0.769) (0.739) (0.613) (0.660)
Prudence (C&E)
× Income risk 1.015?? 1.066?? 0.856 1.037? 0.984? 0.925
(0.424) (0.416) (0.600) (0.566) (0.588) (0.566)
Risk Aversion (A&P) 4.644? 2.231 9.500?
(2.408) (4.460) (5.666)
Male -10.50 -16.27 -4.157
(8.132) (10.95) (12.26)
Age -0.00373 -0.155 0.391
(0.194) (0.275) (0.244)
Financial literacy -1.469 1.966 -4.361??
(1.208) (1.465) (2.085)
BMI 0.0508 -1.284 1.928?
(0.721) (1.146) (0.994)
Adult HH members -1.627 -3.763 0.386
(2.026) (3.145) (3.102)
Children HH members -2.266 -1.202 -3.604
(2.506) (3.452) (3.174)
Income -0.889 3.040 -3.419
(1.637) (2.577) (2.248)
Impatience -0.103 -0.127 0.0365
(0.181) (0.325) (0.237)
Increase in patience 0.381 0.431 0.270
(0.297) (0.400) (0.437)
Planning horizon ref. ref. ref.
– Next months 9.617 7.929 12.01
(6.426) (9.350) (9.271)
– Next year 1.775 14.00 -12.33
(10.76) (17.33) (14.24)
– Next two to five years 14.13 27.74 33.20?
(9.795) (25.44) (18.35)
– 5 or more years 13.87 -6.131 19.77
(9.759) (11.93) (15.42)
Constant -15.33??? -6.033 -12.58??? 20.66 -17.37??? -53.10
(2.995) (29.66) (4.158) (39.63) (4.519) (33.94)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 471 459 218 215 237 230
Notes: This table reports the results of ordinary least squares regressions
on net savings. The sample is restricted to subjects who have non-zero
net-savings. Prudence (C&E) is the Crainich-Eckhoud measure of pru-
dence. Risk Aversion (A&P) is the Arrow-Pratt measure of risk aver-
sion. Income risk is measured as the ratio of closed to existing busi-
nesses in 2013 in the working sector an individual was usually work-
ing in at the time of the survey. Prudence and income risk are centered.
The controls are time preferences, gender, age, financial literacy, body
mass index (BMI), household members (adults and children), income
as measured as the average income per household member, planning
horizon and education. Income in 100k Colombian pesos. We account
for potential heteroskedasticity by robust standard errors. Results of
t-tests indicated at following significance levels ? p < 0.10; ?? p < 0.05;
??? p < 0.01.
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TABLE B.6: Net Savings, Firm Closures and Prudence (C&E) for
Non-zero Net Savings Showing Coefficients on Covariates
Full Sample Risk Averse Risk Loving
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Income risk -0.959 -0.760 -0.562 0.374 3.103 -0.0879
(3.959) (4.329) (4.299) (6.526) (5.844) (6.291)
Prudence (C&E) 2.247?? 2.484??? 3.628??? 3.478??? 0.856 2.309?
(0.871) (0.785) (1.289) (1.302) (1.302) (1.327)
Prudence (C&E)
× Income risk 1.551?? 1.841??? 1.433 1.702 1.574 2.398??
(0.683) (0.684) (0.935) (1.080) (0.988) (1.154)
Risk Aversion (A&P) 11.43?? 1.979 11.00
(4.615) (7.762) (10.39)
Male -25.27 -28.75 -19.87
(15.93) (21.98) (26.13)
Age -0.116 -0.631 0.913
(0.436) (0.653) (0.698)
Financial literacy -2.727 5.485 -7.977??
(2.272) (3.483) (3.374)
BMI 0.908 -0.860 4.629??
(1.383) (1.784) (2.314)
Adult HH members -9.051? -5.144 -7.627
(5.125) (7.019) (10.06)
Children HH members -1.777 -0.121 2.373
(4.964) (6.405) (6.734)
Income -0.724 2.981 -2.307
(2.578) (4.009) (3.928)
Impatience -0.335 -1.074 0.229
(0.373) (0.687) (0.509)
Increase in patience 0.697 0.880 0.801
(0.523) (0.700) (0.810)
Planning horizon ref. ref. ref.
– Next months 9.929 2.249 27.81
(13.33) (17.55) (21.05)
– Next year 0.588 12.86 -27.17
(17.11) (28.80) (24.58)
– Next two to five years 46.50?? 126.6?? 83.38?
(21.63) (51.44) (45.08)
– 5 or more years 33.90? 40.41
(18.62) (25.39)
Constant -30.33??? -56.16 -20.82??? 54.77 -36.02??? -252.6??
(5.829) (80.54) (7.246) (96.24) (9.216) (117.6)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 231 223 111 111 114 107
Notes: This table reports the results of ordinary least squares regressions
on net savings. The sample is restricted to subjects who have non-zero
net-savings. Prudence (C&E) is the Crainich-Eckhoud measure of pru-
dence. Risk Aversion (A&P) is the Arrow-Pratt measure of risk aver-
sion. Income risk is measured as the ratio of closed to existing busi-
nesses in 2013 in the working sector an individual was usually work-
ing in at the time of the survey. Prudence and income risk are centered.
The controls are time preferences, gender, age, financial literacy, body
mass index (BMI), household members (adults and children), income
as measured as the average income per household member, planning
horizon and education. Income in 100k Colombian pesos. We account
for potential heteroskedasticity by robust standard errors. Results of
t-tests indicated at following significance levels ? p < 0.10; ?? p < 0.05;
??? p < 0.01.
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Chapter C
Appendix: The Min MSE Treatment
Assignment Method
C.1 Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1. Similar to the definition of Xt, define the subvector of the k-th
potential outcome Y p,k{i:Di=t},t := (Y
p,k
i1,t
, Y p,ki2,t , . . . , Y
p,k
int ,t
)> and the respective subvec-
tor of error terms εp,k{i:Di=t},t := (ε
p,k
i1,t
, εp,ki2,t, . . . , ε
p,k
int ,t
)>, where again {i1, i2, . . . , int} =
{i : Di = t}. That is, using observed information, (4.2) for all t and k in ma-






{i:Di=t},t. For this linear model, it is
well-known that for all t = 0, 1, . . . , nd and k = 1, . . . , ny,
β̂p,kt − β
p,k
t ∼ N (0, σ2t,k(XtXt>)−1).
Using this result, the squared error of the estimator of the treatment effect for
treatment t and outcome k becomes
E
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where we used independence of the error terms εp,ki,t and ε
p,k
i,0 .
Now denote the l1 norm of a vector with ‖ · ‖1=
∑
| · | and summarize weights






t st,k. Then, apply-
ing the just derived result to the objective function, the generalized MSE (4.1),
completes the proof:






































where ∝ denotes equality up to multiplicative constants.
Proof of Proposition 4. According to Cramer’s rule, the inverse of the p × p matrix





whereAji is the (p−1)× (p−1) matrix resulting from deleting row j and column
i.
Assume nd = 1 and consider the first summand of (4.3) with a realization of
the sample, i.e., x̄>(XX>)
−1
x̄, where, for notational simplicity, we omit group
indicators and x̄ is the vector containing the mean values of the covariates. Sup-
pose the pth covariate vector x>p is multiplied with some scalar c 6= 0 and de-
note the product with w>p . The covariate matrix changes accordingly from X to
W = diag(1, 1, . . . , c)X . Thus, det(WW>) = c2 det(XX>).
Now consider the denominator of (C.1) for the possible combinations of i and
j and denote M = XX>, N = WW>, and Mij , Nij the matrices resulting
from deleting row i and column j of the matrices M and N , respectively. Since
det(Nji) = c
2 det(Mji) for i 6= p and j 6= p, (M−1)ij = (N−1)ij in those cases. If
C.1. Proofs 149
either j = p or i = p, we have det(Nji) = c det(Mji), thus (N−1)ij = 1/c(M−1)ij .
Finally, for i = p and j = p, asNpp = Mpp, we have (N−1)ij = 1/c2(M−1)ij .




>M−1x̄ applies to both sum-
mands of (4.3), also for nd > 1, which completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 5. For N → ∞, σ2t,k
(
XtXt
>)−1, the sample covariance matrix
of β̂p,kt , converges to the population covariance matrix for any t = 0, 1, . . . , nd and
any k = 1, . . . , ny. The elements of the inverse of the population covariance matrix
are given by σ−2t,kE[Xg,iXj,i] for all g, j = 1, . . . ,m. As E[Xg,iXj,i] = 0 for g 6= j,




>)−1 for t = 0, 1, . . . , nt in (4.3) converges to a diagonal matrix with
elements E[X2j,i]−1, j = 1, . . . ,m for N → ∞. Since 1N
∑
iXi is independent of









is minimized. Noting that (4.4) converges to this sum as N → ∞ completes the
proof.
Proof of Proposition 6. It is known that the diagonal elements of the covariance ma-
trix of the estimator for the parameter vector in linear regression models such as







for j = 1, . . . ,m, with notations as in Proposition 6 (see e.g. Wooldridge, 2013).
As in the proof of Theorem 1, the covariance matrix of β̂p,kt − β̂
p,k
0 for any
t = 1, . . . , nd and any k = 1, . . . , ny is given by(
XtXt
>)−1 + (X0X0>)−1 ,
the claim follows, noting that we assume equal variances in Corollary 3.
Proof of Theorem 2. We use mi,j = mj,i = 1 to indicate individual i is matched





jmi,j = N , assuming the sample consists of N individuals. Usually,




jmi,j(yi − yj)2 through the choice of
mi,j , although sometimes the absolute difference is also used (Rubin, 1973). For
being a special case of the squared Mahalanobis distance, we prefer the squared
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We now show that elements of this set maximize the minimal sum of the vari-




y2i − ȳ20 + (N/2)−1
∑
{j:Dj=1}
y2j − ȳ21 = (N/2)−1 =
∑
i
y2i − ȳ20 − ȳ21.
(C.2)
























The first summand is independent of group or treatment assignment. We rewrite












































where we have split the cross product between group observations into those
that are matched and those that are unmatched. The first two parts are again
independent of group or treatment assignment, and so is the third for a fixed
m. Thus, by matching we have maximized the sum of group variances across
feasible treatment assignments. In other words, the sum of group variances re-
sulting from the worst treatment assignment in this aspect from the set of possi-





jmi,jxixj} is still maximized over m.
C.2 Additional Results
C.2. Additional Results 151
TABLE C.1: Comparison of Treatment Assignment Methods Regarding Balance in
a Group of Baseline Variables (N=100)


















Indonesia -0.056 -0.634 0.044 -0.151 0.111 0.892
Pakistan (height scores) 1.508 -0.667 -0.098 -0.105 0.578 0.263
Pakistan (test scores) 0.383 2.001 -0.330 -0.334 0.315 -0.112
Mexico -0.383 -0.492 -0.097 0.074 0.565 -1.546
Sri Lanka -0.633 0.632 0.708 -0.294 0.219 0.106


















Indonesia 159.2 95.6 62.6 37.8 121.5 121.8
Pakistan (height scores) 159.7 85.7 52.3 65.4 116.8 95.2
Pakistan (test scores) 160.1 137.4 67.2 51.4 123.5 122.0
Mexico 159.2 118.0 56.5 44.3 134.6 124.4
Sri Lanka 159.1 128.5 75.7 46.1 126.2 120.6
Total 159.4 113.0 62.9 49.0 124.5 116.8


















Indonesia 409.8 263.9 199.7 260.9 390.3 397.5
Pakistan (height scores) 426.6 350.3 193.6 219.8 403.4 398.6
Pakistan (test scores) 394.7 438.6 218.4 276.4 394.7 407.8
Mexico 445.2 372.8 196.0 140.2 399.9 372.8
Sri Lanka 399.3 453.7 319.4 131.3 401.2 380.0
Total 415.1 375.8 225.4 205.7 397.9 391.3
Note: Statistics based on 10,000 iterations. Details on the study and the computation of
each measures are explained in section 4.5.2. For every dataset, several variables were
considered for treatment assignment. The results in this table report aggregate measures
of differences in treatment group means for the group of considered variables. Lower
values indicate a better balance with respect to equality of group means.
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Note: Distributions of the (mean) differences in the group means of the respective group of
variables are based on 10,000 treatment assignments, where the difference in one draw is
the average of the distances in group means of all variables included in the assignment
of treatments. Group means are expressed in standard deviations. A high mass around
a difference of 0 indicates a good balance with respect to equality of the group means.
FIGURE C.1: Distributions of the Mean Differences in Group Means (N=30)
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We present the results for the scenario considered in BK09, when focusing
on one of the up to seven considered variables for treatment assignment. For
two datasets, groups of variables—referred to as “unobservables”—are available,
but not considered during treatment assignment. Balance on these variables is
reported ‘group-wise’ (see Section 4.5.2).
Figures C.2 and C.3 show the distribution of the differences in group means
for the indicated variables, which are the baseline and follow-up variable of in-
terest, for the five datasets considered with sample sizes 30 and 100. Tables C.2
and C.3 consist of three panels: The upper panel shows the average difference in
group means, the middle panel shows the 95% quantile of this difference and the
lower panel shows the proportion of draws, in which the p-value of a t-test of the
differences in group means was lower than 0.1.
For the single random draw method as well as the stratification methods, re-
sults are identical to those in BK09. Differences in the pairwise greedy matching
approach are probably due to the order in which we run the scripts. However,
the essential part of the do-file for performing the greedy matching is the same as
the one provided by BK09.
The newly introduced methods—the optimal matching approach and the min
MSE procedure—perform comparable to the others and the conclusion here is the
same as in BK09, namely that “on average all methods lead to balance”.
In terms of average balance in baseline variables, we conclude that the min
MSE procedure outperforms the other methods: For four of the five baseline vari-
ables and all unobservables, an average difference of zero to the third digit was
achieved.
With respect to the whole distribution, as shown in Figures C.2 and C.3, the
min MSE procedure shows the most favorable distribution with the highest mass
at 0 and thinnest tails in half of the cases considered. Stratification seems to be
superior in one dataset, where household expenditure is studied, whereas pair-
wise greedy matching dominates the competing mechanisms in achieving bal-
ance with the height z-score data. These findings are numerically underlined not
only by the group means as discussed above, but also by the 95% quantile of the
differences in group means as shown in the middle panel of Table C.3, although
in this panel, no mechanism clearly shows more favorable figures than another.
Consistent with the findings of BK09, we also note that with increasing sam-
ple size, balance improves. This can be seen in Figures C.2 and C.3, where the
distributions of group means for the bigger sample sizes are mostly nearly half
as wide as the distributions on the left.
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With respect to the balance observed in follow-up variables, we find, and con-
sistent with BK09, no major differences; especially for the cases in which baseline
variables explained little of the variation in follow-up outcomes (Microenterprise
profits in Sri Lanka and Indonesian expenditure figures). For the bigger sample
size, there is hardly any difference between the covariate based treatment assign-
ment mechanisms.
Summing up, in most comparisons, either one of the matching methods or the
min MSE procedure dominates the competing mechanisms. All methods achieve
balance, on average, and all decrease extreme imbalances considerably in com-
parison with a single random draw. However, we think results that consider the
overall balance of all variables considered in treatment assignment are more in-
formative. These results are discussed in the main text, see Section 4.6.1, Tables
4.1 and C.1 and Figures 4.1 and C.1.
TABLE C.2: Comparison of Treatment Assignment Methods Regarding Balance in
the Baseline Outcome (N=30)



















(Sri Lanka) -4.214 -0.636 4.004 -1.302 -5.657 0.239
Household expenditure
(Indonesia) -2.094 -2.908 2.218 -2.794 0.644 2.739
Labor income (Mexico) 2.627 1.375 -1.346 -1.062 -0.774 -0.195
Height z-score(Pakistan) -2.502 0.670 -3.486 0.034 -0.506 -0.228
Math test score
(Pakistan) -1.741 -0.632 -2.306 -0.301 -1.464 -1.571
Baseline unobservables
(Sri Lanka) -0.641 -0.331 0.837 0.896 -1.192 1.144
Baseline unobservables
(Mexico) -0.112 -0.130 -0.066 -0.390 -0.114 -0.673



















(Sri Lanka) 705.6 598.0 415.9 227.6 415.9 538.0
Household expenditure
(Indonesia) 716.2 458.1 478.0 643.4 346.9 500.9
Labor income (Mexico) 690.8 176.5 223.7 228.1 409.1 581.8
Height z-score(Pakistan) 710.1 257.9 467.3 393.8 444.8 445.6
Math test score
(Pakistan) 712.8 256.8 362.6 161.2 408.8 586.3
Baseline unobservables
(Sri Lanka) 802.8 879.4 879.4 889.3 824.4 804.6
Baseline unobservables
(Mexico) 834.3 834.3 879.4 834.3 771.3 774.9



















(Sri Lanka) 0.097 0.049 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.021
Household expenditure
(Indonesia) 0.100 0.005 0.011 0.089 0.000 0.012
Labor income (Mexico) 0.099 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.037
Height z-score(Pakistan) 0.102 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.005 0.005
Math test score
(Pakistan) 0.103 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.041
Baseline unobservables
(Sri Lanka) 0.090 0.088 0.068 0.079 0.094 0.094
Baseline unobservables
(Mexico) 0.088 0.077 0.083 0.079 0.077 0.079
Note: Statistics based on 10,000 iterations. Details on the study and the computation of
each measures are explained in section 4.5.2. For every dataset, several variables were
considered for treatment assignment. The results in this table consider the differences in
treatment group means for a single variable of the group of considered variables. Lower
values indicate a better balance with respect to equality of group means.
TABLE C.3: Comparison of Treatment Assignment Methods Regarding Balance in
the Baseline Outcome (N=100)



















(Sri Lanka) 1.388 0.590 0.655 -0.638 -0.053 -0.777
Household expenditure
(Indonesia) -2.223 -1.665 -0.153 0.409 0.810 -0.679
Labor income (Mexico) -0.428 -0.493 -1.051 -0.002 0.024 -0.295
Height z-score(Pakistan) 1.336 0.025 0.413 0.287 0.832 0.117
Math test score
(Pakistan) 2.946 -0.260 -1.419 -0.288 -0.116 -0.555
Baseline unobservables
(Sri Lanka) -0.205 -0.593 1.102 -0.447 0.305 0.031
Baseline unobservables
(Mexico) 0.135 -0.087 -0.113 -0.062 0.250 -0.218



















(Sri Lanka) 386.3 314.6 183.0 119.3 195.5 240.7
Household expenditure
(Indonesia) 390.2 263.9 198.5 260.9 145.0 191.0
Labor income (Mexico) 383.9 99.5 153.8 100.1 280.2 304.0
Height z-score(Pakistan) 394.9 102.7 189.9 185.2 160.1 206.0
Math test score
(Pakistan) 392.2 74.5 184.5 106.5 163.6 237.3
Baseline unobservables
(Sri Lanka) 434.2 434.2 434.2 434.2 417.0 414.2
Baseline unobservables
(Mexico) 456.5 456.5 456.5 456.5 447.6 439.0



















(Sri Lanka) 0.097 0.039 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.005
Household expenditure
(Indonesia) 0.102 0.010 0.001 0.013 0.000 0.000
Labor income (Mexico) 0.100 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.015 0.029
Height z-score(Pakistan) 0.100 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001
Math test score
(Pakistan) 0.100 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.006
Baseline unobservables
(Sri Lanka) 0.101 0.083 0.097 0.091 0.096 0.095
Baseline unobservables
(Mexico) 0.108 0.104 0.091 0.089 0.095 0.093
Note: Statistics based on 10,000 iterations. Details on the study and the computation of
each measures are explained in section 4.5.2. For every dataset, several variables were
considered for treatment assignment. The results in this table consider the differences in
treatment group means for a single variable of the group of considered variables. Lower








































−.75 −.5 −.25 0 .25 .5 .75
Sample size 100





































−.75 −.5 −.25 0 .25 .5 .75
Sample size 100











































−.75 −.5 −.25 0 .25 .5 .75
Sample size 100






1 Draw 8 Strata Matched Opt. Matched minMSE
Note: Panel A, B and C show the distributions of the differences in treatment group means
of the indicated variable for 10,000 treatment assignments, expressed in standard devia-
tions. The higher the mass around a difference of 0, the better the treatment assignment
with respect to balancing group means. Baseline variable is the outcome of interest; one
of up to six variables used for treatment assignment. Follow-up variable is the same
variable, measured six months after the baseline variable was collected; note that it is
not included in treatment assignment.
FIGURE C.2: Distributions of the Differences in Group Means Between the Treat-
ment and the Control Group in the Baseline Variable and the Follow-up Variable
(N=30)
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Note: Panel D and E show the distributions of the differences in treatment group means
in standard deviations of the indicated variable for 10,000 treatment assignments. The
higher the mass around a difference of 0, the better the treatment assignment with re-
spect to balancing group means. Baseline variable is the outcome of interest; one of up
to six variables used for treatment assignment. Follow-up variable is the same variable,
measured six months after the baseline variable was collected; note that it is not included
in treatment assignment.
FIGURE C.3: Distributions of the Differences in Group Means Between the Treat-
ment and the Control Group in the Baseline Variable and the Follow-up Variable
(N=30)
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Note: Distributions of the (mean) differences in treatment group means among the group
of variables to consider for treatment assignment are based on 10,000 treatment as-
signments. Differences in group means are expressed in standard deviations. A high
mass around a difference of 0 indicates a good balance with respect to equality of group
means.
FIGURE C.4: Distributions of the Mean Differences in Group Means (N=100)
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min MSE Greedy Matching Opt. Matching
48 Strata 1 Draw
Note: Distributions of the (maximal) differences in treatment group means among the
group of variables to consider for treatment assignment are based on 10,000 treatment
assignments. Differences in group means are expressed in standard deviations. A high
mass around a difference of 0 indicates a good balance with respect to equality of group
means.
FIGURE C.5: Distributions of the Maximal Difference in Group Means (N=100)
TABLE C.4: Comparison of Treatment Assignment Methods Regarding Balance in
Baseline Variables in Case of Attrition (Assessing Balance Using T-tests, N=30)


















No attrition 0.1131 0.0652 0.0045 0.0058 0.0678 0.0562
1 (2) unit removed 0.1123 0.0597 0.0047 0.0061 0.0665 0.0545
3 (6) units removed 0.0909 0.0642 0.0035 0.0069 0.0640 0.0571
5 (10) units removed 0.0926 0.0671 0.0048 0.0089 0.0635 0.0580
7 (14) units removed 0.0918 0.0686 0.0051 0.0131 0.0644 0.0606
Total 0.1001 0.0650 0.0045 0.0082 0.0652 0.0573
Note: Statistics based on 10,000 iterations. The smaller the proportion of p-values < .1,
the better the balance with respect to similar group means. Details on the study and the
computation of each measure are explained in section 4.5.2.

















































































































−1 −.5 0 .5 1
min MSE Greedy Matching Opt. Matching
48 Strata 1 Draw
Note: Attrition. Evolution of the largest 95% quantile of differences in group means be-
tween treatment groups among the group of variables to consider for treatment assign-
ment. X-axis: Number of units that are randomly removed from the study. Distributions
are based on 10,000 treatment assignments. Differences in group means are expressed
in standard deviations. A lower (maximal) 95% quantile of differences in group means
indicates a better balance with respect to equality of group means.
FIGURE C.6: Simulated Attrition: Evolution of the Largest 95% Quantile of the Dif-
ferences in Group Means Among The Group of Baseline Variables, N=30
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